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Chapter 1
Introduction
Tax non-compliance1 is a significant problem in most countries across the world. For
example, the Internal Revenue Service estimated the tax gap – i.e., the difference between
taxes owed and taxes paid in a fiscal year – in the United States in 2006 to be around
450 billion US Dollars which is roughly 17% of all true tax liabilities (IRS 2012). For
the UK, the government agency HM Revenue & Customs reports that the 2010/2011
tax gap is 32 billion Pounds (about 54 billion US Dollars) which corresponds to 6.7% of
all tax liabilities (HMRC 2012). The Swedish National Tax Agency published tax gap
estimates in the range of 10% of tax liabilities in 2008 (SNTA 2008) and Kleven et al.
(2011) report that the overall share of taxpayers who underreport a positive amount of
income was 10.7% in Denmark in 2007/08. Tax non-compliance is suggested to be an
even more severe problem in developing and transitional countries. Schneider and Enste
(2000), for example, estimate the average size of the shadow economy to be 23% of GDP
in transition countries and 39% in developing countries. Anecdotal evidence additionally
suggests that tax evasion has always existed and is as old as taxes themselves (Slemrod
2007).
While it is in the nature of tax non-compliance that its magnitude is difficult to
measure, all attempts of quantification point in the direction that governments in almost
all countries are forced to renounce significant amounts of tax revenue. This restricts
public spending and possibly also leads to altered market outcomes and economic dis-
tortions (Andreoni et al. 1998; Pomeranz 2013). Given the prevalence of evasion, it is
no surprise that a large academic literature has explored various aspects of evasion (see
below for a broad literature review). This literature can be broadly separated into three
strands (Andreoni et al. 1998; Slemrod and Weber 2012; Alm 2012): The first strand
of literature aims to quantify the extent of non-compliance on an aggregate level. The
1Following Slemrod and Weber (2012), the term tax non-compliance refers to tax evasion and the
shadow economy. While the shadow economy and tax evasion are two distinct concepts, they are clearly
related and the size of the shadow economy is sometimes even used as a proxy for the amount of tax
evasion (Alm 2012). Tax non-compliance entails illegal activities and does not cover legal tax avoidance.
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second strand looks at the determinants of (non-)compliance while the third explores the
consequences of non-compliance and its effects on market outcomes.
1.1 Research questions and agenda
Despite the large and growing literature on tax evasion, there remain important unan-
swered questions in each strand. This dissertation consists of four self-contained papers
that aim to fill some of this gap, particularly in the second and third strands of the
literature.2 The research questions and methods in each chapter are briefly described in
the following.3
This Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research papers included in the dis-
sertation and broadly places the papers in the large literature on tax compliance. Given
the inherent difficulty of measuring non-compliance, Chapter 1 particularly aims to give
an overview of empirical methods and discusses the empirical approaches that are used
in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 is placed in the large literature on the determinants of tax compliance
and particularly contributes to a better understanding of the non-pecuniary motives for
tax compliance, which are the least well understood of all determinants (Dwenger et al.
2014). The Chapter poses the question of whether the usage of tax revenues affects
compliance behavior. The empirical tool is a laboratory compliance experiment in which
subjects are randomly assigned to four different treatment groups that differ only in how
the generated tax revenue is spent.
The remaining chapters study how tax non-compliance affects market outcomes and
tax policy. Chapter 3 examines the question of whether the canonical textbook laws
of tax incidence hold in the presence of evasion opportunities. To explore the effect of
evasion opportunities on tax incidence, a laboratory experiment is conducted in which
subjects trade fictitious goods in competitive double auction markets. The impact of
evasion on tax incidence is identified by comparing the equilibrium prices in groups with
and without evasion opportunities.
Heterogeneity in evasion behavior may also affect other behavioral responses to tax-
ation. In this context, Chapter 4 examines the extent to which labor supply elasticities
with respect to tax rates depend on evasion opportunities. A laboratory experiment is
employed in which the labor supply response to taxes is compared between groups with
and without access to evasion.
Whereas Chapters 3 and 4 show that tax evasion may impact responses to tax
2The question of how tax evasion can be measured is not at the center of this dissertation, and is
discussed only briefly below. See Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod and Weber (2012) and Alm (2012) for
more detailed overviews of different methods.
3See Section 1.3 for a more detailed description as well as the findings.
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reforms, Chapter 5 asks whether tax policy is affected by heterogeneity in access to
evasion and intentions to be compliant. More specifically, this chapter examines the
relationship between ’tax morale’ – defined as the intrinsic motivation to comply – and
tax policy. The chapter uses a unique observational data set and employs an instrumental
variable strategy to address endogeneity concerns.
1.2 Literature review and discussion of methods
In this section, I present an overview of the literature on tax non-compliance and show
how the research questions posed in my dissertation fit into the literature. Since it is in the
very nature of tax non-compliance that it is illusive and difficult to observe empirically,
I particularly survey the literature with respect to empirical data and methods, and
critically discuss the empirical tools that are used in my dissertation. I also provide a
brief overview of the main findings that have been presented in this extensive evasion
literature.4
1.2.1 Theoretical literature
The large literature mainly emerges from theoretical work by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) which is in the spirit of Becker’s (1968) economics-of-crime approach. Allingham
and Sandmo’s (A-S) seminal contribution models compliance decisions as risky gambles
with fully rational taxpayers who maximize after-tax incomes in the presence of exoge-
nous and random audit probabilities and penalties. The model predicts that higher
penalties and audit probabilities improve compliance, whereas the effect of higher tax
rates is ambiguous. Several theoretical studies extend this stylized model to clarify the
effects of various parameters on evasion and improve its realism. For example, Yitzhaki
(1974) shows that the structure of the penalty affects how the tax rate affects compli-
ance. Pencavel (1979) and Sandmo (1981) incorporate endogenous labor supply in the
A-S framework and show that the effect of all enforcement variables becomes ambigu-
ous. An important extension of the A-S approach is to account for interactions between
tax authorities and taxpayers, which eventually result in endogenous audit probabilities
(Andreoni et al. 1998).
Kleven et al. (2011) also allow for endogenous audit probabilities. Their model
accounts for the fact that the risk of being detected critically depends on the type of
income source: whereas workers with self-reported income (usually the self-employed)
have low propensities to be audited, workers in industries with third-party reporting face
4This section shows how the research questions posed in this dissertation generally fit into the devel-
opment of the evasion literature. The single chapters contain literature reviews that are more specific to
the respective chapter.
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an audit probability near one and are therefore predicted to evade very little. Chapters 3
to 5 are partly motivated by this type of theory and show empirically how heterogeneity
in evasion access and compliance behavior affects market outcomes. While the literature
usually acknowledges that non-pecuniary motives – which are relevant in Chapters 2
and 5 of this dissertation – also matter for compliance decisions, theoretical literature
incorporating these motives is rare. An exception is Traxler (2010) who adds social
norms to the A-S framework. Chapter 5 of this dissertation contributes to the theoretical
literature in this regard as it is among the first papers to incorporate intrinsic motivations
to pay taxes – tax morale – into a ’standard’ optimal taxation framework.5
1.2.2 Empirical literature
The theoretical literature discussed above is the basis for a large empirical literature
examining where and why theory fails to explain real-world compliance behavior and
studying various possible determinants of non-compliance. Given the inherent difficulty
of measuring non-compliance, a variety of data sources and methods are used for em-
pirical analyses. Because this dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on tax
compliance, I briefly describe and critically discuss the most commons sources of evidence
and methods in the following. The methods used in the literature are usually based on
either i) observational or ii) experimental data, and both are employed in my disserta-
tion. The discussion of methods and data motivates the use of and gives special emphasis
to survey data and laboratory experiments as these are the main data/methods used in
the dissertation. After the review of empirical data and methods, I briefly summarize
the findings of the empirical literature with respect to the two strands of literature that
I mainly relate to in my dissertation: determinants of tax compliance and the effects of
non-compliance on market outcomes.6
Methods based on observational data
Macro-based indicators A widely used approach to explore the aggregate magnitude
of non-compliance and its correlates uses macro-based indicators. For example, several
studies predict how indicators of true economic activity such as electricity demand (e.g.,
Kaufmann and Kaliberda 1996, Johnson et al. 1997 and Duncan and Sabirianova-Peter
2014) or money circulation (e.g., Tanzi 1983 and Feige 1990) translate to true economic
outcome or income. These predictions are then compared to official output/income statis-
tics and the gap is interpreted as an estimate of the shadow economy. The underlying as-
5See Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Sandmo (2005) for more thorough
overviews of the theoretical compliance literature.
6The following section is partly based on Schneider and Enste (2000), Slemrod and Weber (2012) and
Alm (2012).
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sumptions on the translation of electricity, respectively currency, to true economic output
may, however, be critical. Another concern is regarding the measurement of true income.
Official GDP statistics may not be suitable because many countries adjust their measure
of GDP for underground activities. The so-called Model or MIMIC (multiple-indicators,
multiple causes) approach accounts for multiple causes and effects of underground activ-
ities to approximate the magnitude of shadow activities. Pioneered by Frey and Weck-
Hanneman (1984) in the context of the shadow economy, this method has its roots in
the statistical theory of unobserved variables. The basic idea is to first define observed
causes (e.g., the burden of taxation or attitudes towards the government) and effects
(e.g., worker participation in the official economy or additional monetary transactions) of
the unobserved shadow economy and then connect these causes and effects through the
unobserved shadow economy variable using a set of structural equations.7 The MIMIC
approach, however, critically depends on the selection of the observed causes and effects
and the estimations are not transparent. Estimates for many shadow economies around
the world based on MIMIC methods are presented and discussed in Schneider and Enste
(2000) and a critique is provided by Breusch (2005a, 2005b).
Audited tax returns The most precise source of information on individual tax com-
pliance is based on tax returns audited by the tax authorities. In order to derive a rep-
resentative picture of evasion, this approach requires (exogenous) random audits rather
than endogenous audits that are targeted at suspicious taxpayers. While most countries
mostly perform endogenous audits, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used to con-
duct audits of a stratified random sample of about 50,000 taxpayers every three years
between 1965 and 1988. Clotfelter (1983) and Feinstein (1991) use these data to estimate
the effects of taxes and audit probabilities on evasion. However, deriving causal estimates
using these data is very difficult because the data are only collected every three years,
variation in tax rates and audits is unlikely to be exogenous and the data lack information
on personal characteristics.
Surveys Another possibility to learn about individual evasion behavior is to rely on
anonymous, self-reported household surveys in which respondents are either directly asked
for their compliance behavior or, more indirectly, for their attitudes towards evasion.
As opposed to audited tax returns, surveys have the main advantage that they usually
include many socioeconomic and demographic variables, that they cover representative
samples over time, and that they allow cross-country comparisons. Surveying evasion
7Note that the estimates for the shadow economy that are derived using the MIMIC approach should
not be used as dependent variables in order to identify determinants of the shadow economy because all
possible determinants of the shadow economy are supposed to enter the MIMIC method itself and are
therefore mechanically correlated with the MIMIC based estimate of the shadow economy.
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behavior directly, however, is suspected to yield very imprecise information. Elffers et al.
(1987), for example, link survey responses to tax audit data and show that the correlation
between actual compliance and self-reported compliance is very low. One reason for this
finding might be that evaders wish to excuse their behavior or that respondents fear
(irrationally or not) that their answers may be forwarded to tax authorities.
Due to these concerns regarding direct survey evidence on non-compliance, a wide
literature, including Chapter 5 of this dissertation, use questionnaires which do not sur-
vey compliance behavior directly, but instead intend to measure attitudes towards non-
compliance. This procedure is expected to be less blunt and therefore more reliable. The
most common survey in this context is the World Values Survey (Minkov 2012) which is
a world-wide survey that includes the following question on attitudes towards tax com-
pliance: Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you have the
chance’. The question is measured on a ten-scale index with one (1) meaning ‘never justi-
fiable’ and ten (10) meaning ‘always justifiable’. A wide literature uses the answer to this
question as a proxy for ’tax morale’ and to estimate the determinants of compliance or
tax morale (see e.g., Slemrod 2003, Slemrod 2003, Richardson 2006, Torgler 2006, Halla
2012, and Doerrenberg and Peichl 2013).
Research by Torgler and Schneider (2009) and Halla (2012) validates the World
Values Survey measure of tax morale by providing evidence that there is indeed a causal
link between tax morale as surveyed in the World Values Survey and actual compliance
levels. While survey measured tax morale is unlikely to be appropriate to quantify levels
of evasion, these studies suggest that it can be a valid indicator for heterogeneity in com-
pliance behavior across countries or individuals. Chapter 5 of this dissertation exploits
the fact that the World Values Survey measure of tax morale is associated with actual
inclinations to evade and uses it as an explanatory variable to explain variance in tax
rates across groups with different levels of tax morale in a cross-country approach. The
survey data structure allows to control for time and country specific effects, demographic
and socio-economic variables and, in the spirit of Lubian and Zarri (2011), the use of an
instrumental variable that is correlated with tax morale but unrelated to tax policy deci-
sions. In general, however, estimating causal effects based on survey data is challenging
because they lack random variation and often do not allow the inclusion of person specific
fixed effects.
Traces of true income A different method to derive estimates of individual non-
compliance uses traces of true income. The basic idea is to compare groups with and
without evasion opportunities, usually wage earners and self-employed workers, with re-
spect to variables that are assumed to represent a constant share of true income. For
example, Pissarides and Weber (1989) compare the ratio of reported food expenditures
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to reported income using self-reported survey data. An estimate of tax non-compliance
among the self-employed is backed out by assuming that employees report their true
income correctly, the self-employed underreport income, food expenditures are correctly
reported by both type of workers, and the self-employed and employees spend the same
share of true income for food.8 Feldman and Slemrod (2007) use a similar approach but
have more accurate (tax return) data and use the ratio of reported charitable income to
true income. The underlying assumptions are equivalent; it is especially assumed that the
type of income source – wage earner vs. self-employment – is unrelated with preferences
for charitable giving. While this method clearly adds to the literature on estimating
the extend of evasion, its underlying assumption is very strong. Workers self-select into
industries and employment types and it is therefore likely that wage earners and the self-
employed are different along many dimensions and not only with respect to their evasion
opportunities. As a result, it is difficult to assume that employees and the self-employed
have identical preferences for food expenditures or charitable contributions.9
Methods based on experimental data
Field experiments The previously discussed sources of evidence face two problems
when studying the determinants of non-compliance: non-compliance is not directly ob-
servable and identifying causal effects is difficult due to the lack of control groups, panel
data and randomized variation in the potential determinants. Randomized field exper-
iments overcome both these problems. Randomization of the explanatory variable of
interest allows to identify the causal effect. The problem of not observing the depen-
dent variable is also circumvented by randomization: a simple difference-in-differences
strategy, in which the change in reported income of a control group before and after
the treatment intervention is compared to the change in reported income of a treatment
group, can be employed to estimate the change in evasion due to to the treatment in-
tervention. Slemrod et al. (2001) and Blumenthal et al. (2001) are the first to run a
randomized field experiment in the context of tax compliance. Taxpayers in randomly
assigned treatment groups received letters containing normative appeals or information
that tax returns are audited.10
Field experiments have the advantage of combining external with internal validity;
taxpayers are treated in their natural environment while randomization ensures credible
8In a similar approach, Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) also use consumption expenditure data to estimate
the evasion response to tax reforms.
9Research on entrepreneurship for example shows that personality traits are different between wage
earners and entrepreneurs (Cramer et al. 2002).
10Other examples of field experiments on tax compliance behavior include Iyer et al. (2010), Kleven
et al. (2011), Carrillo et al. (2013), Pomeranz (2013), Dwenger et al. (2014) and Hallsworth et al.
(2014).
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
identification. This makes them a very powerful tool to study the determinants of tax
compliance. On the downside, however, they are time-consuming, expensive and require
the cooperation with tax authorities. Their largest disadvantage though is that they only
allow the study of certain research questions. One reason for this is that many countries
have strict obligations that require equal treatment of all tax payers. A second reason is
that some potential determinants such as trust in government or voting rights over tax
revenue spending can not be induced in a field experiment. Field experiments further do
not allow the study of questions on the effects and implications of tax non-compliance
because it is not feasible to randomly assign taxpayers to groups with and without access
to evasion opportunities.
Laboratory experiments Another widely used tool to explore questions related to tax
compliance is the laboratory experiment. The laboratory offers opportunities to exploit
randomized variation and to observe levels of compliance directly. As opposed to field
experiments, the laboratory further allows the exploration of a wider range of questions
and is cheaper, less time-consuming and less elaborate. The design of lab experimental
compliance decisions differs with respect to many features across studies in the literature,
but the basic idea is similar: Subjects in an artificial laboratory are either endowed with
an amount of gross income or gross income is endogenously earned in a real-effort task.
A tax is due on gross income and subjects must decide how much gross income to report
for tax purposes. There is a probability that the reporting decision is audited. In the
case of an audit a penalty applies that is a function of the underreported amount whereas
in the case of no audit subjects keep the amount not reported and only reported income
is taxed. After completion of the experiment, subjects are paid based on their decisions
and the realization of the audit outcome.
External validity of laboratory experiments While the internal validity of
lab experiments is high due to randomization and the controlled circumstances, factors
such as the artificial environment of the lab or the (usual) use of (undergraduate) college
students are often suspected to challenge the external validity of the results. Since three
chapters in this dissertation employ lab experiments, I discuss the most common point of
criticism regarding compliance lab experiments in some detail here and intend to provide
an assessment of the type of research questions that may or may not be addressed using
lab experimental methods.11
First, economic compliance lab experiments are money-incentivized and include au-
11I do not discuss the external validity of lab experiments in general, but instead focus on the most
important concerns in the case of compliance experiments. For more general discussions see Levitt and
List (2007), Falk and Heckman (2009) and Kessler and Vesterlund (2014). The lab experimental chapters
of this dissertation discuss the external validity of the specific experimental designs.
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dit risks and penalties. They therefore mimic the crucial features of real-world compliance
decisions. When making compliance decisions, taxpayers in reality as well as in the lab
face a trade off between more money through cheating and less money in the case of
detection. Since the majority of real-world tax evasion offenses is likely to be in a range
that implies money penalties rather than jail in the case of detection, the decisions in the
lab are comparable to real-world compliance decisions. In this regard, the use of college
students may even increase the results’ external validity because their choices are more
likely to be sensitive to money stakes in the range of USD 20 per hour of lab work (Falk
and Heckman 2009 put forward a similar argument in the context of lab experiments
in general). In addition, most compliance experiments include a money earning stage
in which subjects have to work for their gross-income and therefore develop a sense of
ownership.
Second, compliance experiments do not intend to approximate the magnitude of
real-world tax non-compliance, the levels of lab experimental tax evasion are not directly
interpretable and the magnitude of treatment effects should be treated with caution.
Instead, lab experiments are appropriate to study the underlying mechanisms behind
compliance behavior and can help to understand the direction of real-world effects. For
a very simple example, consider an experiment in which the effect of audits is tested:
while such an experiment may show that higher audits are likely to improve compli-
ance, one has to be careful with deriving conclusions about the size of the effect (in the
sense of ”doubling the audit probability increases compliance by X %”). Interpreting the
direction rather than size of laboratory treatment effects is not specific to compliance
experiments. The recent overview article by Vesterlund (2014) argues in a similar vain
for lab experiments in general.
Third, the use of student subjects is often subject to criticism. However, there is
not much evidence that students behave differently in the lab than other groups (Alm
2012; Falk et al. 2013). In addition, student subjects are usually very homogeneous with
respect to factors such as age, education, political views, etc. Any differences between
groups in lab experiments are therefore entirely driven by the treatment effect and not
by unobserved variables or unlucky randomization. As noted before, students are also
more likely to be responsive to experimental money stakes.
Finally, another concern is based upon the well-established result in the literature
that relatively high compliance levels are due to the fact that taxpayers value public
goods and the use of tax money use. Well-executed experiments therefore usually spend
lab tax revenues for well-perceived purposes and inform subjects about the use of their
tax money (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation for more discussion).
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Lab experimental literature Paying regard to these points and pioneered by
Becker et al. (1987), a relatively large literature uses lab experiments to study compliance
related research questions (Torgler 2002, Alm and Jacobson 2007 and Alm 2012 provide
overviews). The seminal lab experimental compliance papers by Alm, McClelland, and
Schulze (1992) and Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992a) study questions evolving around
audit probabilities, public good provision, efficiency, and uncertainty. More recent contri-
butions explore tax compliance in the context of social interactions (Fortin et al. 2007),
enforcement spillovers (Alm et al. 2009), emotions (Coricelli et al. 2010), the interaction
between evasion and charitable giving (Hsu 2008), information of compliance behavior of
others (Lefebvre et al. 2014), and credence markets (Balafoutas et al. 2014). Chapters
2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation relate to this strand of literature by using lab experiments
in the context of tax compliance. These chapters address research questions which are –
arguably – relevant, but difficult, if not impossible, to address with observational data or
field experiments. This makes the lab the natural tool to rely on.
Determinants of tax compliance
Governments all across the world strive to reduce levels of non-compliance and demand
advice regarding policies that are effective in combating evasion. Identifying the determi-
nants of compliance is therefore important both from an academic and policy perspective.
In the following, I briefly discuss previous findings in the literature which uses the above
sources of evidence. The overview particularly serves to show how Chapter 2 of this
dissertation, which contributes to the understanding of the determinants, fits into the lit-
erature. In general, the modern literature classifies motives for tax compliance into three
categories: i) deterrence parameters and limited cheating opportunities, ii) false percep-
tions of enforcement parameters and lack of information about cheating possibilities, and
iii) non-pecuniary and intrinsic motives (Andreoni et al. 1998; Alm 2012; Dwenger et al.
2014).
First, deterrence parameters and limited cheating opportunities deter tax-
payers from non-compliance. The relevance of deterrence measures is shown by lab ex-
perimental (Alm 2012) and field experimental (Slemrod et al. 2001; Kleven et al. 2011)
evidence finding that increased audit probabilities improve tax compliance.12 The effect
of higher audits is found to be particularly strong among the self-employed or workers
who work in cash-based industries; that is, among those workers with good evasion op-
portunities. This finding motivated Slemrod (2007) and Kleven et al. (2011) to study
whether missing opportunities to evade, for example due to third-party reported income
12Note that it is extremely difficult to study the effect of audit rates on compliance using non-
experimentally observational data because audits are endogenous and targeted at risk groups of tax-
payers.
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of wage earnings, may explain why observed levels of evasion are higher than predicted
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) type of models. Their research suggests that most
taxpayers are partly compliant simply because they do not have an opportunity to evade.
Based on these findings, Dwenger et al. (2014, page 1) conclude that ”the notion that
deterrence is weak is to some extent an illusion”. Despite showing that evasion is substan-
tial among the self-employed, Kleven et al. (2011) additionally find that higher tax rates
have a positive effect on the evasion of self-employed income. Along with corresponding
lab experimental results showing that evasion rates are considerable and respond posi-
tively to higher tax rates (Alm 2012), it can be concluded that taxpayers who have the
opportunity to cheat do so at least partly for pecuniary reasons.
Second, as opposed to theoretical assumptions, taxpayers may have false percep-
tions of enforcement parameters and lack information about cheating possibil-
ities. The former argument builds upon the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who
show that most people heavily overestimate the probability of a risky event to occur. This
result may indicate that potential evaders perceive the chance of detection to be higher
than it actually is and therefore refrain from evasion. Erard and Feinstein (1994) and
Scholz and Pinney (1995) provide empirical evidence in the context of tax compliance
that confirms this notion. Another reason for unexpectedly high compliance rates may be
that taxpayers are not informed about their evasion opportunities. Paetzold and Winner
(2014), for example, present quasi-experimental evidence from Austria that tax evasion
of workers who start a new job goes up if the knowledge of evasion opportunities is high
among the existing co-workers in the new firm. This result suggests that information
about evasion opportunities are likely to be relevant for compliance.13
Third, taxpayers may be compliant with tax rules for non-pecuniary and intrin-
sic motives. Important issues in this context are conditional cooperation and social
norms. Taxpayers seem to be more compliant if they perceive evasion levels among their
peers to be low and vice versa (Frey and Torgler 2007; Traxler 2010; Alm 2012; Hallsworth
et al. 2014; Lefebvre et al. 2014). Intrinsic motivations or tax morale are further reasons
for non-pecuniary motives to comply. Torgler and Schneider (2009) and Halla (2012)
show that survey measured intrinsic motivations are positively related to actual levels of
tax compliance. Dwenger et al. (2014) find that 20% of individuals pay their tax liability
even in a setting with zero deterrence, suggesting that intrinsic motives are substantial.
Other non-pecuniary factors that seem to matter for compliance decisions, and that are
likely to interact with tax morale, are among others: trust in government (Slemrod 2003;
Feld and Frey 2007), patriotism (Konrad and Qari 2012), religious beliefs (Torgler 2006),
service orientation of tax authorities (Alm et al. 2010), social interactions (Fortin et al.
13Other studies such as Chetty and Saez (2013) and Chetty et al. (2013) confirm that some taxpayers
lack knowledge about the tax system.
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2007; Bo et al. 2014), efficiency of redistribution (Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1992a), and
voting possibilities over tax revenue spending (Alm and Jackson 1993; Lamberton et al.
2014). Chapter 2 of my dissertation examines the role of tax revenue usage for compliance
and therefore contributes to this strand of literature that explores non-pecuniary motives
for tax compliance.
Market outcomes in the presence of non-compliance
Identifying the drivers of compliance is obviously important. However, as noted by An-
dreoni et al. (1998, page 818), from a public finance perspective tax compliance ”spans
the notions of equity, efficiency and incidence” and is of further academic interest because
it is presumed to affect economic outcomes. For example, the deadweight loss of taxation
is likely to be higher in the presence of non-compliance since more distortionary taxes are
required to meet given revenue goals. Efficiency losses do also occur when taxpayers waste
resources to shelter taxable income. This suggests that in addition to studying its deter-
minants, it is important to study the impact of non-compliance on market outcomes. One
issue that is particularly relevant in this context is heterogeneity in compliance behavior.
Slemrod (2007) and Kleven et al. (2011) emphasize that some taxpayers, in particular
those with self-reported income, have considerably better opportunities to underreport
taxable income than other taxpayers. The literature on intrinsic motivations to comply
with the tax law additionally shows that such intrinsic motives are also heterogeneously
distributed across the population of taxpayers (Torgler 2007).
It is widely suspected that this heterogeneity implies that taxes affect different
taxpayers differently or that markets where evasion is an option converge to different
equilibria than others. Andreoni et al. (1998), for example, propose several intuitive
examples where heterogeneity in compliance behavior might affect market outcomes. It is
instanced that tax systems are effectively less redistributive than legislated if the wealthy
are able to evade a larger share of their income. This is confirmed by several empirical and
theoretical studies (Roine 2006; Johns and Slemrod 2010; Alm and Finlay 2013; Traxler
2012; Duncan 2014; Doerrenberg and Duncan 2014a). Andreoni and co-authors further
note that the incidence of taxation may be affected because those who are able to shelter
their incomes pay a smaller share of taxes. Kopczuk et al. (2013) present suggestive
empirical evidence that non-compliance indeed affects incidence. Labor market outcomes
are likely to be altered as well if certain taxpayers have better evasion opportunities
than others. For example, workers with a high willingness to evade may self-select into
industries with good evasion opportunities or taxes could have differential effects on labor
supply of workers with and without access to evasion.
While these examples in Andreoni et al. (1998) have intuitive appeal and show
that the literature speculates that non-compliance is likely to affect market outcomes,
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evidence on many questions regarding the consequences of tax non-compliance is rather
scarce.14 In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this dissertation, I contribute to closing this gap and
study the implications of tax non-compliance, and in particular heterogeneous compliance
behavior, in different contexts. One reason for scarce empirical evidence on the effects
of evasion opportunities and compliance behavior may be that identifying causal effects
in this context is usually very difficult because workers self-select into industries and
markets; that is, they select the industry/market that matches their preferences. As
a result, taxpayers in different occupations/markets are very likely to differ not only
with respect to their evasion opportunities but also along other dimensions such as risk
aversion and other personality traits. Simply comparing occupations/markets with and
without evasion options therefore does not identify a causal effect. Chapters 3 to 5 of
this dissertation intend to circumvent this fundamental problem by conducting laboratory
experiments with random assignment to evasion opportunities (Chapters 3 and 4) and
an instrumental variable strategy with observational data (Chapter 5).
1.3 Overview of chapters and main findings
The preceding section elaborates based on the literature that the study of both the deter-
minants and consequences of tax (non-)compliance is important. This section provides an
overview of each chapter of this dissertation. It particularly summarizes the main find-
ings and shows how the chapters contribute to both strands of literature; determinants
and consequences of tax non-compliance. Incorporating the insights of the literature re-
view and discussion of methods, I additionally briefly motivate the empirical tool that is
chosen in the respective chapter.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Does the use of tax revenue matter for com-
pliance behavior?
Chapter 2 of this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the non-pecuniary
motives for tax compliance, which are not very well understood. While it is often spec-
ulated that the usage of tax revenue is among the non-pecuniary determinants of tax
compliance, the literature is relatively silent in this regard. Chapter 2 of this dissertation
contributes to fill this gap in the literature and explores the role of tax revenue usage for
compliance behavior. The empirical tool used is a laboratory experiment which is the
appropriate method for the study of this question because it is difficult, if not impossible,
to study the effect of revenue use with observational data: random assignment of different
types of tax money usage to taxpayers is difficult to achieve. Another justification to use
14Chapter 3, 4 and 5 of this dissertation provide more detailed and specific literature reviews.
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a lab experiment is that the experiment only requires to compare compliance behavior
across treatment groups whereas the actual levels of evasion are not interpreted. In the
experiment, subjects make tax reporting decisions and are randomly assigned to different
treatment groups that differ only in how the generated tax revenue is spent. 1) Tax rev-
enue is equally redistributed among all subjects, 2) it goes to the experimenters’ scientific
research fund, 3) it is donated to the Red Cross, 4) it is transferred to the German federal
budget. The motivation for the choice of these four treatment groups is twofold: First,
they reflect set-ups that are either used in the ”real-world” (group 4 with transfer to
the federal government) or have been used in the lab experimental compliance literature
and hence allow an evaluation of whether the use of tax revenue matters for previously
conducted experiments (groups 1 to 3).15 Second, they reflect four situations that differ
with respect to the degree that subjects benefit from their tax payment; something which
is speculated to matter for compliance behavior.
The findings of this Chapter indicate that average compliance levels are higher in
the groups in which tax revenue is spent for research and charity purposes, relative to
the two other groups with redistribution and tax payment transfer to the government.
These differences are large and economically sizable. For example, relative to the group
with redistribution among subjects, the level of compliance is about 40% and 35% higher
in the Research and Red Cross groups, respectively. Although these differences between
groups are economically meaningful, several non-parametric and parametric (regression)
analyses reveal that they are not different from zero in a statistical sense. This paper
therefore provides some suggestive evidence that the recipient of tax payments matters for
compliance behavior, but the experimental data do not allow to reject the null hypothesis
of no treatment effect. While it cannot be ruled out that other types of tax revenue use
would make a larger and more precisely estimated difference, this chapter shows that
the most common types in the literature and a realistic transfer to the government are
likely to affect compliance behavior. The results may further suggest that taxpayers
prefer spending tax revenues for charitable, rather than redistributive, purposes. The
chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides new evidence
on the determinants of tax compliance. Second, it benefits the methodological side of
compliance lab experiments in that it shows that the recipient of tax revenue is likely
to make a difference in compliance lab experiments. Third, it adds to the behavioral
literature on pro-social behavior and giving by showing that a different type of pro-social
behavior – tax compliance – may depend on the type of return (i.e., the type of recipient)
that is granted in exchange for pro-social behavior.
15For example, Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992a) use a public good structure where all tax payments
are redistributed among subjects, Fortin et al. (2007) transfer paybacks to scientific research funds, and
Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014b) donate tax revenues to the Red Cross.
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1.3.2 Chapter 3: Tax incidence in the presence of tax evasion
After adding to the literature on the determinants of tax compliance in Chapter 2, the
next chapters study the consequences of evasion behavior on different outcomes. Chapter
3 examines the question of whether the canonical textbook laws of tax incidence hold in
the presence of evasion opportunities. Intuitively, access to evasion opportunities allows
taxpayers to lower their effective tax rates, which should result in different responses
to tax rates for taxpayers with and without evasion opportunities. Despite its intuitive
appeal, evidence on the effect of tax non-compliance on tax incidence is scarce. One
reason for scarce evidence is likely to be rooted in the difficulty of identifying this effect
with observational data. Causal inference with observational data would require random
variation in access to evasion across otherwise similar markets. This is obviously difficult
to achieve since access to tax evasion is most likely one of the dimensions of a market that
determines whether buyers and sellers select to participate in that market. The chapter
is therefore based on results of a laboratory experiment, in which subjects trade fictitious
goods in competitive double auction markets. Subjects are randomly assigned roles of
buyers and sellers in treatment and control groups. A per-unit tax is imposed on sellers,
and sellers in the treatment group are provided the opportunity to evade the tax whereas
sellers in the control group are not. Therefore, the impact of evasion on tax incidence is
identified by comparing the equilibrium prices in the treatment and control group.
The results of the experiments show that the market equilibrium price in the treat-
ment group with evasion opportunities is economically and statistically lower than in the
control group where sellers are not provided an option to underreport. Accordingly, the
number of traded goods is higher in the treatment group. These results are consistent
with a theoretical model that is set up to improve the understanding of the mechanisms
behind the results. In the model, access to evasion opportunities reduces the effective
tax rate and therefore dampens real behavioral responses. The findings of the lab ex-
periments further suggest that the benefits of tax evasion are not limited to the side of
the market with access to evasion but are partly shifted to the non-evading side of the
market.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Evasion opportunities and labor supply elas-
ticities
Heterogeneity in evasion opportunities may also affect other behavioral responses to tax-
ation. Agents with evasion opportunities have more margins to respond to tax changes
and it is therefore likely that there is an interaction between the sensitivity of differ-
ent adjustment margins, such as labor supply or deduction behavior, with tax evasion.
Chapter 4 of the dissertation examines the extent to which labor supply elasticities with
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respect to tax rates depend on evasion opportunities. Self-selection of individuals into
markets with evasion opportunities, along with non-trivial identification of labor supply
elasticities with respect to taxation, make it difficult to estimate a causal effect using ob-
servational data. This chapter therefore also employs a laboratory experiment to examine
the research question. In the experiment, all participants undertake a well-established
real-effort task over several rounds. Subjects face a tax rate that varies across rounds and
are required to pay taxes on earned income. The treatment group is given the opportunity
to underreport income, while the control group is not.
The lab experimental results provide evidence that subjects with an evasion oppor-
tunity indeed respond differently to changes in the net-of-tax rate than participants who
do not have access to evasion. This confirms the expectation that an extra channel to
adjust to changing tax rates affects the tax sensitivity of other adjustment channels. The
results further show that this differential effect is more prevalent when tax rates go down.
Additionally, the direction of the treatment effect is dependent on the order and evolution
of tax rate changes. As expected, the elasticity of taxable income is considerable larger
in the treatment group with evasion opportunity than in the control group.
In general, chapters 3 and 4 provide evidence that economic responses to tax rates
depend on access to evasion opportunities; individuals who are able to evade have an extra
margin to respond to tax rate changes and therefore adjust their behavior differently than
individuals without this extra margin.
1.3.4 Chapter 5: Effect of compliance heterogeneity on tax pol-
icy
Chapter 5 of this dissertation asks whether tax policy is affected by the fact that different
taxpayers have different inclinations to be non-compliant. Since it is difficult to mimic
tax policy making in the laboratory using student subject pools, this chapter employs
observational rather than experimental data. A single observational data set is, however,
not readily available for an exploration of the question at hand, which is why a unique
cross-country data set based on the World Values Survey and the World Tax Indicators
is constructed. The resulting rich data set offers the opportunity of measuring various
relevant variables – in particular tax burden, attitudes towards evasion, and income – and
endogeneity concerns are addressed through an instrumental variables approach which
exploits variation that is unrelated to the outcome variable of interest. The Chapter
additionally makes a theoretical contribution as it is one of the first that incorporates tax
morale into a ’standard’ model of optimal taxation.
The findings of the empirical analysis show that income groups with high tax morale
face higher average and marginal tax rates, conditional on other tax relevant variables.
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This result is somewhat surprising and three possible mechanisms are proposed which
may help to explain the result: i) an inverse elasticity argument where governments
seek to minimize distortions, ii) a political economy argument where governments take
voting behavior into account, and iii) an administrative costs argument where taxing
high morale groups is more cost efficient.
1.4 Structure and co-authors
Chapter 2 studies how tax revenue usage affects compliance behavior. This chapter is
solo-authored and not publicly available yet. Chapter 3 examines whether the incidence
of taxes is affected by evasion opportunities. It is co-authored with Denvil Duncan
(Indiana University) and circulates as Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014c). Chapter 4
deals with the question of whether tax evasion opportunities affect labor supply responses
to taxation. This chapter is also co-authored with Denvil Duncan and was published as
Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014b). The last Chapter 5 studies whether heterogeneous
levels of intrinsic motivation to pay taxes affect tax policy. It is joint work with Denvil
Duncan, Clemens Fuest (ZEW Mannheim) and Andreas Peichl (ZEW Mannheim), and
was published as Doerrenberg et al. (2014).
Chapter 2
Does the use of tax revenue matter
for compliance behavior?
Experimental evidence
2.1 Introduction
Identifying the drivers of tax non-compliance is one of the key aims of governments
across the world and is also at the center of the economic literature on tax evasion. This
paper examines whether the use of tax revenue is among these drivers and of relevance
for compliance behavior. As opposed to the degree of control over private spending,
taxpayers only have very limited information over the use of their tax payments. This
lack of information over the use of tax revenue is suspected to be among the reasons
why we observe considerable tax non-compliance (Alm 2012).1 Another related reason
for non-compliance may be that taxpayers have different preferences regarding the use
of tax payments than policy-makers who administer tax expenditures. In this paper, I
explore the relationship between tax usage and tax evasion and study whether the nature
of tax revenue spending affects (lab experimental) compliance behavior.
Since it is difficult – if not impossible – to study the effect of tax money use on
tax compliance with observational field data,2 I address this question in the framework
of a standard tax evasion lab experiment. Subjects first receive an endowment which is
subject to a tax, and they are then given a tax reporting decision. The novelty of my
experiment is that each subject is randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups
(between-subjects design) that differ only in how the generated tax revenue is spent: 1)
1For example, Lamberton et al. (2014) report that the tax gap amounts to 385 billion US Dollars in
the US and 42 billion pounds (about 70.8 billion US Dollars) in the UK.
2This has obvious reasons: First, evasion is, by its very nature, not observed. Second, one would
need a field experiment where different taxpayers are randomly informed about the exact use of their
tax payments.
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Tax revenue generated in the experiment is equally redistributed among all subjects, 2)
All tax revenue goes to the experimenter’s scientific research fund, 3) Tax revenue is
donated to the Red Cross, 4) Tax revenue is transferred to the German federal budget
(administered by the Ministry of Finance). Since assignment to treatment groups is
random and everything except the use of tax revenue is held constant, any differences in
compliance behavior can be attributed to the way tax revenue is spent.3
The motivation for the choice of these four treatment groups is twofold: First, they
reflect set-ups that are either used in the ”real-world” (federal budget) or have been used
in the lab experimental compliance literature and hence allow an evaluation of whether
the use of tax revenue matters for previously conducted experiments. For example, Alm,
Jackson, and McKee (1992a) use a public good structure where all tax payments are
redistributed among subjects, Fortin et al. (2007) transfer paybacks to scientific research
funds, and Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014b) donate tax revenues to the Red Cross.
Second, they reflect four situations that differ with respect to the degree that subjects
benefit from their tax payment. This is likely to matter for compliance behavior. Torgler
et al. (2010), for example, show that there exists a negative correlation between the level
of local tax autonomy and shadow economy measures, suggesting that compliance may be
higher if taxpayers are under the impression that their tax payments are spent locally and
hence to their direct benefit. In the first group, redistribution among all participants of a
session mimics a situation in which tax money is spent locally and to the direct benefit of
a well-defined group. In the second group, participants benefit less directly: more money
for research marginally increases the reputation of the participant’s university and may
lead to more lab experiments in which subjects can participate and earn money. In the
group with donations to the Red Cross, subjects benefit only if they have a warm glow
for giving to charity (e.g., Andreoni 1990). The fourth group with transfers to the budget
of the federal government mimics the most realistic tax payment set up, and it is likely
that tax money is perceived to benefit an individual subject only very marginally.4
The experimental results indicate that average compliance levels are higher in the
groups in which tax revenue is spent for research and charity purposes, relative to the
two other groups with redistribution and tax payment transfer to the government. These
differences are large and economically sizable. For example, relative to the group with
redistribution among subjects, the level of compliance is about 40% and 35% higher in
the Research and Red Cross groups, respectively. Although these differences between
groups are economically meaningful, several non-parametric and parametric (regression)
3That is, the recipient of tax revenues is varied in my experimental design. Since most subjects are
likely to have a broad perception of how the different recipients use tax revenues, I argue that this link
between tax revenue recipient and tax revenue use allows me to infer conclusions not only about the
effect of tax revenue recipient but also of tax revenue use on compliance.
4For example, Mettler (2011) shows that many people under-recognize the benefits of tax-funded
policies.
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analyses reveal that they are not different from zero in a statistical sense. This paper
therefore provides some suggestive evidence that the recipient of tax payments matters for
compliance behavior, but the experimental data do not allow to reject the null hypothesis
of no treatment effect. While it cannot be ruled out that other types of tax revenue use
would make a larger and more precisely estimated difference, my paper shows that the
most common types in the literature and a realistic transfer to the government are likely
to affect compliance behavior. The results may further suggest that taxpayers prefer
spending tax revenues for charitable, rather than redistributive, purposes.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the litera-
ture on tax evasion in general by presenting more evidence on the potential determinants
of tax evasion.5 For example, Frey and Torgler (2007) find a strong correlation between
survey measured tax morale and institutional quality and Torgler and Schneider (2009)
show that measures of the shadow economy are correlated with the level of institutional
quality as well. The large-scale field-experiment by Hallsworth et al. (2014) provides
further evidence that compliance depends on tax revenue use. Taxpayers who receive a
letter that reminds them that tax payments are used to finance public goods like roads
and schools pay their tax liabilities quicker than taxpayers who do not receive such a
letter. These studies using observational data from the field suggest that compliance
depends on the institutions that administer tax payments and is affected by the salience
of tax payment use, but they do not inform whether the type of tax money use matters
as well.
There is also lab experimental literature regarding the use of tax payments that I
relate to and which I extend. Alm and Jackson (1993) find that compliance increases if
taxpayers are able to vote over the spending of tax payments. A study by Lamberton
et al. (2014) explores a related question and shows that compliance increases even if
subjects are only provided a hypothetical voice over tax payments that is not binding,
i.e., is not directly implemented in the actual tax payment use. Other studies such
as Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) and Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992b) show
that compliance increases if complying yields efficiency gains. In their experiments, the
sum of all tax payments is increased by a multiplier to increase efficiency and then
equally redistributed among the subjects.6 These papers provide evidence that use of
5Note that I do not claim that the use of revenue is the only reason for non-compliance but I test if it
is among the drivers. See Alm (2012) or Slemrod and Weber (2012) for overviews on the determinants
of compliance.
6The procedure is therefore similar to standard public good experiments (following Marwell and
Ames 1981). Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) additionally show that compliance increases with the
public good multiplier, suggesting that the level of tax payment efficiency matters as well. Note that
the tax money recipients in my design are not necessarily perceived to differ in efficiency. I intentionally
do not introduce a public good multiplier in the treatment group with redistribution of tax money
among subjects because redistribution is usually not perceived to be this efficient, some subjects might
rather have the ”leaky bucket” (Okun 1975) picture in mind where tax money is lost in the process of
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tax payments generally matters for compliance behavior7 and I add to this literature by
examining if the type of recipient affects evasion. In particular, subjects in the present
experiment are neither provided a voice over alternative spending alternatives, nor are
they faced with a situation in which complying is associated with an efficiency gain.
In line with ”real-world” applications, taxpayers in my experiment are confronted with
different tax payment recipients and there are no obvious efficiency gains.
A second set of results in Alm and Jackson (1993) is more closely related to my pa-
per. They conduct a survey among students before their lab experiments to determine the
popularity of various campus organizations. Subjects in all treatments are first informed
about the survey and which organizations were voted to be most- and least-popular.
In one treatment, participants were then told that tax payments would be donated to
the most-favored organization, whereas in another treatment it was told that tax money
would go to the organization that was surveyed to be the least-favored. The results show
that compliance is higher when tax payments go to the more popular organization. This
suggests that individual compliance behavior is affected by the majority opinion, and that
social norms regarding the recipient matter. While I relate to this study in that I compare
compliance between treatments that differ with respect to the tax money recipient, I do
not test if the public opinion on the recipient affects compliance. In my design, subjects
decide independently of each other and it is neither known if the recipient is considered
to be popular nor is it made salient to the participants that tax money could have been
spent in a more popular way.8
This paper further benefits the methodological side of the lab experimental litera-
ture on tax evasion in that it tests whether researchers should be concerned about how
they spend the ”tax revenue” generated in their experiments. Given the nature of tax
evasion, it is very difficult to study evasion with observational data that suffer from false
reporting and randomized or quasi experiments. Field experiments (e.g., Slemrod et al.
2001; Kleven et al. 2011; Pomeranz 2013) are promising but only allow to study certain
questions – besides being expensive and time consuming.9 The broad literature on lab
experimental compliance experiments (e.g., Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1992a, Fortin et al.
2007, Alm et al. 2009, Doerrenberg and Duncan 2014b, Balafoutas et al. 2014) shows
redistribution.
7This is further supported by Cowell and Gordon (1988) who show theoretically that introducing
public goods to the standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model changes the effect of tax rate changes
on evasion. Becker et al. (1987) find in a lab experiment that evasion increases if a taxpayer supposes
that she receives less tax financed public transfers than other tax payers.
8It can well be presumed that subjects in my design do not know that the experiment is intended to
examine the effect of varying tax money recipients. Not making the purpose of the experiment salient is
also one of the reasons why I exploit between-subject variation rather than within-subject variation.
9For example, many countries have strict obligations that require the equal treatment of all tax payers.
This often makes the conduction of field experiments with randomized treatments legally difficult, and
certainly limits the range of questions that can be examined.
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that the lab is a reliable environment to study compliance behavior. While it is critical to
derive conclusions about actual levels of compliance from lab experiments, it is possible
to study various mechanisms that help to understand compliance behavior (see Slemrod
and Weber 2012 or Alm 2012 for similar assessments).10 This paper evaluates whether
previously used ways of spending lab tax revenues (see above for references) affect com-
pliance behavior. It provides suggestive evidence that the use of tax revenue may matter
for lab experimental evasion decisions. Researchers conducting lab experiments in the
context of tax compliance should be aware that the choice of tax revenue recipient may
impact the average level of compliance.
Third, the paper speaks to the behavioral economics literature on pro-social behav-
ior (i.e., paying taxes), donating and altruism (note that fully evading is the dominant
rational strategy in my experiment). For example, Carpenter and Myers (2010) and
Chetty and Saez (2014) present evidence from the field that pro-social behavior depends
on the – monetary or non-monetary – benefit that people receive in return. These results
correspond with the broad literature that uses lab experiments to study pro-social be-
havior (see Vesterlund 2014 for a recent survey). Several lab experimental studies show
that the type of recipient matters for giving behavior in dictator games and voluntary
donations to government or charity agencies (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 1996; Fong 2007;
Fong and Luttmer 2011; Li et al. 2011).11 Despite imprecise treatment effects, my pa-
per somewhat confirms the results of this literature in that it shows that another type
of pro-social behavior – tax compliance – may also depend on the type of return (i.e.,
the type of recipient) that is granted in exchange for pro-social behavior. In a broader
perspective, the paper further suggests that some of the results in behavioral economics
are also likely to apply to the economics of tax evasion.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the experimental design and
procedures. Parametric and non-parametric results are presented in Section 2.3, and
Section 2.4 discusses the results and concludes the paper.
2.2 The laboratory experiment
This section describes the experimental design and procedures. I first provide a brief
overview of the design and then lay out the flow of each round of the experiment. In
10This argument is in line with for example Kessler and Vesterlund (2014) who explore the issue of
external validity of laboratory experiments. They argue that lab experiments inform about the direction
of ”real-world” effects whereas the magnitudes of most lab experiments should be treated with caution.
Fortin et al. (2007), Slemrod and Weber (2012) and Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014b) present more
detailed discussions of the external validity of tax compliance lab experiments.
11Donating for real charity purposes is not standard in the lab experimental literature on giving. Fong
and Luttmer (2009) and Grossman and Eckel (2012) are among further examples in which lab donations
are donated to real charity organizations.
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a next step, the payment structure and calculation of total tax revenue are described
and details on the treatment groups are presented. The organizational procedure of the
experiment and summary statistics are described at the end of this section.
2.2.1 Overview of the experiment
The laboratory experiment I design consists of one practice round and eight payoff-
relevant rounds. Each round has two stages: In the first stage, subjects are endowed
with an amount of money that represents their pre-tax gross income. This endowment is
the same for all subjects in all groups but differs across rounds. Gross income is subject
to a tax rate of 30%. In the second stage, all subjects make a tax reporting decision.
There is a 10% audit probability of being audited and a penalty is due if a subject is
audited and income was underreported. This basic set-up of the experiment is identical
for all subjects in all experimental sessions. In order to study the research question, I
randomly assign subjects to one of four treatment groups – between subjects design –
that differ only in how the generated tax revenue in a session is used. The four treatment
groups are as follows (see section 2.2.4 for more detailed information): 1) Tax revenue
is equally redistributed among all subjects, 2) all tax revenue goes to the experimenter’s
scientific research fund, 3) tax revenue is donated to the Red Cross, 4) tax revenue is
transferred to the German federal budget (administered by the Ministry of Finance). All
subjects within a given session are always in the same treatment group, and the relevant
tax revenue consists of the tax payments of all subjects in one session.
2.2.2 Overview of a round
Endowment
Subjects receive an exogeneous endowment, which constitutes their pre-tax gross income,
in the first stage of each round. As opposed to several recent tax evasion experiments
such as e.g., Alm et al. (2009) and Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014b), I do not implement
a real-effort task in the first stage of the experiment. In the literature, real-effort tasks are
used to induce a sense of ownership and to simulate a real-world situation where money
is earned. However, contributions using a real-effort task study research questions where
there is no concern that the treatment variation may have an effect on the effort supply,
and hence gross incomes, of subjects. This is different in the context of the present paper
where the recipient of tax money is varied across treatment states. If one tax recipient
is perceived to be more reliable or in need, subjects may work harder in these treatment
groups and generate higher gross incomes. This would bias the results because subjects
in different groups would not only differ with respect to the tax money recipient but also
with respect to their effort levels and gross incomes. Since evasion decisions are likely to
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depend on effort and wealth, differences in compliance levels across groups could not be
solely attributed to different tax money recipients.
Endowing subjects with an exogenous gross income and not allowing for endogenous
income earning follows the early lab experimental evasion literature (e.g., Alm, Jackson,
and McKee 1992a) and is also in line with more recent contributions such as Fortin et al.
(2007) or Balafoutas et al. (2014). In order to examine if the treatment effect of interest
depends on the level of gross income, I vary the level of endowments across rounds. Before
the experiment I chose four different levels of endowment and randomized the assignment
of these four levels to the eight rounds of the experiment. The chosen endowment levels
are 65 ECU (13 EUR), 58 ECU (11.60 EUR), 51 ECU (10.20 EUR) and 44 ECU (8.80
EUR).12 Note that the levels and order of endowments is the same for all subjects in all
sessions and treatment groups. 58 ECU was randomly drawn to be the endowment level
in the practice round. Subjects were informed in the instructions before the start of the
experiment that the endowment may vary from round to round and that endowments
are in the range of 44 and 65 ECU. The endowment levels in each round are displayed in
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Endowment levels in each round
Round: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Endowment (ECU): 44 65 58 58 51 65 51 44
Notes: Reported are the endowment levels (pre-tax gross incomes) in each payoff-relevant
round. Numbers are in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) where 5 ECU correspond to 1
EUR. The four endowment levels 65, 58, 51, 44 were randomly assigned to the eight rounds
of the experiment. 58 ECU was randomly drawn to be the endowment in the practice round.
The tax reporting decision
Subjects’ gross incomes (endowments) are subject to a proportional tax rate of 30%.13
However, subjects in all treatment groups are faced with a tax reporting decision in
the second stage of each round. This reporting stage follows good practice in the lab
experimental evasion literature (see Torgler 2002 and Alm 2012 for overviews). Subjects
are first informed about their gross income in this round and are then asked to indicate an
amount between zero and their true gross income for tax purposes. There is an exogenous
probability of 10% that their reporting decision is audited, and in the case of an audit,
12These endowment levels are relatively high, especially considering that mostly undergraduate stu-
dents participated in the experiment and that the sessions lasted about 45 minutes. For an impression
of the purchasing power of these endowment levels, note, for example, that a minimum hourly wage of
8.50 EUR is discussed to be introduced in Germany. A full lunch menu at the University of Cologne’s
cafeteria costs about 2,50 EUR.
1330% is chosen as the tax rate because it is likely to be perceived as a realistic tax rate in Germany.
Lamberton et al. (2014), for example, also use a 30% tax rate.
2.2. THE LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 25
all underreported income is detected and a penalty is due. The chosen audit probability
of 10% is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Alm et al. 2009; Fortin et al. 2007;
Doerrenberg and Duncan 2014b). As in almost all previous compliance lab experiments,
the penalty in case of detected underreporting is proportional to the evaded amount.
However, while many recent studies use a fine rate of 2 – meaning that detected subjects
pay taxes on their reported income plus twice the evaded amount – , I employ a fine rate
of 3 in order to generate a sufficiently high level of compliance that allows for variation
in compliance levels in all directions (e.g., Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1992b also use a
fine rate of 3). After each reporting decision, the computer determines randomly if a
reporting decision is audited. Subjects are informed about the parameters of the tax
system (tax rate, audit probability and penalty structure) in the instructions and the
computer screen also reminds them before each round. All tax reporting decisions are
completely anonymous and neither other subjects nor the experimenters are able to know
during a session if and how much a subject underreported.
Net income
The final income subjects receive in each round, i.e., a round’s ”net income”, depends on
whether the reporting decision is audited or not. If it is not audited, subjects earn their
gross income minus taxes paid on reported income. In case of an audit, a subject has to
pay the true tax liability plus a penalty that equals twice the evaded amount.14 Audited
subjects who have not underreported income simply pay taxes on their true gross income.
That is, a subject i receives a net income Y neti in a given round that can be summarized
as follows:
Y neti =
 = G(1− τ)− 2τ(G−Ri) with probability p= G− τRi with probability (1-p) (2.1)
where G is the exogenous gross income (endowment) that does not vary between subjects,
Ri is the amount reported for tax purposes in this round, τ is the proportional tax rate
of 30% and p is the exogenous and constant audit probability of 10%.
Tax payment and total tax revenue
The tax payment of a subject depends on her gross income, the tax rate, penalty structure
and audit outcome, as well as the compliance decision. Tax payment of each subject i in
14Note that this is equivalent to paying taxes on reported income plus three times the evaded amount,
i.e., a fine rate of 3.
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a round is denoted with ti and can be written as:
ti =
 = τG+ 2τ(G−Ri) with probability p= τRi with probability (1-p). (2.2)
The total tax revenue generated in a round is the sum of tax payments from all subjects
in that round. The number of subjects in a session shall be N so that total tax revenue
T is written as
T =
N∑
i=1
ti. (2.3)
T is the relevant tax revenue from one round that is used depending on the respective
treatment group (the treatment groups are described further below).
2.2.3 Final payment
Subjects do not receive the sum of all eight payoff-relevant rounds’ net incomes, but their
final pay-off is instead based on the net income of one randomly chosen round. This
payment structure avoids wealth effects, satiation and unreliable decisions once subjects
have achieved a certain desired pay-off. It further allows to have higher stakes involved in
each of the reporting decisions (see e.g. Blumkin et al. 2012 and Doerrenberg and Duncan
2014b who have a comparable payment structure). After the completion of all rounds in a
session, the computer randomly selects one of the eight rounds and subjects are informed
of the draw. The randomly chosen round is the same for all subjects within one session;
that is, the computer randomly selects a round at the end of each session that determines
the payment-relevant round for all participants of this session.15 Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) are used as the currency during the experiment. The net income (in ECU)
for the selected round is then converted to EUR using the publicly known exchange rate
of 5 ECU for 1 EUR. In the treatment group with redistribution among subjects, tax
revenue of the payoff-relevant round in the session is split equally among all subjects
and each subject’s share is also converted to EUR and added to the final payment. In
addition to this, subjects in all groups receive a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR which is added
to the selected net income. See the summary statistics in section 2.2.6 for information
on final payments.
The amount of tax revenue that is spent depending on the respective treatment
group is also based on the randomly selected round of a session; hence, the tax revenue
generated in the randomly selected round of one session is used in the way that was
indicated to the subjects of a treatment group.
15An alternative would have been to select rounds individually for each subject. However, this would
not have allowed the implementation of the redistribution treatment where tax revenue is split equally
among all subjects.
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2.2.4 Treatment groups
The flow of each round, including payment structure and generation of tax revenue, is
identical for all subjects in all sessions. In order to identify how the usage of tax revenue
matters for the evasion decisions in the reporting stage, I employ a between-subjects
design in which each subject is randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups that
only differ in how tax revenue generated in a session is used. This design ensures that
all differences across the four groups are solely due to the use of tax revenue and not
endogenously confounded by any other variables.16 The usage of tax revenue is public
information and made salient to the subjects by indicating it in the instructions as well
as on the computer screen when the reporting decision is made. That is, the instructions
and computer screens are identical for all subjects except for single sentences that are
regarding the usage of tax revenue. The instructions (see Appendix 2.6) describe in an
extra section labeled ”Use of tax revenues” how tax payments are spent. In addition,
while subjects make their reporting decision, they are reminded on the computer screen
how their tax payments will be used. I describe the four treatment groups in more detail
in the following:
1. Redistribution: Tax money generated in this group is equally redistributed among
all subjects in one session. Subjects are informed that after the determination of the
relevant payment round the computer calculates total tax revenue in the selected
round and splits it equally among all subjects of the session; that is, the share of tax
revenue that a subject receives is only indirectly linked to her own performance or
compliance choices. This treatment simulates a set-up where tax revenue is spent
within a small and well-defined group of individuals who, although they most likely
had not met before, have seen each other before and in the lab.17 In addition,
tax revenue in this group is used such that it directly benefits the monetary pay-
off of the subjects. The procedure in this group is similar to previous compliance
experiments (e.g., Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1992a) and experiments in the large
literature on public good provision following Marwell and Ames (1981), except that
I do not add a public good multiplier which increases the efficiency of redistribution.
2. Research: Subjects in this group were informed that all tax revenue generated
in the selected payment round of this experimental session is spent for research
purposes. In particular, it was stated in the instructions and on the computer screen
16Charness et al. (2012), for example, argue that a between-design is usually superior to a within-
design where each subject is faced with different treatments. In a between-design such as mine, order
effects in the treatment conditions do not affect the results and it is not made salient to the subjects
that other treatments exist.
17Note that while this treatment induces a personal component to the experiment, compliance decisions
and labor effort performances are of course anonymous so that it is never known to any other participant
how much each subject contributed to the total tax revenue.
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that tax revenue goes to the research fund of the experimenters and will be spent on
future research projects (without specifying a particular project). This treatment
group intends to stimulate a situation in which tax money is spent locally at the
University where the experiment was conducted and where most of the participants
are enrolled as students. As a result, tax payment used here does not directly
benefit the subject but may only have a small indirect impact through a small
improvement of the university’s research reputation or an increased probability
that more experiments are conducted in which subjects can participate and earn
money. Subjects may have an idea of how research is conducted at their university
and may know university researchers in person from classes and seminars. That is,
subjects may have a sense what is done with the money but this sense is clearly
less developed than in the redistribution group. This way of spending laboratory
tax payments is in line with Fortin et al. (2007).
3. Red-Cross: In this treatment group, subjects are informed that total tax revenues
from the selected payment round are donated to the German Red Cross. The
Red Cross is a non-ideological charity organization that is usually perceived as
reliable and transparent. It is used as the tax recipient in lab experimental evasion
studies by, for example, Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014b) to make the compliance
decision as realistic as possible. A paper by Eckel and Grossman (1996) shows
that dictators share more in experimental dictator games if the recipient is the
American Red Cross, suggesting that subjects do act differently in lab experiments
where money goes to a charity organization such as the Red Cross. The donations
are not targeted at a specific project, country or the such, but go to a general Red
Cross fund and Red Cross Germany decides independently how to use the donation
from this experiment. Participants in the present experiment may have a vague
idea which projects are supported by the Red Cross but they do not know the
exact usage of the money. That is, they only have a diffuse idea how their tax
money is spent. It is in any case save to assume that subjects will not directly
benefit from the donated money unless they have a warm glow for giving.
4. Federal Government: All tax revenue collected in the payoff relevant round of
this treatment group is transferred to the budget of the federal German government.
Tax payments therefore go to the same general fund as any federal taxes (such as
the German income tax) and spending is decided upon by the federal government
after tax payments have been received. This payment situation therefore mimics the
real-world set-up where federal taxes go to the general fund and are not targeted at
specific purposes. Transferring to the federal government without a specific purpose
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is easily possible for any person willing to give money.18
2.2.5 Organization
The lab experiment was run in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER)
at the University of Cologne, Germany in June 2014. A random sample of the labo-
ratory’s subject pool of approximately 4000 persons was invited via email – using the
recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2004) – to participate in the experiment. Poten-
tial participants signed up for participating in a session on a first-come-first-serve basis.
A total of 126 subjects participated in the experiment (see section 2.2.6 for summary
statistics). Neither the content of the experiment nor the expected payoff were stated
in the invitation email. The computerized experiment was programmed utilizing z-tree
software (Fischbacher 2007).
All subjects in one session were in the same treatment condition and I conducted
one session of 32 or 31 subjects for each of the four treatment groups, giving a total of four
sessions.19 Each session included a practice round, in which subjects could familiarize
themselves with the experiment and in particular the reporting decision, eight payoff-
relevant rounds, and lasted about 45 minutes (including reading of the instructions and
payment of all participants). Upon entering the lab, random assignment to computer
booths was implemented by asking each subject to draw an ID number out of a box.
Subjects received a hard copy of the instructions when they entered the lab (see appendix
2.6) and were allowed as much time as they needed to familiarize themselves with the
procedure of the experiment. They were then given the opportunity to ask any clarifying
questions in private.
2.2.6 Data and summary statistics
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics separated by treatment groups. Several demo-
graphic and attitudinal variables were surveyed through a questionnaire at the end of
the experiment. The demographic variables include age, gender and native language. I
further asked one question on risk aversion20 and one on tax morale.21
The summary statistics show that males and native German speakers make up
18A simple bank transfer is required to give money to the federal government’s budget. Such transfers
are administered by the so-called Bundeskasse. See http://www.kkr.bund.de for more information.
19It was intended to have 32 subjects in all sessions but there were two no-show ups.
20The measure of risk aversion is obtained by asking subjects to choose between a certain pay-off of
EUR 50 and a gamble that pays EUR 100 with probability of 0.5 and EUR 0 with probability of 0.5.
21The tax morale question is adopted from World Values Survey (Minkov 2012). “Please tell me for
the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something
in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you have the chance’.” This is the most frequently used question to
measure tax morale in observational studies (e.g., Slemrod 2003, Alm and Torgler 2006, and Halla 2012).
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39.7% and 86.5% of the sample, respectively, and that the average age is 24.52 years.
Randomization into treatment groups worked mostly well as the variables are fairly bal-
anced across treatment groups. Non-parametric pair-wise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for
differences in distributions reveal small statistical significances in age between treatment
group 4 (government) and the other groups, as well as in the share of native German
speakers between group 1 and the other groups. All other group wise comparisons yield
non-significant differences. In order to ensure that the results are not driven by these
differences, I provide regression results that control for all demographic variables.
The table also depicts how much tax revenue was generated in each of the groups
(average per round: 309.23 ECU, 61.85 EUR) and how much tax revenue was eventually
used in the respective treatment group (Variable Tax amount used. Recall that this was
based on one randomly selected round). That is, in the group with redistribution 283.80
ECU (56.76 EUR) were equally redistributed among all 31 subjects. In the other groups,
351.60 ECU (70.32 EUR) were kept for research purposes, 255.01 ECU (51.00) EUR)
were donated to the Red Cross and 215.52 ECU (43.10 EUR) were transferred to the
budget of the German federal government.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status
Treatment group
Redistribution Research Red Cross Government Total
Age 23.26 24.22 23.59 27.06 24.52
(4.993) (3.599) (3.387) (8.771) (5.723)
Male 0.387 0.531 0.375 0.290 0.397
(0.495) (0.507) (0.492) (0.461) (0.491)
German native 0.968 0.813 0.844 0.839 0.865
(0.180) (0.397) (0.369) (0.374) (0.343)
Tax morale 7.935 7.250 7.594 7.645 7.603
(2.190) (2.300) (2.662) (2.715) (2.460)
Risk 1.323 1.281 1.219 1.484 1.325
(0.653) (0.634) (0.491) (0.811) (0.655)
Tax revenue avg. 308.2 337.7 290.0 300.7 309.2
(0) (0) (0) (0) (17.88)
Tax amount used 283.8 351.6 255.01 215.52 276.48
(0) (0) (0) (0) (41.22)
Observations 31 32 32 31 126
Notes: Reported are the means of demographic and attitudinal variables by treatment group. Stan-
dard deviations in parentheses. Variable Tax revenue is the average amount of tax revenue generated
over all rounds. Variable Tax amount used is the tax revenue in the randomly selected payoff-relevant
round, which was spent as indicated in the respective treatment group. All information, except Tax
revenue avg. and Tax amount used, were surveyed after the end of the experiment.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Non-parametric comparison of treatment groups
In this section, I provide an overview of compliance levels and compare the treatment
groups with respect to evasion behavior. Figure 2.1 depicts the mean share of reported
income, i.e., ratio of income reported for tax purposes to endowment, in each treatment
group. The figure suggests that average compliance levels are different across the groups.
I observe that the share of gross income that is reported for tax purposes is 30.22%
in the ”Redistribution” group, 42.52% in the ”Research” group, 40.87% in the ”Red
Cross” group, and 34.94% in the ”Government” group.22 While the compliance levels are
22The fact that the ranks of groups in terms of tax revenue (reported in the previous section) do not
mimic the ranks in compliance levels is due to the fact that tax revenues include penalty payments. For
example, while tax revenue in the Red Cross group is relatively low despite the relative high compliance
rate, subjects in this group were subject to less (random) audits and therefore had to pay less penalty
fees.
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similar in groups 1 and 4, they are larger in groups 2 and 3. That is, subjects in the
”Research” and ”Red Cross” treatments are on average more compliant than subjects
in the ”Redistribution” and ”Government’ groups. These effects are fairly large and
economically relevant. For example, compliance in the ”Research” and ”Red Cross”
groups is about 41% and 35%, respectively, higher than in the ”Redistribution” group.
Figure 2.1: Compliance Rate by Treatment Group
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
M
ea
n 
Co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
Le
ve
l
Redistribution Research Red Cross Government
Notes: Reported are the means of compliance rates by treatment group. Compliance rate is defined as
income reported for tax purposes divided by gross income. N = 126. Treatment groups differ in the use
of tax revenue.
Figures 2.2 to 2.5 in the Appendix report histograms of the compliance levels. The
Figures show that most participants in all four treatment groups chose the extreme values
of compliance behavior; either full compliance or full evasion.23 In all four groups, the
number of full evaders is higher than the number of full compliers. The figures further
reveal that the differences in means are partly driven by the relatively low share of full
evaders in group ”Research” and the relatively high share of full compliers in groups
”Research” and ”Red Cross”. The number of full evaders in the group with transfers to
research is particularly low relative to the other groups. This corresponds with the results
for the average compliance levels, which is highest in this group.
In a next step, I first average the data by subject,24 and then provide an overview of
means in compliance levels for each group along with the respective standard deviations
in Table 2.3. The table depicts that deviations from the mean are high in all groups.
For example, the standard deviation is 0.35 in the ”Redistribution” group which has an
23Tobit regression analyses below account for this distribution of compliance levels.
24This procedure yields one observation per subject. Averaging is necessary because a subject’s deci-
sions are very likely to be correlated across the eight periods; this implies that one should not treat the
eight decisions of a subject as independent observations.
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average compliance level of 0.302. These high variances put into question whether the
descriptive differences in means reflect significant differences in a statistical sense. In order
to test statistical significance, I first conduct a Kruskal-Wallis test which evaluates the
hypothesis that samples from all four groups are drawn from the same distribution. The
test yields a p-value of 0.44, suggesting that there are no statistical differences between all
four groups. This result is confirmed by pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests in which each
group is non-parametrically compared to each other group (not reported in the Table):
none of the pairwise comparisons show a statistically significant effect. The difference
between groups 1 and 2, which have the lowest and highest compliance levels respectively,
is close to conventionally defined significance; however, the p-value of 0.134 does not allow
to reject the null hypothesis of no effect even for these two groups.25 While there are
sizable differences in compliance levels between groups, the results therefore suggest that
these differences do not reflect statistically significant differences.
Table 2.3: Compliance and Standard Deviations by Treatment Status
Treatment group
Redistribution Research Red Cross Government Total K-W
Compliance 0.302 0.425 0.409 0.349 0.372 0.44
(0.350) (0.369) (0.411) (0.392) (0.380)
Observations 31 32 32 31 126
Notes: Reported are the means of compliance rates by treatment group. Standard Deviations in
parentheses. Compliance rate is defined as income reported for tax purposes divided by gross income.
Treatment groups differ in the use of tax revenues. K-W is the p-value of a Kruskal-Wallis test for
differences in distributions between the treatment groups (H0: no differences).
2.3.2 Parametric regressions
This section explores whether the non-parametric results translate into estimates from
parametric regressions. In the following, I present results based on the following regression
model:
φigt = α + β · Treatg + φ ·Xig + ηt + ig, (2.4)
where subscripts indicate a subject i in treatment group g = 1, 2, 3, 4 (with g = 1:
redistribution, g = 2: research, g = 3: Red Cross, g = 4: government) and round t. The
dependent variable φigt is the share of gross income that is reported for tax purposes, i.e.
the compliance rate. Treatg is a categorical indicator variable for a subject’s treatment
25The p-values of all pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are: Group 1 vs 2: 0.134, 1 vs 3: 0.441, 1 vs
4: 0.948, 2 vs 3: 0.695, 2 vs 4: 0.215, 3 vs 4: 0.902.
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group26 and β is the coefficient of interest. The coefficients for each treatment group will
be relative to the omitted group with g = 1, in which tax revenues are redistributed among
all subjects. i is an error term. Some specifications also include a set of round fixed
effects ηt, and controls for demographic and attitudinal variables that are captured inXig.
I use standard pooled OLS panel regressions as well as Tobit regressions that account
for the censored (between zero and one) nature of the dependent variable. Standard
errors in all regressions are clustered on the subject level to adjust statistical inference
for the interdependency (serial correlation) of decisions across the eight rounds of the
experiment.27
Specification (I) of Table 2.4 shows OLS panel estimates of the effect of treatment
status on the share of reported income (without including any further variables). The es-
timated coefficients of the treatment variables, all relative to the omitted reference group
”Redistribution”, confirm the non-parametric analysis: while the coefficients mirror the
fairly large differences in means, relatively high standard errors do not allow to reject the
hypothesis of no effect. As in the non-parametric comparisons, the difference between
groups ”Redistribution” and ”Research” is fairly close to conventional significance, but
does not cross the 10% threshold (p-value: 0.171). These results are virtually unchanged
in the presence of period fixed effects in specification (II). Specifications (III) and (IV)
add control variables for demographics (age, gender language) and attitudinal variables
(tax morale and risk surveyed after the experiment). The main results still remain stable:
compliance is higher in groups ”Research” and ”Red Cross” but these differences are not
precisely estimated. Table 2.5 in the Appendix displays the coefficients for the control
variables. In line with many findings, males in this experiment were less compliant than
women. All other variables are close to zero and not statistically significant. The his-
tograms discussed above indicate that many subjects chose extreme compliance behavior
at either zero or one. This motivates the use of Tobit regressions that account for censor-
ing at zero and one as a robustness check. Results from such Tobit regressions, presented
in Table 2.6 in the Appendix, are in line with all previous findings: compliance levels are
different, the difference between groups 1 and 2 is close to conventional significance, and
all other coefficients are not not statistically significant.
26Recall that I employ a between-subjects design where each subject is exclusively in one of the four
treatment groups. This also permits including individual fixed effects in the regressions.
27Note that in contrast to the non-parametric analysis, I use the panel data set with eight observations
per subject in the regressions.
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Table 2.4: Panel Regressions: Effects of treatment on compliance
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Reference group: Treatment Redistribution
Research 0.123 0.123 0.140 0.140
(0.090) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088)
Red Cross 0.106 0.106 0.102 0.102
(0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.093)
Government 0.047 0.047 0.018 0.018
(0.093) (0.094) (0.097) (0.097)
constant 0.302∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.217 0.241
(0.062) (0.065) (0.207) (0.210)
Period FE X X
Controls X X
N 1008 1008 1008 1008
R2 0.014 0.019 0.046 0.051
Notes: Pooled OLS panel regressions based on equation 2.4. Standard errors in parentheses clustered
by individuals. Estimates are based on a sample of 126 individuals and eight periods. Significant levels
are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01. Dependent variable: Compliance rate defined as income reported
for tax purposes divided by gross income. Independent variables of interest are the dummy variables
for the treatment groups ”Research”, ”Red Cross” and ”Government”. Coefficients of interest are
relative to the omitted treatment group ”Redistribution” (in ”constant”). Treatment groups differ
with respect to the usage of tax revenue. Specifications (II) and (IV) include period fixed effects.
Specifications (III) and (IV) include control variables for age, gender, language, tax morale and risk
attitude. The results for these coefficients are depicted in Table 2.5 in the Appendix.
Heterogeneity in gross income levels In a next step, I test whether treatment
effects depend on the level of endowment; something which may of relevance for future
compliance experiments. In a first step towards the exploration of the role of gross income,
I regress the compliance rate on gross income. The estimate from this regression is slightly
negative, but marginally significant (p-value: 0.095). In order to explore whether the level
of endowment is relevant for the treatment effects, I then interact the level of gross income
with each of the treatment dummies. The results, presented in Table 2.7 in the Appendix,
reveal that the coefficients on the interaction variables are always very close to zero and
never statistically significant. This suggests that the effect treatment effect of tax revenue
is unlikely to depend on the level of gross income.
2.4 Discussion and concluding remarks
While the literature sometimes speculates that the type of tax money recipient affects
compliance decisions, evidence on this question is surprisingly scarce. This paper aims to
contribute to filling this gap and examines if lab experimental compliance decision depend
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on the nature of tax expenditures. I run a ”typical” tax compliance lab experiment and
solely vary how generated tax revenues are spent: 1) Redistribution among all subjects in
a session, 2) transfer to the experimenters’ research fund, 3) donation to the German Red
Cross and 4) transfer to the general budget of the federal government. These treatment
groups reflect set-ups that have previously been used in the experimental compliance
literature as well as a realistic scenario where tax money is transferred to the federal
government.
The experimental results indicate that average compliance levels are higher in the
groups in which tax revenue is spent for research and charity purposes (Red Cross).
These effects are fairly sizable. For example, compliance in the ”Research” and ”Red
Cross” groups is about 40% and 35% higher than in the group with redistribution among
subjects. Non-parametric and parametric (regression) analyses, however, depict that
these differences are not precisely estimated and do not differ from zero in a statistical
sense. These results suggest that the type of tax recipient is likely to matter for lab
experimental compliance decisions, but the present experimental data do not allow the
statistical rejection of the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. Although the effects are
imprecisely estimated, the large differences in means along with p-values fairly close to
conventionally defined significance yet show that future lab experiments should be aware
that the type of recipient may make a difference. While it cannot be ruled out that other
types of tax revenue use would make a larger and more precisely estimated difference,
my paper depicts that the most common types in the literature and a realistic transfer
to the Government may affect compliance behavior. The imprecision in the estimated
differences may to some extend be due to the relatively low number of observations.
Follow-up studies that study the present research question with a larger sample may be
promising and shed more light on my results.
The paper’s results are in line with the large literature on pro-social donation be-
havior in that they provide further evidence that the type of recipient is likely to matter
for pro-social behavior. The low compliance level in the group with redistribution among
anonymous subjects along with the high compliance level in the ”Red Cross” group is
particularly complementary to Eckel and Grossman (1996) who find that transfers in
dictator games are substantially higher when the recipient is the Red Cross, relative to
a situation with anonymous recipients. A general conclusion from this may be that the
economics of tax compliance might be able to benefit from the studies on charitable giving
and vice versa.
The reasons for higher compliance levels in the ”Research” and ”Red Cross” groups
are speculative. The extent to which subjects directly benefit from their tax payments
does not seem to make a difference: tax compliance is higher in groups without a di-
rect link between tax payment and a subject’s own benefit. However, given that the
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government redistributes the vast share of tax revenues, the results may indicate that
taxpayers prefer using tax money for charitable donations and giving – to research and
the Red Cross – over the redistributive use of tax money – as in groups ”Redistribution”
and ”Government”. The average compliance rate in groups 1 and 4 where tax payments
are used for redistributive purposes is 0.326, whereas it is 0.417 in the other two groups
where tax payments are donated. Another explanatory factor may be concrete knowledge
about how the respective recipient spends the allocated tax money. Subjects are familiar
with the type of research that is conducted at their university, and they are likely to have
a clear perception about donation use of the Red Cross. In contrast, since government
money is transferred to the large general fund, subjects in this group may lack informa-
tion about the concrete usage of their money. As suggested by the literature on charitable
giving, anonymity may be among the reasons as well. Whereas subjects are familiar with
researchers and their work through lectures and seminars, it is unlikely that subjects
knew other lab experiment participants. There likely is not a personal relationship to
the Red Cross either, but it is a large charity organization and their work and represen-
tatives are fairly well-known. A further reason may be rooted in differing opinions on
the reliability and efficiency of the recipients. In particular, public government finances
are often perceived to be inefficient and wrongly targeted in large Continental European
welfare states (Algan et al. 2014)
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2.5 Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Compliance Rates: Group Redistribution
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Notes: Histogram of Compliance Rates. Compliance rate is defined as reported income divided by gross
income.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Compliance Rates: Group Research
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Notes: Histogram of Compliance Rates. Compliance rate is defined as reported income divided by gross
income.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Compliance Rates: Group Red Cross
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Notes: Histogram of Compliance Rates. Compliance rate is defined as reported income divided by gross
income.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Compliance Rates: Group Government
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Notes: Histogram of Compliance Rates. Compliance rate is defined as reported income divided by gross
income.
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Table 2.5: Panel Regressions: Effect of treatment on compliance (detailed results)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Reference group: Treatment Redistribution
Research 0.123 0.123 0.140 0.140
(0.090) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088)
Red Cross 0.106 0.106 0.102 0.102
(0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.093)
Government 0.047 0.047 0.018 0.018
(0.093) (0.094) (0.097) (0.097)
Age 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Male -0.135∗ -0.135∗
(0.070) (0.070)
German -0.032 -0.032
(0.101) (0.102)
Tax Morale 0.010 0.010
(0.013) (0.013)
Risk -0.008 -0.008
(0.055) (0.055)
constant 0.302∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.217 0.241
(0.062) (0.065) (0.207) (0.210)
Period FE X X
N 1008 1008 1008 1008
R2 0.014 0.019 0.046 0.051
Notes: Pooled OLS panel regressions based on equation 2.4. Standard errors in parentheses clustered
by individuals. Estimates are based on a sample of 126 individuals and eight periods. Significant levels
are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01. Dependent variable: Compliance rate defined as income reported
for tax purposes divided by gross income. Independent variables of interest are the dummy variables
for the treatment groups ”Research”, ”Red Cross” and ”Government”. Coefficients of interest are
relative to the omitted treatment group ”Redistribution” (in ”constant”). Treatment groups differ
with respect to the usage of tax revenue. Specifications (II) and (IV) include period fixed effects.
Specifications (III) and (IV) include control variables for age, gender, language, tax morale and risk
attitude.
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Table 2.6: Tobit Regressions: Effects of treatment on compliance
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Reference group: Treatment Redistribution
Research 0.299 0.300 0.332 0.332
(0.217) (0.217) (0.211) (0.211)
Red Cross 0.213 0.213 0.199 0.200
(0.233) (0.233) (0.228) (0.228)
Government 0.086 0.086 -0.007 -0.006
(0.232) (0.232) (0.239) (0.239)
Age 0.015 0.015
(0.014) (0.014)
Male -0.351∗∗ -0.351∗∗
(0.174) (0.174)
German -0.177 -0.178
(0.226) (0.226)
Tax Morale 0.026 0.026
(0.032) (0.032)
Risk 0.021 0.021
(0.130) (0.129)
constant 0.025 0.074 -0.261 -0.216
(0.161) (0.167) (0.515) (0.517)
Period FE X X
N 1008 1008 1008 1008
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.008 0.026 0.028
Notes: Tobit panel regressions based on equation 2.4. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by
individuals. The tobit regressions account for censoring in the compliance level at zero and one.
Estimates based on a sample of 126 individuals and eight periods. Significant levels are ∗ < 0.10,
∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01. Dependent variable: Compliance rate defined as income reported for tax
purposes divided by gross income. Independent variables of interest are the dummy variables for the
treatment groups ”Research”, ”Red Cross” and ”Government”. Coefficients of interest are relative to
the omitted treatment group ”Redistribution”. Treatment groups differ with respect to the usage of
tax revenue. Specifications (II) and (IV) include period fixed effects. Specifications (III) and (IV)
include control variables for age, gender, language, tax morale and risk attitude.
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Table 2.7: Panel Regressions: Heterogeneity w.r.t. gross income
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Reference group: Treatment Redistribution
Research 0.237 0.096 0.254∗ 0.114
(0.147) (0.191) (0.144) (0.189)
Red Cross 0.187 0.047 0.183 0.042
(0.117) (0.170) (0.113) (0.166)
Government 0.023 -0.117 -0.006 -0.146
(0.117) (0.170) (0.123) (0.174)
Research × Inc -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Red Cross × Inc -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Govn’t × Inc 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Age 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Male -0.135∗ -0.135∗
(0.070) (0.070)
German -0.032 -0.032
(0.101) (0.102)
Tax Morale 0.010 0.010
(0.013) (0.013)
Risk -0.008 -0.008
(0.055) (0.055)
constant 0.302∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.217 0.253
(0.062) (0.070) (0.207) (0.211)
Period FE X X
N 1008 1008 1008 1008
R2 0.014 0.019 0.047 0.051
Notes: Pooled OLS panel regressions. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by individuals. Es-
timates are based on a sample of 126 individuals and eight periods. Significant levels are ∗ < 0.10,
∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01. Dependent variable: Compliance rate defined as income reported for tax
purposes divided by gross income. Independent variables of interest are the dummy variables for the
treatment groups ”Research”, ”Red Cross” and ”Government”, as well as the interaction variables
between these treatment dummies with the level of gross income (”Inc”). Coefficients of interest are
relative to the omitted treatment group ”Redistribution” (in ”constant”). Treatment groups differ
with respect to the usage of tax revenue. Specifications (II) and (IV) include period fixed effects.
Specifications (III) and (IV) include control variables for age, gender, language, tax morale and risk
attitude.
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2.6 Appendix B: Instructions
The following pages display the English translation of the instructions (the original Ger-
man version is available upon request). The instructions for the four treatment groups
are almost identical and only differ with respect to the information about tax revenue
use. These difference are indicated in the following instructions.
Instructions  
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end of the experiment, 
please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you do not abide by this rule, we will have to 
exclude you from the experiment. 
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions after reading the instructions 
or during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the instructors will come to you and answer your 
question in person. Your payment and your decisions throughout the experiment will be treated confidentially. 
None of the other participants is informed, neither during nor after the experiment, about your decisions in the 
experiment or your payment. 
You can earn money in this experiment. During the experiment, your payments will be calculated in a virtual 
currency: Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 5 ECU corresponds to 1 EUR. After the experiment, your 
pay-off will be converted to Euro and given to you in cash. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 
2.50 EUR. 
 
The Experiment 
 
Overview 
The experiment consists of one practice round and eight payoff rounds. You cannot earn money in the 
practice round. Each round has two stages. In the first round, you receive an income. This income is subject to 
a tax of 30% and in the second stage of the experiment you are asked to make an income reporting decision 
for tax purposes. There is a random chance of 10% that your reporting decision is checked. If your reporting 
decision is checked and you have not reported the true amount of income, you will have to make an extra 
payment. 
[Treat 1] The tax revenue generated in the experiment is equally redistributed among all participants of the 
experiment. 
[Treat 2] The tax revenue generated in the experiment is used for future research projects of the 
experimenters. 
[Treat 3] The tax revenue generated in the experiment is donated to the German Red Cross. 
[Treat 4] The tax revenue generated in the experiment is transferred to the German federal government. 
 
The details of the experiment are described in the following. 
 
Proceeding of a round 
Stage 1: Gross income 
In the beginning of each round, you receive an income. This income is subject to a tax and is therefore called 
gross income. The level of gross income may vary from round to round, but is always between 44 and 65 
ECU. The level of gross income is the same for all subjects in a given round. 
Stage 2: Income reporting decision 
The gross income you receive in stage 1 is subject to a tax rate of 30%. This tax rate is the same throughout 
the entire experiment. 
You are now asked to make an income reporting decision for tax purposes and report the level of gross 
income that you received. You report an amount that shall be taxed at the tax rate of 30%. This reported 
amount can be between zero and your full gross income. 
After you have completed the tax reporting decision and confirmed through pressing “OK”, the computer 
determines whether it is checked if the reported amount equals the true amount of gross income. To do so, the 
computer randomly selects a natural number between 1 and 10. Your decision is only checked if the number 1 
is selected. That means there is a random chance of 10% that the reporting decision is checked. The 
experimental investigators of course cannot see whether or not you reported your full gross income. 
 
Calculation of net income 
Your payment at the end of a round is called net income. 
After your tax reporting decision you are shown which number was randomly selected by the computer. Based 
on this random selection of a number you are faced with one of the following two scenarios for your net 
income: 
 
Scenario a): The computer selects the number 1: 
Your reporting decision will be checked to determine whether you reported your full gross income for tax 
purposes. Depending on your previous decision, there are two possibilities for your net income: 
- Too little gross income reported: 
If your reported income is lower than your full gross income, then you will have to pay the tax 
liability based on your full gross income and an extra payment. This extra payment is the higher 
the lower the reported amount is. The extra payment equals twice of the underreported tax 
liability. Hence: 
 Net income = gross income – (gross income x 0.30) – [2 x 0.30 x (gross income – reported 
income)] 
- True gross income reported: 
If your reported income equals your full gross income, then your net income consists of your 
gross income less your tax liability. Hence:  
                     Net income = gross income – (gross income x 0.30) 
 
Scenario b): The computer selects a number between 2 and 10  
Your reporting decision will not be checked to determine whether you reported your full gross income for tax 
purposes. Your net income, in this case, consists of your gross income less the tax payment. The tax payment 
depends on your income reporting decision. The tax payment is the reported income multiplied with the tax 
rate of 0.30. Hence:  
     Net income = gross income – (reported income x 0.30) 
 
Use of tax revenue 
Your tax payment in a given round is calculated as gross income minus your net income. Hence: 
     Tax payment = gross income – net income 
That is, the amount of tax payment depends on the level of gross income, the amount you reported for tax 
purposes and whether your reporting decision was checked. 
The tax payments of all participants sum up to tax revenue that is generated in this experiment. 
[Treat 1] The overall tax revenue, plus potentially paid extra payments, in a randomly chosen round are 
equally redistributed among all participants in the laboratory. In addition to your net income you hence 
receive a share of total tax revenue. This share is calculated by summing up the tax payments of all 
participants and then dividing by the number of participants. 
[Treat 2] The overall tax revenue, plus potentially paid extra payments, in a randomly chosen round are used 
for research purposes. The tax payments are used by the experimenters for future research projects. 
[Treat 3] The overall tax revenue, plus potentially paid extra payments, in a randomly chosen round are 
donated to the German Red Cross. The donation to the Red Cross is not targeted at a specific aid project. 
[Treat 4] The overall tax revenue, plus potentially paid extra payments, in a randomly chosen round are 
transferred to the federal budget of the Federal Republic of Germany. The tax payments are transferred to the 
Bundeskasse, where all regular federal tax payments in Germany go. The transfer to the federal budget is not 
targeted at a specific purpose. 
 
Payoff 
Your final payoff, which will be paid to you at the end of the experiment, does not consist of the sum of all 
net incomes in the eight payoff rounds. Instead, after the end of the experiment a round will randomly be 
selected based on which you are paid. This selected payoff relevant round is identical for all participants. 
After the end of the eighth payoff round, the computer randomly determines the payoff relevant round. Each 
of the eight rounds can be selected with the same probability. Your final payoff is based on your net income in 
the selected round. That is, if, for example, number “2” is selected, your final payoff consists of your net 
income in round two. The selected net income is converted to EUR and paid to you in cash. In addition, you 
receive a show-up fee of EUR 2,50. The use of tax revenue also depends on the tax payments made in the 
same randomly selected round. 
 
Final Remarks 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire while we prepare the 
payments. All information collected through this questionnaire, just like all data gathered during the 
experiment, are anonymous and exclusively used for scientific purposes.  
 
 
Chapter 3
Tax incidence in the presence of tax
evasion
3.1 Introduction
The standard textbook theory of taxation makes the prediction that the economic in-
cidence of a tax solely depends on the relative elasticity of demand and supply. The
tax burden will fall disproportionately on consumers if demand is more inelastic than
supply and more on producers if supply is more inelastic than demand. However, there
is evidence that the incidence of a tax also depends on other factors such as tax salience
(Chetty 2009) and remittance policy (Slemrod 2008).1
Another factor likely to drive the incidence of taxes is the prevalence of tax evasion
opportunities. Intuitively, access to tax evasion allows taxpayers to lower their effective
tax rate by reducing their tax base. As a result, the “real" behavioral responses that
determine tax incidence are likely to differ between taxpayers who can evade and those
who cannot.2 Understanding this possible source of deviation between observed and
standard theoretical economic incidence is important given the prevalence of tax evasion
in both developed and developing countries (Slemrod 2007; Schneider et al. 2010; Kleven
et al. 2011). Although the impact of tax evasion on incidence has intuitive appeal and
is policy relevant, theoretical evidence is mixed (Marrelli 1984; Yaniv 1995; Bayer and
Cowell 2009), and there is very little empirical evidence.
The objective of this paper, therefore, is to contribute empirical evidence on the
effect of tax evasion on tax incidence. The specific research question is, do sellers with
tax evasion opportunities trade their goods and services at different prices than they
otherwise would if no tax evasion opportunities existed? In other words, are equilibrium
1The literature is reviewed in detail further below.
2By real response we are referring to behavioral changes that directly affect decisions such as leisure,
consumption or production (Slemrod 1995).
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prices different in markets where evasion is an option relative to markets without evasion
opportunities? We design an economic laboratory experiment with between-subject vari-
ation in which subjects trade fictitious goods in a double auction. Subjects are randomly
assigned roles as sellers or buyers in treatment and control groups. A per-unit tax is im-
posed on all sellers. In the treatment group, sellers are able to under-report the number
of units sold, whereas in the control group the tax liability is paid automatically (as with
exact withholding). The only difference between the treatment and control group is that
sellers in the treatment group can evade the sales tax. Therefore, we identify the impact
of evasion on tax incidence by comparing the equilibrium prices in the treatment group
with that in the control group.
The experimental laboratory has been used extensively to study the economic in-
cidence of taxes. In fact, various studies have found that the theoretical results of tax
incidence – without evasion – hold in competitive experimental markets such as a double
auction (Kachelmeier et al. 1994; Borck et al. 2002; Ruﬄe 2005). We therefore intro-
duce tax evasion to an environment that has been shown to provide credible results in
the context of tax incidence.3 Relying on the controlled environment of the laboratory
also means that we are able to avoid much of the econometric problems of observational
data analyses and thus produce clean identification of the treatment effect. Achieving
causal identification using observational data requires random variation in access to eva-
sion across otherwise similar markets. This is obviously difficult to achieve since access
to tax evasion is most likely one of the dimensions of a market that determines whether
buyers and sellers select to participate in that market.
We place our empirical question in a theoretical framework based on the standard
textbook partial equilibrium approach to tax incidence. The model shows that access to
tax evasion changes the incidence of the tax. More specifically, an increase in the statutory
tax rate leads to a smaller increase in the market price if sellers are non-compliant relative
to a market with full compliance; this impact on incidence is increasing in the non-
compliance rate. The simple reason for this result is that sellers with an evasion option
are able to reduce their effective tax rate relative to those without evasion. As a result,
the tax causes the supply curve to shift up by less in the case with evasion. In our specific
context, a per-unit tax on sellers who can evade taxes reduces the share of the statutory
tax burden that is passed on to buyers.
Our empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction. In particular, the equilib-
rium price in the treatment group with tax evasion is statistically and economically lower
than in the control group. Accordingly, the number of units traded is higher in the case
with evasion. By under-reporting sales, sellers reduce their effective tax burden, which
3We employ an experimental double auction similar to Grosser and Reuben (2013). Riedl (2010)
provides an overview of experimental tax incidence research.
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allows them to sell at lower prices. Although the statutory burden on buyers is lower in
the presence of tax evasion, we find evidence that sellers shift the full expected effective
tax rate onto buyers. As expected, the smaller impact on the market equilibrium results
in a much lower partial equilibrium excess burden in the presence of tax evasion.4
Addressing the research question posed in this paper makes several important con-
tributions to the literatures on tax incidence, tax salience and tax evasion. First, several
studies have attempted to identify the incidence of taxes using observational data. For
example, Alm et al. (2009) and Marion and Muehlegger (2011) find that the incidence
of the fuel tax in the US is fully shifted to final consumers and related to supply and
demand conditions, Saez et al. (2012) find that tax equivalence does not hold in the
context of the Greek payroll tax, and Fuest et al. (2013) find that the burden of local
business taxes in Germany partly falls on employees via lower wages.5 To overcome the
challenges of identifying causal effects using observational data, several studies explore
the question of economic incidence in a laboratory setting. For example, Kachelmeier
et al. (1994), Quirmbach et al. (1996), Borck et al. (2002), and Ruﬄe (2005) find that
the theoretical predictions of tax incidence hold true in a competitive laboratory mar-
ket with full information.6 We add to this strand of the literature by introducing tax
evasion to a standard competitive experimental double-auction market and show that
this changes the incidence of the tax. This finding is important because it suggests that
tax equivalence, which is the focus of the existing laboratory tax incidence literature, is
unlikely to hold in the real world where buyers and sellers have different access to evasion
(Slemrod 2008).
Two studies more closely related to ours in that they estimate economic incidence in
the presence of tax evasion are Alm and Sennoga (2010) and Kopczuk et al. (2013). The
latter provides empirical evidence that the stage of production at which the tax on diesel
is collected in the US affects the economic incidence of the tax. Although they suggest
that this difference is driven by variation in access to evasion across production stages,
reliance on observational data makes it difficult to cleanly identify whether this effect is
fully due to variation in compliance behavior. Alm and Sennoga (2010) use a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the economic incidence of tax evasion for a
“typical" developing country. They find that the benefits of evasion generally do not stay
with the evader if there is free entry, which suggests that evasion changes the incidence
4Tax evasion opportunities also have a negative effect on generated tax revenue; revenue is higher
in the control than in the treatment group. However, the foregone tax revenue represents a transfer to
private agents and does not affect welfare as long as one does not impose a welfare function that gives
higher weight to tax financed public goods relative to private consumption.
5Other examples of observational tax incidence studies include Evans et al. (1999), Gruber and
Koszegi (2004), and Rothstein (2010).
6Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) and Riedl and Tyran (2005) find that the laws of tax incidence
do not translate to non-competitive experimental market.
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of taxes. Since we rely on the controlled environment of the lab, our empirical approach
provides precise control over the market institutions, which allows us to randomize access
to evasion and measure non-compliance accurately. As a result, we are able to offer cleaner
identification of the impact of tax evasion on the economic incidence of the tax than these
two studies. Nonetheless, we view our work as complementary to these papers. The
illusive nature of tax evasion implies that consistent results across multiple techniques is
required if we are to draw firm conclusions about causes and consequences of tax evasion.
We argue that our results, combined with Kopczuk et al. (2013) and Alm and Sennoga
(2010), provide evidence that the standard textbook model of tax incidence does not hold
up in many real world applications.
Second, our paper is related to the tax salience literature, which shows that the
standard theoretical incidence result may not hold if taxes are not salient. For example,
Chetty (2009) show in the field that people under-react to taxes that are added at the
register relative to taxes that are shown in the displayed price of goods. Similarly, Saus-
gruber and Tyran (2005) find in a lab experimental context that indirect taxes exhibit
a different incidence than direct taxes because indirect taxes are less visible.7 Similar to
the salience effects described in Chetty (2009), we provide evidence that the willingness
and opportunity to evade taxes dampens “real" behavioral responses to taxation. Tax-
payers who evade taxes do not adjust their economic behavior in response to changes in
the tax rate by as much as if evasion was not an option. The dampening effect on “real"
behavioral responses changes the incidence of the tax just as if the tax was not salient to
the taxpayer.
Finally, our paper adds to the general tax evasion literature. Naturally, obtaining
credible causal evidence in the context of tax evasion is very difficult using observational
studies (Slemrod and Weber 2012). A broad strand of literature has therefore employed
lab experiments to study evasion (e.g., Fortin et al. 2007; Alm et al. 2009; Balafoutas
et al. 2014).8 However, unlike most of the tax evasion literature, we focus on the impli-
cations of tax evasion (e.g., Doerrenberg and Duncan 2014b) rather than on explaining
tax evasion (e.g., Alm 2012). In particular, like Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014b), we
show that real responses to taxes are small in part because of income shifting responses
such as tax evasion.
Our findings also have important policy implications related to the distribution of
tax burden and the effectiveness of tax policy as a tool for influencing behavior. First,
understanding the impact of tax evasion on the economic incidence of taxes is important
for the correct evaluation of the distributional effect of tax policies aimed at reducing tax
7Further examples of salience effects in the field are Finkelstein (2009) and Gallagher and Muehlegger
(2011). Abeler and Jaeger (2014) and Blumkin et al. (2012) study questions related to salience effects
in a laboratory setting.
8Andreoni et al. (1998) and Torgler (2002) provide surveys on tax compliance in experiments.
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evasion. The results we present here further suggest that accounting for tax evasion in
incidence studies may lead to a re-evaluation of the progressivity/regressivity of various
taxes. For example, a sales tax where the benefits of evasion stay with sellers is likely
to be more regressive than one where the benefits are shifted to buyers, especially if the
evading sellers sell mostly to lower income individuals. This finding is important for
empirical analysis of the distributional implications of tax reform proposals.
Second, taxes aimed at influencing real behavior are likely to be less effective if
the market participants responsible for remitting the tax have access to tax evasion
opportunities. Because the effective tax rate is lower among evaders, “real" behavioral
responses to the tax are dampened, which limits the ability of the tax to achieve desired
behavioral outcomes. For example, a number of states in the U.S. are now considering the
adoption of road mileage user-fees as a replacement for fuel taxes (Duncan and Graham
2013). The salience of road mileage user-fees suggests that they are likely to reduce
vehicle miles traveled. According to our results, this desirable outcome is unlikely to
occur if mileage user-fees are administered in ways that facilitate tax evasion via odometer
tampering, say. More generally, to the extent that tax evasion cannot be fully eliminated,
our findings suggest that it might be optimal to apply higher tax rates to goods sold in
markets with evasion opportunities (e.g., Cremer and Gahvari 1993). Not only could this
be more efficient, but it might also achieve the desired adjustments in behavior.
The relevance and importance of these policy implications is especially obvious when
one considers the prevalence of tax evasion across the world (Slemrod 2007; Schneider
et al. 2010; Kleven et al. 2011). Transaction taxes, which we focus on in our study, are
of particular interest in this context. For example, sales tax gap estimates range from 2
percent to 41 percent for the value added tax in the European Union and 1 percent to
19.5 percent for the retail sales tax in the United States (see Mikesell 2014 for a review of
sales tax evasion estimates). Additionally, it is generally accepted that ‘use’ tax evasion
by both businesses and individuals is much higher than retail sales tax evasion; e.g., GAO
(2000) assume non-compliance rates of 20 to 50 percent among businesses and 95 to 100
percent among individuals in a study of the potential revenue losses of e-commerce.9
Therefore, our results are relevant in countries such as the United States where, for
example, a number of states have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, legislation
aimed at (a) restricting the sale of “zappers", which are used to evade sales taxes, and (b)
requiring online traders to register as sales tax collectors. Our findings suggest that such
measures are likely to result in higher prices as affected sellers fully adjust to the retail
sales tax. While we focus on sales taxes here, the findings also suggest that other anti-tax
evasion initiatives, such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), are likely
9Consumers in the United States are required to pay ‘use’ tax in lieu of the retail sales tax if the seller
is not required – by law – to register as a tax collector in the consumers’ state.
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to affect the level of economic activity as affected parties respond to the reduced evasion
opportunities.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We describe the experimental design in
section 3.2, the theoretical framework in section 3.3 and the results in section 3.4. Our
findings are discussed in section 3.5 and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Overview
The experimental design reflects a standard competitive experimental double auction
market as pioneered by Smith (1962).10 The auction and the parameters in our exper-
iment are based on Grosser and Reuben (2013). In each round of the double auction
market, 5 buyers and 5 sellers trade two units of a homogeneous and fictious good. Sell-
ers are assigned costs for each unit and buyers are assigned values. The roles of sellers
and buyers as well as the costs and values are exogenous and randomly assigned to the
lab participants. We impose a per-unit tax on sellers to this set-up and give sellers in the
treatment group the opportunity to evade the tax whereas sellers in the control group
pay the per-unit tax automatically (as with exact withholding). We employ a between-
subjects design where each participant is either in the control or treatment group. Further
details on the experimental design are provided in the next subsections.
3.2.2 Organization
The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER),
University of Cologne, Germany. A large random sample of all subjects in the labora-
tory’s subject pool of approximately 4000 persons was invited via email – using the
recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2004) – to participate in the experiment. Partic-
ipants signed up on a first-come-first-serve basis. Neither the content of the experiment
nor the expected payoff was stated in the invitation email. The experiment was pro-
grammed utilizing z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). We ran eight sessions over two
regular school days in November and December 2013.11 Each session consisted of either
a control or treatment group market and lasted about 100 minutes (including review of
instructions and payment of participants).
10Double auction markets mimic a perfectly competitive market. Dufwenberg et al. (2005), for ex-
ample, rely on an experimental double auction to study financial markets. Holt (1995) provides an
overview.
11There are two regular semesters at the tertiary level in Germany; winter semester lasting from Octo-
ber to March and summer semester between April and July. Therefore, the experiment was implemented
during the regular semester.
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We conduct four control and four treatment sessions for a total of 80 subjects.12
Experimental Currency Units (ECU) are used as the currency during the experiment.
After the experiment, ECU are converted to Euro with an exchange of 30 ECU = 1 EUR
and subjects are paid the sum of all net incomes (see below) in Euro. It was public
information that all tax revenue generated in the experiment would be donated to the
German Red Cross.
At the beginning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned to computer
boothes by drawing an ID number out of a bingo bag upon entering the lab. The com-
puter then randomly assigns each subject to role as buyer or seller, as well as her costs
or values which stay constant during the experiment. Subjects are given a hard copy
of the instructions when they enter the lab and are allowed as much time as needed to
familiarize themselves with the procedure of the experiment. They are also allowed to
ask any clarifying questions.
3.2.3 Description of a session
Each session includes 1 market that is either a control or treatment group market. Each
market has five buyers and five sellers who each have 2 units of a fictitious good to trade.
Sellers and buyers are randomly assigned costs and values for both of their units; the
roles as buyer or seller and the assigned values and costs are exogenously determined and
stay constant for the entire experiment. All ten subjects in one session/market first trade
in 3 practice rounds and then 27 payoff relevant rounds.
Trade in the Double Auction As is common in experimental markets, subjects are
given demand and supply schedules for a fictitious good at the beginning of the session
(Ruﬄe 2005; Cox et al. 2012; Grosser and Reuben 2013). The demand schedule for buyers
assigns a value to each of two items and the supply schedule for sellers assigns a cost to
each of two items. The cost/value of the units vary across items and subjects as illustrated
in Table 3.1. This allows us to induce demand and supply curves for each market, which
are depicted in Figure 3.1. The schedules are chosen such that demand and supply
elasticities are equal in equilibrium. The demand and supply schedules remain fixed
across periods in a given session, and they do not differ between control and treatment
markets.
Subjects trade the good in a double auction market that is opened for two minutes
in each period. During this time, each seller can post an “ask” that is lower than the
current ask on the market, but higher than the cost of the item to the seller. In other
12While this appears to be low, note that Grosser and Reuben (2013), for example, only implemented
four markets and yet have sufficient statistical power to identify a treatment effect. See section 3.4.2 for
summary statistics on demographic characteristics of the participants.
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words, sellers cannot trade an item below its cost. Additionally, sellers must sell their
cheaper unit before they sell their more expensive unit. Similarly, each buyer can post
a “bid” that is higher than the current bid on the market, but lower than the value of
the item to the buyer. Therefore, buyers cannot buy an item at a price that exceeds its
value. Buyers must also buy their most valued item before their least valued item. The
lowest standing ask and the highest standing bid are displayed on the computer screen
of all ten market participants.13
An item is traded if a seller accepts the standing buyer bid or a buyer accepts the
standing seller ask. Subjects are not required to trade a minimum amount of items,
items that are not traded yield neither costs nor profits. Traders are not allowed to
communicate with each other. This trading procedure is identical for the treatment and
control groups.
Income: Control Group Gross-income in each period consists of the sum of the profit
on each unit traded. Sellers’ gross profit on each unit is equal to the difference between
the selling price and cost, while buyers’ profit on each unit is the difference between
value and price paid. All subjects (buyers and sellers) are told that sellers have to pay
a per-unit tax for each unit sold, that the tax rate is fixed across all periods at τ = 10
ECU per-unit and that the tax is collected at the end of every third trading period. In
other words, subjects complete three rounds of trading then tax is collected from sellers,
then three more rounds of trading then another tax collection and so on. This yields 27
trading periods and 9 tax collections; we discuss this design feature below. We define
total gross profit in each trading period i (i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 25, 26, 27) as
Πsi = Pi1d1 + Pi2d2 − C1d1 − C2d2, (3.1)
for sellers and
Πbi = V1d1 + V2d2 − Pi1d1 − Pi2d2, (3.2)
for buyers. Superscripts s and b indicate seller and buyer, respectively, dj = 1 if good j
is traded and 0 otherwise, Pij is the price of good j in period i, Cj is the cost of good j
and Vj is the value of good j.
Because taxes are collected at the end of every third trading period, a seller’s net
income for each tax collection period k (k = 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27) is equal to:
pisk = Πsk + Πsk−1 + Πsk−2 − τU, (3.3)
where U is the total number of units sold in the last three rounds and τ = 10 is the
13Figure 3.8 in the appendix depicts a screenshot of the experimental market place for a seller in the
treatment group with evasion opportunity.
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statutory per-unit tax rate. Because buyers do not pay a tax, their net income for each
tax collection period may be written as:
pibk = Πbk + Πbk−1 + Πbk−2 (3.4)
Both buyers and sellers are shown their gross income after every trading period and their
net income after every tax collection period. Subjects’ final payoff is the sum of their net
incomes from the nine tax collection periods.
Income: Treatment Group Since buyers do not pay the tax, the calculation of gross
and net income for buyers in the treatment group is identical to that of the control group:
see equations (3.2) and (3.4). Sellers, on the other hand, make a tax reporting decision at
the end of every third round. In other words, subjects complete three rounds of trading
then sellers make a reporting decision; then three more rounds of trading then another
reporting decision and so on.
One advantage of allowing subjects to report after every third trading period is that
it increases the probability that every subject has a positive amount to report and must
therefore explicitly decide if they wish to under-report sales for tax purposes. Another
advantage of using every third round is that it yields 9 reporting decisions. This is
advantageous because it means that subjects can learn the implications of tax evasion for
their profits and update their beliefs about the probability of being caught. As a result,
we can be assured that the market equilibrium in the evasion treatment reflects the
impact of tax evasion on the behaviour of market participants. Although reporting every
period would maximize the number reporting decisions, we opted against this option
because excess supply in the market implies that some subjects will sell zero units in
a given trading period, which trivializes the reporting decision. Another option is to
have subjects make a single reporting decision at the end of the experiment. While this
approach maximizes the chance that everyone has a positive amount to report, having
a single reporting decision would not allow subjects to learn or update their beliefs. We
opted for every third round as a reasonable compromise between these two extremes.14
Sellers can report any number between 0 and the true amount sold in the previous
three trading periods, and the reported amount is taxed at τ = 10 ECU per-unit. Sellers
face an exogenous audit probability of γ = 0.1 (10 percent) and pay a fine, which is
equal to twice the evaded taxes if they underreport sales and are audited. The tax rate,
audit probability, and fine rate are fixed across periods and sessions, and all subjects –
buyers and sellers – in the treatment group receive this information at the beginning of
the experiment.
14Although subjects in the control group do not make a reporting decision, we collect taxes and report
their net profits at the end of every third period to ensure comparability with the treatment group.
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Therefore, unlike sellers in the control group who must pay taxes on each unit sold,
sellers in the treatment group are able to evade the sales tax by underreporting sales.
Sellers’ gross income in any trading period i is the same as in equation (3.1), but their
net income in each tax collection period is rewritten as:
pisk =
Π
s
k + Πsk−1 + Πsk−2 − τR if not audited,
Πsk + Πsk−1 + Πsk−2 − τU − τ(U −R) if audited,
(3.5)
where R is the reported number of units sold, U is the number of units actually sold over
the last three rounds, and τ = 10 is the statutory per-unit tax rate. Subjects’ final payoff
is the sum of their net incomes from the nine tax collection periods.
3.2.4 Market Equilibrium
The demand and supply schedules described in Table 3.1 and displayed in Figure 3.1 can
be used to determine the competitive equilibrium price and quantity with and without
the per-unit tax. Theoretically, we expect the market to clear with 7 units traded at any
price in the range 48 ECU to 52 ECU in the case without taxes. We obtain a range of
prices in equilibrium because the demand schedule is stepwise linear (Ruﬄe 2005; Cox
et al. 2012; Grosser and Reuben 2013).15
A per-unit tax on sellers increases the cost of each unit by 10 ECU and thus shifts the
supply curve to the left as shown in Figure 3.1. In the absence of tax evasion opportunities,
this theoretically produces a new equilibrium quantity of 6 units, which is supported by
an equilibrium price in the range of 53 ECU to 57 ECU. Because the demand and supply
schedules have equal elasticity in equilibrium, the incidence of the tax should theoretically
be shared equally between buyers and sellers; buyers pay an extra 5 ECU and sellers
receive 5 ECU less (after paying the tax).
The question we seek to answer is whether this equilibrium outcome is affected by
the presence of tax evasion opportunities among sellers. The next section provides a
theoretical discussion for why tax evasion may or may not affect the incidence of the tax.
3.3 Theoretical Context
This section places our experimental design in the context of a simple theoretical set-up
based on the textbook partial equilibrium analysis of tax incidence. It is straight forward
15Grosser and Reuben (2013) conducted an experiment using the same demand and supply schedule
as we do and find that the “no-tax" equilibrium is equal to that predicted by the theory. Therefore,
although we do not implement the “no-tax" treatment here, we expect that our “no-tax" equilibrium is
in line with theoretical expectations.
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to show that the standard text book results hold for the control group because they have
no evasion opportunity. In particular, the incidence of the tax is determined solely by the
relative elasticity of demand and supply. We want to know if and how these predictions
change when the person legally responsible for remitting the tax has access to evasion
opportunities. Therefore, the analysis that follows focuses on the treatment group where
the opportunity to evade the tax exists. However, as shown below, the model describing
the control group is nested within the model described here.
3.3.1 Buyers’ and Sellers’ Decision
Consider a market where buyers and sellers trade q units of a good at price p in a given
trading period. Sellers have to pay a per-unit (excise) tax for each unit they sell, but are
provided a tax reporting decision. As a result, the per-unit tax τ is paid on r (0 ≤ r ≤ q),
which is the number of units reported by a seller. The tax reporting decision is audited
with probability γ, and because all audits lead to the full discovery of actual sales, a fine
equal to twice the evaded taxes, 2(q − r)τ , must be paid if audited.
Buyers Buyers are never allowed an evasion opportunity so their only choice variable
is the number of traded units; they simply maximize
piB = (v − p)q (3.6)
with respect to q, where v is the assigned value the buyer receives from each unit bought.
This is maximized where the price paid for the last unit is equal to the value of that unit
to the buyer v = p. Aggregated, this suggests that market demand is a function of price,
D(p).
Sellers On the other hand, sellers maximize expected profits piS, which are given by:
piS = (p− c)q − rτ − 2γ(q − r)τ, (3.7)
where c is the assigned cost of each unit sold by a seller. Equation (3.7) can be rewritten
as:
piS = (p− c)q − q τ(φ+ 2(1− φ)γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective tax te
, (3.8)
where φ = r/q (0 ≤ φ ≤ 1) is the share of actual sales that is reported for tax purposes.
Sellers face an expected effective tax rate te = τ(φ+2(1−φ)γ) for each unit they actually
sell.16 It is clear that the effective tax rate differs from the statutory tax rate as long
16For reasons of brevity, we henceforth refer to te as the effective tax rate, rather than expected effective
tax rate.
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as φ 6= 1. In fact, the effective tax rate is lower than the statutory rate as long as
sales are underreported (φ < 1) and the chance of being audited is less than one half
γ < 1/2. Additionally, the effective tax rate is positively related to the statutory tax rate
τ ( δte
δτ
≥ 0), the share of reported income φ ( δte
δφ
> 0 for γ < 0.5) and the audit probability
γ ( δte
δγ
≥ 0). Note that because sellers in the control group do not have an opportunity to
evade the tax, their reported sales is equal to their actual sales; i.e., r = q, which implies
that φ = 1. As a result, the effective tax rate te is equal to the statutory tax rate τ in
the control group.
Sellers chose the number of traded units q and the share of reported sales φ to
maximize their expected profits piS. Maximizing equation (3.8) yields the following first
order conditions (F.O.C.) with respect to q and φ:
p = c+ te
γ = 1/2
(3.9)
These F.O.C. define the optimum and have the usual interpretations: sellers trade until
the revenue from the last unit sold is equal to its cost, and some amount of sales is
underreported if the chance of being caught is no more than one half.
Note that the effective tax rate te equals the statutory tax rate τ when the audit
probability is γ = 1/2. This implies that the optimal output q∗ is defined by p = c + τ ,
which is identical to the q∗ in the control group.17 The optimal output in the treatment
group is also identical to that in the control group if sellers report honestly, which is
predicted to occur if γ > 1/2. Intuitively, the effective tax rate is greater than the
statutory tax rate if the audit probability is greater than one half, except when φ = 1.
Therefore, sellers can maximize their expected profit by reporting honestly when the
chance of being audited is greater than one half. By reporting honestly in this case,
sellers ensure that te = τ , which yields the same q∗ as in the control group. Therefore,
the opportunity to evade the tax has no effect on sellers output decisions if the audit
probability is equal or larger than 50%. This further implies that the opportunity to
evade has no effect on the incidence of the tax.
However, the optimal strategy for any audit probability γ smaller than 1/2 is to
fully evade. Since γ is 0.1 in our experiment, the model predicts that sellers do not report
any of their sold units. With this optimal strategy of full evasion (φ = 0), the effective
tax rate reduces to te = 2γτ , which is less than the statutory tax τ since γ = 0.1. In
this case, the F.O.C. with respect to q reduces to p = c + 2γτ . Because unit costs and
the statutory tax rate are equal in both treatment and control groups, it follows that the
17To see this, recall that φ = 1 in the control group because there is no opportunity to evade the tax.
Substituting this value into equation (3.8) and optimizing over q yields p = c+ τ .
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price in the treatment group (evasion possible) is lower than in the control group (evasion
not possible).
This optimal solution assumes that sellers are fully rational and therefore evade
all units due to the low audit probability. However, the existing tax evasion literature
shows that most empirically observed evasion rates are lower than suggested by standard
theory (Alm 2012). Our experimental results also support this observation; despite the
low audit probability of 0.1 we observe an average compliance rate of 7%. That is, φ is
larger than zero in our experiment. However, only 33 out of 40 sellers report non-zero
sales in any given reporting period, which suggests that most sellers behave rationally as
predicted by the theory and that φ < 1. Therefore, the non-zero compliance rate reflects
the effect of a combination of full and partial evaders.18
So how does the incidence of the tax in the treatment group compare to that in
the control group? We address this question in the next section for a general case where
market compliance is greater than zero and smaller than one, i.e. 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.
3.3.2 Market outcome
Consider the empirical case where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. The F.O.C. with respect to q implies that
market supply is implicitly defined not only by the price p but also by the effective tax
rate te, which in turn depends on τ , φ and γ. This allows us to express market supply as a
function of p and te: S(p, te). We already showed that market demand is defined by D(p)
because each buyer’s q∗ depends on the price only. As has been shown in the literature,
an experimental double auction market clears the market so that demand equals supply:
D(p) = S(p, te) (3.10)
The equilibrium condition is differentiated implicitly with respect to p and τ to
determine the incidence of the statutory excise tax τ :
dp
dτ
= ∂te
∂τ
∂S
∂te
1
∂D
∂p
− ∂S
∂p
. (3.11)
The incidence result is equivalent to the textbook case except for parameter ∂te
∂τ
= φ(1−
2γ) + 2γ. ∂te
∂τ
equals 1 as long as the effective tax rate is equal to the statutory tax rate.
This is the case in the control group where there is no evasion opportunity.19 Therefore,
the incidence of the tax in the treatment group is lower than in the control group if ∂te
∂τ
18One could define the difference between the “irrational” φ > 0 and the rational φ = 0 as a parameter
for an exogenously given level of irrationality.
19Note that this is also the case if everyone in the treatment group reports honestly. However, we do
not consider this case here since our empirical observation shows less than full compliance.
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is smaller than 1. It is easy to show that, conditional on γ < 1/2, this is the case as long
as φ < 1. In other words, we expect the market equilibrium price in the presence of tax
evasion to be lower than in the case where tax evasion is not possible as long as some
units are evaded (φ < 1). This follows from the fact that the statutory tax rate is only
due on reported units and therefore has less of an impact if a positive amount of units is
evaded, i.e., the effective tax rate will be lower than the statutory rate as long as we do
not see full compliance.
To see this more clearly, rewrite equation (3.11) in terms of elasticities:
dp
dτ
= ∂te
∂τ
S,τ
S,p − D,p (3.12)
where S,τ is the supply elasticity with respect to the tax rate τ , and S,p and D,p are
the supply and demand elasticities with respect to the price. In our experimental design,
supply elasticities equal demand elasticities in equilibrium. Assuming that S,τ = S,p,
the incidence result can hence be rewritten:20
dp
dτ
= ∂te
∂τ
1
2 (3.13)
In the control group where evasion is not possible ∂te
∂τ
= 1 and a 1 unit increase in
the tax rate increases the price by 1/2 units. On the other hand, a 1 unit increase in
the tax rate in the treatment group - where evasion is possible - increases the price by
(φ(1− 2γ) + 2γ)× 1/2 units, which is less than 1/2 as long as φ < 1 (recall that γ < 0.5
in our experiment).
The intuition for this result is fairly straight forward. Since φ < 1 implies that the
effective tax rate is lower than the statutory tax rate, sellers who evade are less responsive
to changes in the statutory tax rate than sellers who report honestly. Therefore, as long
as some firms evade the tax, the industry supply curve shifts up by a smaller margin
than would be observed in the absence of tax evasion. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
First, consider panel A in Figure 3.2, which represents the control group where evasion is
not possible. The supply curve generally shifts up by the effective tax rate. Because the
effective tax rate equals the statutory tax rate in the case without evasion, the supply
curve shifts up by the full amount of the statutory rate. This results in a new market
equilibrium (p∗c , q∗c ); subscript c indicates control group.
On the other hand, the supply curve in the treatment group – shown in panel B
of Figure 3.2 – shifts up by the effective tax rate, which is less than the statutory rate
as long as φ < 1. This results in a new market equilibrium (p∗t , q∗t ) where (p∗t < p∗c) and
(q∗t > q∗c ); subscript t indicates treatment group. Also note that the difference between
20This is a fair assumption because the tax is highly salient in our experiment.
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the two equilibria increases with evasion and is maximized if all sellers in the treatment
group fully evade the tax. This difference in price suggests that some of the benefits of
evasion are shifted to buyers in the form of lower prices.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
Recall that we are interested in identifying the impact of tax evasion opportunities on
the economic incidence of a sales tax. We describe the empirical strategy used to identify
this treatment effect in section 3.4.1 and our findings in section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Given the discussion in section 3.3, we are particularly interested in knowing whether
the market clearing price in the treatment group is different from the price in the control
group. Therefore, the first step in our empirical strategy is to define the market price.
The experiment produced one price for each unit sold in a given market-period, which
allows us to create three measures of market price. The first measure is simply the price
at which each item is sold, which we denote P . We also calculate the mean and median
price in a given market-period and denoted them P and P50, respectively. Therefore, our
data set has one observation per market-period when price is measured by P or P50 and
n observations per market-period when market price is measured by P , where n is the
number of units sold in that market-period.21
Second, due to random assignment to groups and markets, any (non-parametric)
difference in these prices between the treatment and control groups is taken as evidence
of the presence of treatment effects. We also test for treatment effects parametrically by
regressing each measure of price, separately, on a treatment dummy. The baseline model
for P is specified as follows:
P i,m = β0 + δTm + i,m, (3.14)
where P i,m is the mean price of the good in period i (with i = 1, ..., 27) of market m (with
m = 1, ..., 8). Tm is a dummy for the treatment state, which is equal to one if treatment
group and zero if control group. i,m is a standard error term. Our coefficient of interest is
δ, which represents the difference in market price between the two groups. More precisely,
δ indicates the causal effect of evasion opportunity on the equilibrium market price. This
causal interpretation follows from the fact that the groups are identical except for access
to evasion and random assignment of participants to the two groups.
21The minimum number of units sold in a market period is 5 and maximum is 7. Therefore, n ranges
from 5 to 7.
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We set up our data as a panel with 27 periods per market and run pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions with standard errors clustered on market. OLS regressions
yield unbiased results because random selection into treatments cause the error term to
be uncorrelated with our explanatory variable of interest in each period.22 Because the
treatment status of each market and hence the participants in that market is always the
same, the treatment effect (parametric and nonparametric) is identified using a between-
market design.23 We include period fixed effects in some specifications.
3.4.2 Results
Demographics of Participants
After the experiment, subjects reported their age, gender, native language, level of tax
morale and field of study. Tax morale is determined using a question very similar to one
used in the World Values Survey (Minkov 2012).24 Each of these variables is summarized
in Table 3.2. Casual observation of the data shows that randomization into the treatment
states worked well. This is confirmed by non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for
differences in distributions between groups (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and Whitney 1947); we
do not observe any statistically significant differences in gender, age, share of participants
whose native language is German, tax morale or field of study across the two groups.
While we do not explicitly measure other attitudinal variables such as social norms or
preferences, randomization implies that these omitted variables are also balanced across
groups and therefore do not have any effect on our results.
Among all participants, approximately 51% were male, 77% indicated German to be
their native language, and the average age was 26 years. Approximately 24% of subjects
stated that cheating on taxes can never be justified and 48% indicated that economics is
their major field of study.
22Note that estimators that allow for censoring, such as Tobit models, are unnecessary since the market
price is not censored. Although the market price could be no lower than 18 and no higher the 82, the
distribution of market prices suggest that these prices were never binding; the lowest market price is 30
and the highest is 63.
23Notice that this also implies that it is not possible to estimate the treatment effect in the presence
of market fixed effects. Each individual is randomly assigned to a market and everyone in the market
has the same treatment status. Therefore, the treatment status of a market is the same as the treatment
status of the individuals trading in that market.
24“Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you have the chance’.” This is the most frequently
used question to measure tax morale in observational studies (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006, Halla 2012
and Doerrenberg and Peichl 2013).
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Compliance and effective tax rate
Our hypothesis that markets with evasion opportunities clear at lower prices requires
that sellers actually underreport sales. The empirical results show that this condition is
satisfied. We find that every subject evaded some positive amount of sales at least once
and 33 of the 40 subjects in the treatment group fully pursued the profit maximizing
rational strategy of full evasion in every reporting period. As a result the mean compliance
rate is approximately 7% among all sellers in treatment group and 61% among those who
report non-zero sales.25
Recall that the effective tax rate te can be written as τ(φ+2(1−φ)γ). Substituting
the exogenously determined statutory tax rate (τ = 10 ECU) and audit probability (γ =
0.1), and rearranging the expression, yields te = 2 + 8φ. Therefore, the average effective
tax rate depends on the average compliance rate and, in our case, is approximately
te = 2.56 ECU (= 2 + 8× 0.07).26
We combine this effective tax rate with the demand and supply schedules shown
in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 in order to predict the equilibrium price and quantity in the
treatment group. As shown in Figure 3.1, a per unit tax shifts the supply curve up.
However, unlike the control group, the supply curve only shifts up by 2.56 ECU in the
treatment group, thus producing a new equilibrium with price in the range of 50.65 to
52 ECU and 7 units. Consistent with the theoretical model, this price is lower than the
predicted equilibrium price range for the control group: 53 to 57 ECU (see section 3.2.4).
Price
Non-parametric results The non-parametric results presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4
and Table 3.3 show clearly that the price in the treatment group is lower than in the
control group. Figure 3.3 reports the mean market price by period for the treatment and
control groups. The data show that the mean market price varied a lot in both groups in
the first 10 to 14 trading periods. This is consistent with the existing literature, which
generally finds that double auction markets take approximately 8 to 10 rounds to converge
(Ruﬄe 2005).
Although price in both groups converged in roughly same number of periods, the
25This level of evasion is at the high end of evasion estimates in the experimental tax evasion literature
(e.g., Fortin et al. 2007; Alm et al. 2009; Alm et al. 2010; Coricelli et al. 2010). However, these studies
focus on income taxes and are therefore not directly comparable to our results. We do not know of
any sales tax experiments in the tax evasion literature. Evidence from the real world suggest that our
compliance rates are not unreasonable. For example, the compliance rate in our experiment is comparable
to the compliance rate for the ‘use’ tax in the United States; 0 to 5 percent among individuals (GAO
2000).
26The average effective tax rate is obviously lower among those who fully evade (te = 2 ECU) and higher
among those who partially evade (te = 6.88 ECU). In either case, the effective tax rate is sufficiently
different from the statutory tax rate to generate a treatment effect as predicted by the theoretical model.
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evolution of prices is different. Price increased steadily to equilibrium in the treatment
group, and behave erratically in the control group. For this reason, and as is common in
the literature, our primary results are based on data from trading periods 14 to 27; we
provide results for the full sample for illustrative purposes. The mean market price in both
groups stabilized after round 14: at approximately 54.35 ECU in the control group and
51.63 ECU in the treatment group (see panel B of Table 3.3). These observed market
prices are well within the equilibrium price ranges predicted by the theoretical model; see
sections 3.2.4 and 3.4.2. This confirms that the experimental results are consistent with
the theoretical predictions, which increases our confidence in the results.
More importantly, the mean market price in the treatment group is 2.72 ECU
lower than in the control group. This represents the estimated treatment effect and it
is statistically different from zero at the 1% level according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test. In other words, we find that markets with access to tax evasion trade at lower prices
than markets without access to tax evasion.27 Figure 3.4 and the second column of Table
3.3 show that the treatment effect is qualitatively the same when we use median market
price instead of mean market price; in this case the treatment effect is ECU 3.00.28
Parametric results We extend the analysis above by estimating equation (3.14) for
the mean market price as the dependent variable. The estimated treatment effect reported
in Panel B of Table 3.4 ranges from -2.65 ECU to -2.70 ECU and is statistically different
from zero at the 1 percent level.29 Additionally, the estimates are robust to the inclusion
of period fixed effects (model 2), demographic covariates (model 3) and both period fixed
effects and demographic covariates (model 4). They are also robust to the definition of
price as demonstrated by the results in Table 3.5. Estimating equation (3.14) with the
median market price P50 as our dependent variable yields treatment effects of -1.60 ECU
to -2.10 ECU that are statistically different from zero at the 1% level (see Panel A of Table
3.5). Although these estimates are approximately 0.70 to 1.00 ECU smaller than that
reported in Panel B of Table 3.4, they remain economically meaningful.30 These results
27Note that the estimated treatment effect is larger for the full sample (panel A). Because this sample
includes data before the market price converges, we prefer the estimate in panel B.
28Further evidence that tax evasion affects the incidence of a tax is provided in Figures 3.6 and
3.7, which report the cumulative distribution of mean and median market prices, respectively, for the
treatment and control groups. Both figures show clearly that the price in the control group is not
drawn from the same distribution as that in the treatment group. This conclusion is supported by the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions; in both cases we reject the null that the
distributions are equal. This result also holds when we use the individual ask prices (P ) instead of mean
or median prices; results available upon request.
29Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the results for the full sample. These results are reported for illustrative
purposes only since the market does not clear until around period 14.
30We also estimate the model with the ask price for each unit sold as the dependent variable and
report the results in Panel B of Table 3.5. The estimated treatment effect in this case is -2.66 ECU to
-2.72 ECU, which is almost identical to that for the mean market price as reported in Panel B of Table
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confirm our earlier non-parametric findings that the market price in the treatment group
is lower than in the control group.
Units sold
Non-parametric results The theoretical predictions in section 3.3 suggests that treat-
ment markets will clear at a lower price and higher quantity than the control group. We
have already demonstrated that the market clearing price is lower in the treatment group.
This section shows that the treatment group also sold more units than the control group.
The results in Table 3.3 show that the mean number of units sold per period in the con-
trol group is 5.96, which is close to the 6 units predicted by the theoretical model. On
the other hand, the treatment group sold an average of 6.5 units per period. Although
this is slightly below that predicted by the theoretical model, it is statistically different
from the number of units sold in the control group at the 1% level. In other words, the
estimated treatment effect of 0.5 units is statistically different from zero. The difference
in sales between the two groups is more obvious when we look at the total number of
units sold by each group. Again, restricting attention to trading periods 15 to 27 (after
the market clears), we find that the treatment group sold a total of 336 units while the
control group only sold 308 units. Corresponding numbers for periods 1 to 27 are 704
and 647 in the treatment and control group, respectively.
Parametric results These results are supported by results from a regression analysis
that are reported in Table 3.6. Focussing on Panel B, which reports results for periods 15
to 27, we find a treatment effect of 0.6 units; relative to the control group, the treatment
group sold approximately 0.6 more units per period.
3.5 Discussion
The results presented in section 3.4.2 show that markets with sellers who have the op-
portunity to evade taxes trade more units and do so at lower prices than markets where
tax evasion is not possible. Section 3.5.1 explains the incidence results in the context of
the theoretical model and section 3.5.2 describes the welfare implications. The external
validity of our findings is discussed in section 3.5.3.
3.5.1 Incidence
The treatment effect identified above is very much consistent with the theoretical model
in section 3.3. According to the theoretical framework, tax evasion lowers the effective tax
3.4.
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rate facing sellers, thus allowing them to trade at lower prices in a competitive market.
As a result, the final tax burden shifted to buyers is lower than it would otherwise be
in the absence of tax evasion. This is exactly what we find; the mean compliance rate
ranges from 0% among full evaders to 61% among partial evaders with an average of 7%
among all sellers. This implies an average effective tax rate of 2 ECU among full evaders
and 6.88 ECU among partial evaders for an average of approximately 2.56 ECU among
all sellers. Because the market is competitive, sellers facing these lower effective tax rates
trade at lower prices in an effort to maximize their profits.
So how does this response among sellers affect the incidence of the tax? In order
to answer this question, we fist have to determine the incidence of the tax in the control
group, which requires knowing the market equilibrium in the absence of the tax. Although
we did not run a “no-tax" treatment, we are able to estimate this “no-tax" equilibrium
by relying on evidence from Grosser and Reuben (2013) who run a “no-tax" treatment
using a comparable double auction market with the same demand and supply schedule
as we do.31 In line with the theoretical expectation, they find a mean market price of
49 ECU and 7 units in the “no-tax" equilibrium. On the other hand, the market in our
control group (with tax but no evasion opportunity) cleared with a mean price of 54.35
ECU and 5.96 units, which is well within the equilibrium predicted by the theory: 53
ECU to 57 ECU with 6 units traded.
More importantly, this equilibrium price is approximately 5 ECU above the “no-
tax" equilibrium of 49 ECU. This suggests that the incidence of the tax burden in the
control group is shared equally between buyers and sellers since the tax rate is 10 ECU
per unit. Again, this is consistent with the theoretical framework; since the demand and
supply schedules have equal elasticity in equilibrium, the burden is expected to be shared
equally between buyers and sellers.
The next step is to determine the extent to which access to evasion affected the
incidence of the tax. The mean market clearing price in the treatment group (with tax
and evasion opportunity) is 51.63 ECU, which is within the 50.65 to 52 ECU price range
we predicted given the empirical compliance rate (7%) and mean effective tax rate 2.56
ECU (see section 3.4.2). Considering the statutory tax rate of 10 ECU per unit, this
implies that buyers in the treatment group pay 26.4% (51.64 − 49)/10 of the statutory
tax burden, compared to the 50% in the case without evasion. In other words, access to
evasion reduced the statutory tax burden on buyers by about 23 percentage points.
This result would seem to suggest that sellers bear the greater share of the tax
31The experimental design in Grosser and Reuben (2013) differs from ours in that they use a within
subject design where each subject trades in a market with and without the tax. We are aware that
within subject and between subject designs may yield different results (Charness et al. 2012). However,
we argue that their “no-tax" estimate is a reasonable baseline to use in our incidence analysis, especially
since they randomized the order of tax and “no-tax" treatments. Additionally, their result is in line with
the theoretical prediction which is further support for using their result as a baseline result.
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burden despite equal supply and demand elasticities. To see that this is incorrect, consider
the following exercise. For simplicity, consider the mean effective tax rate of 2.56 ECU.
If sellers with evasion opportunity continued to share the effective tax burden 50-50, we
would expect the price in the treatment group to increase by approximately 1.28 ECU
(= 2.56/2) relative to the “no-tax" equilibrium; that is to 50.28. However, this is not what
we observe. The price in the treatment group is 51.63 ECU, which suggest that sellers
shift the full effective tax rate onto buyers; buyers bear 2.63 ECU (= 51.63 − 49) even
though the effective tax rate is 2.56 ECU. As a result, about 102.7% (= (51.63−49)/2.56)
of a seller’s effective tax rate is shifted onto buyers.
3.5.2 Welfare Implications
Because we find that markets with access to evasion trade a lower prices and higher
quantity, we expect the efficiency cost of the tax to be lower in market where tax evasion
is possible. Our induced demand and supply curves along with our estimated equilibrium
price and quantity allows us to do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to approximate
the impact of evasion on the deadweight loss of the per unit tax. For simplicity, we
assume linear demand and supply schedules in the following calculations and estimate
the partial equilibrium deadweight loss as the area of the Harberger triangle.32 The
estimated equilibria for the average trading period are (49 ECU, 7 units), (54.35 ECU,
5.96 units) and (51.65 ECU, 6.5 units) for “no-tax", control, and treatment, respectively.
This implies that the deadweight loss of the 10 ECU per unit tax in the control group
where there is no access to evasion is approximately 5.50 ECU (= 1/2 ∗ 10 ∗ (7 − 5.9))
per trading period. This scales up to approximately 71.5 ECU across all market clearing
trading periods in the control group.
For the treatment group we consider the case where the effective tax rate is 2.56
ECU, which is over-shifted to buyers; recall that buyers pay 2.63 ECU more than in
the “no-tax" baseline. Using the mechanics of the simple partial equilibrium model, the
supply curve has to shift up by 5.26 ECU for the buyers’ price to increase by 2.63 ECU
and quantity to fall to 6.5 units. Using these numbers, we get a deadweight loss of 1.32
ECU (= 1/2 ∗ 5.26 ∗ (7− 6.5)) per trading period. This scales up to approximately 17.1
ECU across all market clearing trading periods in the treatment group. Therefore, the
deadweight loss of the tax is much lower in the treatment group than in the control group.
Table 3.7 summarizes our results.
There are three important things to note about the calculations shown above. First,
the calculations assume that tax evasion is costless except for the fine. In particular, tax
32Note that these are uncompensated estimates of deadweight loss, which overestimates the tradi-
tionally favored compensated estimates. For this reason, we focus on the difference in deadweight loss
between the two groups rather than the level of the deadweight loss.
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evasion does not require any real resource costs in our experiment. Therefore, the excess
burden is limited to the changes in the market outcome: quantity sold and price. To the
extent that tax evasion requires real resource costs, the reduction in excess burden caused
by evasion is likely to be partially offset by the cost of real resources used to facilitate
evasion.33 Second, we exclude the impact on tax revenue since the foregone tax revenue
represents a transfer to private agents and does not affect welfare as long as one does not
impose a welfare function that gives higher weight to tax financed public goods relative
to private consumption.
Third, our calculations hold the tax rate constant rather than tax revenue. It can
be shown that the difference in excess burden between the treatment and control group
would be smaller if a revenue requirement is imposed. This follows from the fact that
a lower tax rate would be required in the control group in order to generate the same
amount of revenues as the treatment group. Since the excess burden is increasing in the
square of the tax rate, a lower tax rate would imply a substantially smaller excess burden
in the control group than the amount shown above. In fact, it is possible for markets
without tax evasion opportunities to generate smaller excess burdens than markets with
evasion opportunities, if the compliance rate is very low.
3.5.3 External Validity
As with all economic laboratory experiments, there remains doubt about the external
validity of our results.34 One major concern is that the setting in the lab is abstract
and artificial. However, the literature shows that laboratory double auctions generate
very plausible equilibria (e.g., Smith 1962; Holt 1995; Dufwenberg et al. 2005; Grosser
and Reuben 2013.). Although subjects trade in fictitious goods, they receive actual
money pay-offs and thus face incentives similar to buyers and sellers in actual markets.
Furthermore, the question of tax incidence has been widely studied in the laboratory
setting (e.g., Riedl and Tyran 2005; Ruﬄe 2005; Cox et al. 2012; Grosser and Reuben
2013) and shown to lead to results that reflect theoretical predictions very well.
In order to make the tax evasion decision as realistic as possible we used actual tax
terminology and announced to the participants that all tax revenue would be donated to
the German Red Cross, a non-ideological charity organization that is usually perceived as
reliable and transparent.35 Although evasion may occur among buyers as well, the real-
33The absence of real resource costs in our experiment is comparable to ‘use’ tax evasion by individuals
who purchase goods online. Purchasing goods online in order to evade the sales tax, arguably, involves
smaller resource costs than visiting a store front in person.
34See Levitt and List (2007) for a critical discussion of the generalizability of lab experiments. Falk
and Heckman (2009) offer a defense of most concerns, some of which are also discussed here.
35Tax morale research (Torgler 2007) finds that taxpayers are more likely to comply with tax laws if
they believe that the tax revenue is spent transparently. Eckel and Grossman (1996) show that dictators
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world problem seems to be more relevant among sellers; sellers are usually responsible for
remitting sales taxes to the government. In this sense, our laboratory setting mimics the
operation of most transaction taxes in the real world and thus reflects the more relevant
“real-world” sales tax evasion concerns.
It is also often argued that the stakes in lab experiments are too small to interpret
the outcomes as realistic. This is unlikely to be true in our case because our average
pay-off of EUR 19.63 is relatively high and, to give an idea of its purchasing power in
Cologne, roughly corresponds to eight full lunch meals in the student cafeteria at Cologne
University.36 Furthermore, many experiments conducted in locations where the stakes
were equivalent to more than a month’s earnings find very similar results to conven-
tional “small-stake” experiments (Slonim and Roth 1998). Additionally, it is question-
able whether high stakes render a more realistic setting, since most “real-life” decisions
do not involve massive amounts of money either (Falk and Heckman 2009). Another
concern is the reliance on university students as participants. Many experiments with
non-student populations find results comparable to experiments with students (Charness
and Kuhn 2011; Falk et al. 2013). Furthermore, Alm et al. (2011) compare students
to non-students in tax compliance experiments and find that the reporting responses of
students to policy innovations are largely the same as those of non-students in identical
experiments and “real" people in non-experiment environments.
3.6 Conclusion
We use data generated in an economic laboratory experiment to identify the effect of
tax evasion among sellers on the economic incidence of a per-unit tax. We find strong
evidence that access to evasion opportunities affect the incidence of a per-unit tax. In
particular, sellers who are able to evade a per-unit tax trade at lower prices and sell more
units. In fact, relative to the baseline case where buyers face 50% of the statutory tax
burden, buyers in the treatment group only face approximately 26.4% of the statutory tax
burden. Although buyers pay lower prices than they otherwise would, we find that sellers
fully shift the expected effective tax onto buyers. Partial equilibrium welfare analysis
reveal that evasion options reduce the excess burden of taxation and increase welfare.
However, the latter result may change if a revenue requirement is imposed.
Our findings suggest that access to evasion reduces the effectiveness of taxes that
are implemented with the specific intent of changing the activity level of market partici-
pants. Furthermore, because evasion reduces the amount of the tax that is shifted onto
share more in dictator games if the recipient is the American Red Cross. Overall, we donated EUR 288
to the Red Cross.
36The show-up fee is equivalent to one meal. The cafeteria at University of Cologne is the most popular
spot for students to buy their daily lunch.
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buyers, our findings also suggest that sales taxes may be more or less regressive than we
think depending on which part of the income distribution benefits most from the evading
activities of sellers.
The results also imply that policy makers do not necessarily have an easy choice
when deciding whether to pursue evasion reducing strategies or to exploit the potential
efficiency gains of evasion. For example, Cremer and Gahvari (1993) show that the opti-
mal Ramsey rule in the presence of tax evasion calls for higher tax rates on the good with
the tax evasion opportunity. The argument is that evasion lowers the real behavioral
response and thus lowers excess burden; this is confirmed by our results. However, given
that governments often face revenue requirements along with the fact that tax evasion
may require real resource costs, we prefer a strategy that seeks to minimize tax evasion
opportunities. This is especially important in cases where the policy objective is to influ-
ence real behavior. Evasion reducing strategies may also make sense on revenue grounds.
Although revenues represent a simple transfer from an economic welfare perspective, rev-
enues are used to produce public goods/service that are likely to be underproduced or
not produced at all as tax revenues decline.
Finally, while we show that tax evasion opportunities affect tax incidence, it is not
clear that the magnitude and effect is the same across all types of taxes. Conditional
on the ease with which taxes can be evaded, it is also possible that the mechanism of
evasion matters. For example, Tran and Nguyen (2014) show that Vietnamese firms
evade VAT by artificially increasing their sales and material costs, which is facilitated by
colluding with other producers in the supply chain. The presence of collusion as a means
of evasion suggests lower competitive pressure, which may lead to different incidence
outcomes under a VAT compared to retail sales taxes where collusion among firms is not
necessary for evasion. Given recent calls for the adoption of VAT in the USA, we argue
that this potential difference is worth investigating in future research. More generally,
it would be interesting to know if and how evasion mechanisms in different tax systems
affect the incidence of taxes.
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Tables and Figures
Tables
Table 3.1: Demand and Supply Schedules
Buyer Seller
Subject Value 1 Value 2 Subject Cost 1 Cost 2
1 82 52 1 18 48
2 77 72 2 23 28
3 67 37 3 33 63
4 62 42 4 38 58
5 57 47 5 43 53
Notes: Reported are demand and supply schedules.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of Demographic Variables
Gender Age German Tax Morale Econ
Control Group (Non-Evaders)
Mean 0.43 24.90 0.72 0.25 0.43
St. Dev. 0.50 6.87 0.46 0.44 0.50
N. of Subjects 40 40 39 40 40
Treatment Group (Evaders)
Mean 0.60 26.93 0.83 0.23 0.53
St. Dev. 0.50 12.25 0.38 0.42 0.51
N. of Subjects 40 40 40 40 40
P-value 0.12 0.23 0.26 0.79 0.37
Notes: Reported are the mean characteristics of treatment and control groups. Gender is a dummy that is equal to 1 if
male, German is a dummy that is equal to 1 if native language is German, tax morale is a dummy that is equal to 1 for
subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be justified and Econ is a dummy that is equal to 1 if field of study is
economics. One subject in the control group did not report his/her language. P-value is for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test;
null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the characteristics between the two groups.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Choice Variables
Price Units sold N.
Group Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Panel A: Full Sample
Non-evader 54.98 54.00 4.99 6.04 0.53 647
Evader 51.24 51.00 2.50 6.56 0.51 704
Panel B: Period>14
Non-evader 54.35 54.00 3.92 5.96 0.47 308
Evader 51.63 51.00 1.69 6.50 0.50 336
P-value 0.00 0.00 – 0.00 – –
Notes: Reported is the mean and median market price and mean number of units sold in each group. Price is the price at
which each unit in a given market period is sold. Units sold is the number of units sold in a market period. Panel A uses
all completed contracts from periods 1 to 27 and panel B uses all completed contracts in periods 15 to 27. P-value is for
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test; null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the two groups.
Table 3.4: Impact of treatment on mean market price
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Full Sample
Treat -3.750*** -3.750*** -4.300*** -4.300***
(1.009) (1.077) (0.347) (0.371)
Constant 55.008*** 54.181*** 48.868*** 48.040***
(0.727) (1.247) (2.632) (3.407)
R2 0.499 0.517 0.737 0.754
N 216 216 216 216
Panel B: Period>14
Treat -2.701*** -2.701*** -2.651*** -2.651***
(0.795) (0.847) (0.075) (0.081)
Constant 54.362*** 54.297*** 49.508*** 49.443***
(0.539) (0.516) (0.572) (0.750)
R2 0.553 0.563 0.884 0.894
N 104 104 104 104
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (3.14) with the dependent variable defined as
mean market price in a given market period. Panel A uses all completed contracts from periods 1 to 27, panel B uses all
completed contracts in periods 15 to 27. Period FE is period fixed effects.
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Table 3.5: Impact of treatment on median and ask market price
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Median Ask Price (P50)
Treat -2.087*** -2.087*** -1.589*** -1.589***
(0.625) (0.665) (0.218) (0.233)
Constant 53.779*** 53.918*** 60.175*** 60.314***
(0.089) (0.222) (1.655) (1.809)
R2 0.538 0.563 0.853 0.878
N 104 104 104 104
Panel B: Ask Price (P)
Treat -2.720*** -2.721*** -2.662*** -2.660***
(0.798) (0.808) (0.065) (0.069)
Constant 54.354*** 54.255*** 49.500*** 49.481***
(0.543) (0.486) (0.491) (0.593)
R2 0.173 0.176 0.276 0.279
N 644 644 644 644
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (3.14) with the dependent variable defined as
median market price in a given market period in panel A; and the market price for each good in each market period in
Panel B. All panels use completed contracts from periods 15 to 27. Period FE is period fixed effects.
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Table 3.6: Impact of treatment on units sold
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Full Sample
Treat 0.336*** 0.334*** 0.320*** 0.324***
(0.064) (0.068) (0.027) (0.035)
Constant 6.088*** 6.525*** 6.701*** 7.186***
(0.059) (0.144) (0.406) (0.277)
R2 0.090 0.292 0.100 0.301
N 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006
Panel B: Period>14
Treat 0.402*** 0.403*** 0.598*** 0.594***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.051) (0.056)
Constant 5.939*** 6.177*** 7.891*** 8.102***
(0.118) (0.323) (0.756) (0.878)
R2 0.148 0.262 0.191 0.303
N 476 476 476 476
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (3.14) with the dependent variable defined as the
number of units sold in a given market period. Panel A uses all completed contracts from periods 1 to 27, panel B uses all
completed contracts in periods 15 to 27. “Period FE" is period fixed effects.
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Table 3.7: Overview of Results
Condition Price Units EB
No Tax 49 7 //
Control 54.35 5.96 5.50
Treatment 51.63 6.50 1.32
Treat Effect -2.72 0.54 -4.18
Notes: The results in “No Tax” row are from Grosser and Reuben (2013) who use
identical supply and demand schedules in an experimental double auction without
taxes. “Control” and “Treatment” refer to the groups without and with evasion op-
portunity, respectively. Reported are the mean prices and number of units traded.
The excess burden “EB” of the per-unit tax is calculated based on the simple Har-
berger triangle. “Treat Effect” indicates the non-parametric treatment effect defined
as the difference between treatment and control group. All numbers expressed in
Experimental Currency Units.
Figures
Figure 3.1: Supply and Demand Schedule
Note: The figure is adapted from Grosser and Reuben (2013, page 42, Figure 1). It shows
the demand schedule for buyers and the supply schedule for sellers with and without the
per unit tax. The predicted equilibrium occurs where the curves intersect: quantity q = 7
and price p between 48 and 52 without tax and quantity q = 6 and price p between 53
and 57 with the ECU 10 per unit tax.
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Figure 3.2: Economic incidence of tax on seller
Notes: The imposition of a per-unit tax would ordinarily cause the supply curve to shift to the left and the market
equilibrium to move from point (P ∗, Q∗) to (Pc, Q1) as illustrated in panel A. Because sellers are able to evade the tax,
the supply curve shifts by a smaller amount causing the equilibrium to move from (P ∗, Q∗) to (P ′c , Q
′
1) as illustrated in
panel B, where P ′c < Pc.
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Figure 3.3: Average market price by period and treatment
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Notes: Reported is the average market price P in each period for the treatment and control groups. The vertical line
indicates period 14; empirical results are based on market periods 15 to 27.
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Figure 3.4: Median market price by period and treatment
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Notes: Reported is the median market price P50 in each period for the treatment and control groups.The vertical line
indicates period 14; empirical results are based on market periods 15 to 27.
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Figure 3.5: Units sold by period and treatment
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Notes: Reported is the number of units sold in each period for the treatment and control groups.The vertical line indicates
period 14; empirical results are based on market periods 15 to 27.
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3.7 Appendix A: Tables
Table 3.8: Impact of treatment on market price
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ask Price Mean Ask Price Median Ask Price
Treat -2.662*** -2.660*** -2.651*** -2.651*** -1.589*** -1.589***
(0.065) (0.069) (0.075) (0.081) (0.218) (0.233)
Age -0.367*** -0.370*** -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.641*** -0.641***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.059) (0.064)
Gender -21.352*** -21.389*** -21.435*** -21.435*** -17.990*** -17.990***
(0.177) (0.174) (0.219) (0.234) (0.633) (0.676)
German 29.607*** 29.642*** 29.663*** 29.663*** 22.833*** 22.833***
(0.347) (0.329) (0.410) (0.438) (1.186) (1.267)
Tax Morale -1.274*** -1.258*** -1.245*** -1.245*** -0.921 -0.921
(0.219) (0.222) (0.254) (0.271) (0.735) (0.786)
Economics 5.126*** 5.141*** 5.156*** 5.156*** 2.562*** 2.562***
(0.153) (0.162) (0.183) (0.195) (0.529) (0.565)
Constant 49.500*** 49.481*** 49.508*** 49.443*** 60.175*** 60.314***
(0.491) (0.593) (0.572) (0.750) (1.655) (1.809)
R2 0.276 0.279 0.884 0.894 0.853 0.878
N 644 644 104 104 104 104
Period FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (3.14) with the dependent variable defined as
the market price for each good in each market period in Models 1 and 2; mean market price in a given market period in
Models 3 and 4; and median market price in a given market period in Models 5 and 6. All panels use completed contracts
from periods 15 to 27. Period FE is period fixed effects. Gender is a dummy that is equal to 1 if male, German is a dummy
that is equal to 1 if native language is German, tax morale is a dummy that is equal to 1 for subjects who believe cheating
on taxes can never be justified and Field of study is a dummy that is equal to 1 if field of study is economics.
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Table 3.9: Impact of treatment on units sold
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Treat 0.539*** 0.540*** 0.385*** 0.383***
(0.171) (0.173) (0.131) (0.131)
Age -0.017 -0.017
(0.035) (0.035)
Gender 2.349*** 2.343***
(0.353) (0.363)
German -2.000*** -1.973***
(0.691) (0.691)
Tax Morale 0.495 0.479
(0.436) (0.448)
Economics -0.351 -0.349
(0.305) (0.305)
Constant 5.961*** 6.147*** 6.832*** 7.005***
(0.088) (0.231) (0.978) (1.064)
R2 0.235 0.315 0.352 0.433
N 644 644 644 644
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (3.14) with the dependent variable defined as the
number of units sold in a given market period. Estimation is based on all completed contracts in periods 15 to 27. Period
FE is period fixed effects. Gender is a dummy that is equal to 1 if male, German is a dummy that is equal to 1 if native
language is German, tax morale is a dummy that is equal to 1 for subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be
justified and Field of study is a dummy that is equal to 1 if field of study is economics.
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3.8 Appendix B: Figures
Figure 3.6: Cumulative distribution of market price by treatment
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Notes: Reported is the cumulative distribution of average market price P for the treatment and control groups. Distributions
are based on data from market periods 15 to 27. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
reports a maximum difference in distributions of 0.770 with pvalue of 0.000. This implies that the null hypothesis that the
distributions are equal is rejected.
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Figure 3.7: Cumulative distribution of market price by treatment
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Notes: Reported is the cumulative distribution of median market price P50 for the treatment and control groups. Distri-
butions are based on data from market periods 15 to 27. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution
functions reports a maximum difference in distributions of 0.751 with pvalue of 0.000. This implies that the null hypothesis
that the distributions are equal is rejected.
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Figure 3.8: Screenshot of the Market Place
Note: Screenshot of the lab experimental double-auction market place. The screen dis-
plays the market place for a seller in the treatment group with evasion opportunity. The
seller has sold her first unit at a price of 35. The cost for the first unit was 18, yielding a
current gross-income of 17. Her second unit with cost 48 is not traded at this point. The
screen shown is translated to English, the original experiment was conducted in German.
The market place is based on Grosser and Reuben (2013).
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3.9 Appendix C: Instructions
The following pages contain the translated instructions for both treatment groups. The
original German versions are available from the authors upon request.
3.9.1 No-Evasion opportunity control group
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end
of the experiment, please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you do
not abide by this rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment.
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions after
reading the instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the
instructors will come to you and answer your question in person. Your payment and your
decisions throughout the experiment will be treated confidentially.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions
and the decisions of other participants. During the experiment, your payments will be
calculated in a virtual currency: Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 30 ECU corre-
spond to 1 Euro. After the experiment, your pay-off will be converted to Euro and
given to you in cash. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
The Experiment
Roles
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will randomly assign five participants
to the role of ”sellers” and five other participants to the role of ”buyers”. Therefore,
you will either be a buyer or a seller. Your role as seller or buyer will remain the same
throughout the experiment. You will only know your own role and not the roles of other
participants.
Overview
The experiment consists of 3 practice rounds and 27 paying rounds. At the beginning
of each round, all buyers and sellers trade a fictitious good in a market place. As a
buyer, you can buy units of the fictitious good and as a seller you can sell units. You
can earn ECU in the market place and your earnings depend on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Each unit sold will be subject to a per unit tax of
10 ECU for sellers. The tax rate is the same for all sellers and is due at the end of
every third round. Details on the market place will be explained further below. All tax
revenues paid by you and all other participants will be donated to the German Red Cross.
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The Market Place
Basics
The market place is opened for two minutes at the beginning of each round. All buyers
and sellers trade a fictitious good. In each market period, each seller can sell two units
of the fictitious good and each buyer can buy two units of the good.
Units, costs, and values
If you are a seller, you will be given the costs for two units of a fictitious good at the
beginning of the experiment. These units shall be denoted ”Unit 1” and ”Unit 2”, where
Unit 1 costs less than Unit 2. The cost of these units to you is the same in all rounds.
However, the cost of each seller’s units will differ from the cost of other sellers’ units.
Each seller only knows her own costs.
If you are a buyer, you will be given the values for two units of a fictitious good at
the beginning of the experiment. These units shall be denoted ”Unit 1” and ”Unit 2”
where Unit 1 values more than Unit 2. The value of these units to you is the same in
all rounds. However, the value of each buyer’s units will differ from the value of other
buyers’ units. Each buyer only knows her own values.
Asks, Bids, and Transactions
Sellers can make ”asks” and Buyers can make ”bids” during the trading period. All asks
and bids are visible to everyone through the screen that appears during the two minutes
of trading. This screen will also state your type (Seller or Buyer), the time left in the
trading period and the costs or values that you were assigned for each Unit. Each Seller
can first sell Unit 1 and afterward Unit 2. Accordingly, Buyers can first buy Unit 1 and
then Unit 2.
Sellers cannot sell goods at prices lower than the assigned cost for the respective Unit.
Buyers cannot buy at prices that exceed their assigned value for the respective Unit.
Sellers can make asks at any time during the trading period but each ask has to be lower
than the current lowest ask on the market. Similarly, Buyers can always propose bids as
long as they are larger than the current largest bid on the market.
To realize a transaction, Sellers can either accept a bid or buyers can accept an ask.
The transaction price for the unit will then be equal to the accepted ask or bid.
(Gross) Earnings in the Market Place
Units that are not traded do not yield any earnings. Gross earnings for each Unit are as
88 CHAPTER 3. TAX INCIDENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF TAX EVASION
follows:
For Sellers:
Gross Earnings from selling Unit 1 = transaction price of Unit 1 - cost of Unit 1
Gross Earnings from selling Unit 2 = transaction price of Unit 2 - cost of Unit 2
For Buyers:
Gross Earnings from buying Unit 1 = value of Unit 1 - transaction price of Unit 1
Gross Earnings from buying Unit 2 = value of Unit 2 - transaction price of Unit 2
Screenshots from trading market
Sellers:
Here Screenshot Sellers
Sellers can accept a current bid by pressing ”Sell at this Price”. To make a new ask,
Sellers have to enter their ask price into the field to the right of the ”Make a smaller ask”
button and press the button to submit the ask.
Buyers:
Here Screenshot Buyers
Buyers can accept the current ask by pressing ”Buy at this Price”. To make a new bid,
Buyers have to enter their bid into the field to the right of the ”Make a smaller bid” and
press the button to submit the bid.
Calculation of Net Income for Sellers
After three consecutive trading periods, the screen shows how many units of the fictitious
unit you have traded over the previous three rounds and the resulting gross income from
the previous three periods. For each unit traded in the three previous periods, a per-unit
tax of 10 ECU is due for sellers
Therefore, a seller’s payment – the net income – , consists of her sum of all gross earnings
from the three previous rounds, (henceforth denoted ”sum gross income”) minus the tax
payment. The tax payment is the number of units sold over the previous three periods
multiplied by the tax rate of 10 ECU. Hence:
3.9. APPENDIX C: INSTRUCTIONS 89
Net Income = sum gross income - (number of units sold in previous 3 rounds * per-unit
tax rate)
After every third round, sellers are informed about the net income that they earned over
the previous three periods.
Payment
The first 3 rounds serve as practice rounds, in which you cannot earn money. The
subsequent 27 rounds are paying rounds.
Buyers do not pay taxes so that gross earnings equal net earnings. A buyer’s payoff
hence equals the sum of gross earnings from all 27 trading periods.
Sellers receive a payoff that consists of the sum of all net incomes, each of which is
earned after every third paying round (i.e., after paying rounds 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24,
27.)
You will be paid the payoff in cash at the end of the experiment. Additionally, each
participant receives a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro. If the sum of all gross or net incomes is
negative or zero, you will be paid the show-up fee; that is, you cannot make losses and
will earn a minimum amount of 2.50 Euro.
Final Remarks
After the completion of all 30 rounds – 3 practice round plus 27 paying rounds – the
experiment is finished. You will be asked to complete a short questionnaire at the end
of the experiment while we prepare the payments. All information collected through
this questionnaire, just like all data gathered during the experiment, are anonymous and
exclusively used for scientific purposes. After you have completed the questionnaire,
please remain seated at your booth until we call you to come up front to pick up your
payment.
3.9.2 Evasion opportunity treatment group
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end
of the experiment, please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you do
not abide by this rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment.
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions after
reading the instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the
instructors will come to you and answer your question in person. Your payment and your
decisions throughout the experiment will be treated confidentially.
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You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions
and the decisions of other participants. During the experiment, your payments will be
calculated in a virtual currency: Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 30 ECU corre-
spond to 1 Euro. After the experiment, your pay-off will be converted to Euro and
given to you in cash. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
The Experiment
Roles
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will randomly assign five participants
to the role of ”sellers” and five other participants to the role of ”buyers”. Therefore,
you will either be a buyer or a seller. Your role as seller or buyer will remain the same
throughout the experiment. You will only know your own role and not the roles of other
participants.
Overview
The experiment consists of 3 practice rounds and 27 paying rounds. At the beginning
of each round, all buyers and sellers trade a fictitious good in a market place. As a
buyer, you can buy units of the fictitious good and as a seller you can sell units. You
can earn ECU in the market place and your earnings depend on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Each unit sold will be subject to a per unit tax of
10 ECU for sellers. The tax rate is the same for all sellers and is due at the end of every
third round. At the end of every third round, sellers are asked to report the number of
units that they sold in the previous three market rounds. There is a 10% chance that
the reported decision will be checked for accuracy. Details on the market place will be
explained further below. All tax revenues paid by you and all other participants will be
donated to the German Red Cross.
The Market Place
Basics
The market place is opened for two minutes at the beginning of each round. All buyers
and sellers trade a fictitious good. In each market period, each seller can sell two units
of the fictitious good and each buyer can buy two units of the good.
Units, costs, and values
If you are a seller, you will be given the costs for two units of a fictitious good at the
beginning of the experiment. These units shall be denoted ”Unit 1” and ”Unit 2”, where
3.9. APPENDIX C: INSTRUCTIONS 91
Unit 1 costs less than Unit 2. The cost of these units to you is the same in all rounds.
However, the cost of each seller’s units will differ from the cost of other sellers’ units.
Each seller only knows her own costs.
If you are a buyer, you will be given the values for two units of a fictitious good at
the beginning of the experiment. These units shall be denoted ”Unit 1” and ”Unit 2”
where Unit 1 values more than Unit 2. The value of these units to you is the same in
all rounds. However, the value of each buyer’s units will differ from the value of other
buyers’ units. Each buyer only knows her own values.
Asks, Bids, and Transactions
Sellers can make ”asks” and Buyers can make ”bids” during the trading period. All asks
and bids are visible to everyone through the screen that appears during the two minutes
of trading. This screen will also state your type (Seller or Buyer), the time left in the
trading period and the costs or values that you were assigned for each Unit. Each Seller
can first sell Unit 1 and afterward Unit 2. Accordingly, Buyers can first buy Unit 1 and
then Unit 2.
Sellers cannot sell goods at prices lower than the assigned cost for the respective Unit.
Buyers cannot buy at prices that exceed their assigned value for the respective Unit.
Sellers can make asks at any time during the trading period but each ask has to be lower
than the current lowest ask on the market. Similarly, Buyers can always propose bids as
long as they are larger than the current largest bid on the market.
To realize a transaction, Sellers can either accept a bid or buyers can accept an ask.
The transaction price for the unit will then be equal to the accepted ask or bid.
(Gross) Earnings in the Market Place
Units that are not traded do not yield any earnings. Gross earnings for each Unit are as
follows:
For Sellers:
Gross Earnings from selling Unit 1 = transaction price of Unit 1 - cost of Unit 1
Gross Earnings from selling Unit 2 = transaction price of Unit 2 - cost of Unit 2
For Buyers:
Gross Earnings from buying Unit 1 = value of Unit 1 - transaction price of Unit 1
Gross Earnings from buying Unit 2 = value of Unit 2 - transaction price of Unit 2
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Screenshots from trading market
Sellers:
Here Screenshot Sellers
Sellers can accept a current bid by pressing ”Sell at this Price”. To make a new ask,
Sellers have to enter their ask price into the field to the right of the ”Make a smaller ask”
button and press the button to submit the ask.
Buyers:
Here Screenshot Buyers
Buyers can accept the current ask by pressing ”Buy at this Price”. To make a new bid,
Buyers have to enter their bid into the field to the right of the ”Make a smaller bid” and
press the button to submit the bid.
The Reporting Decision for Sellers
After three consecutive trading periods, you will be shown the number of units traded
over the three previous trading rounds and the respective gross earnings on those units.
For each unit traded in the three previous periods, a per-unit tax of 10 ECU is due
for sellers.
Sellers will then be asked to report the number of units sold in the previous three rounds
for tax purposes. The reported amount may be between zero and the total number of
units that were actually sold over the previous three rounds. After the reporting decision
is submitted by pressing the ”OK” button, the computer will determine if it is checked
whether the reported number equals the actual number of units sold over the last three
periods. The computer makes this call by randomly selecting an integer number between
1 and 10. The reporting decision will only be checked if the computer selects the number
1. Therefore, there is a random chance of 10% that the reporting decision will be checked.
Calculation of Net Income for Sellers
Sellers will be informed of the outcome of the random draw, and will be faced with one
of the following two scenarios:
1. Computer selects a number between 2 and 10 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10):
The reporting decision will not be checked. A seller’s earnings after taxes – the net in-
come –, in this case, consists of the sum of all her gross earnings from the three previous
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periods (henceforth denoted ”sum gross income”) minus the tax payment. The tax pay-
ment is the reported number of units sold multiplied by the tax rate of 10 ECU. Hence:
Net income = sum gross income - (reported number of units sold * per unit tax rate)
2. Computer selects number 1:
The reporting decision will be checked. A seller’s earnings after taxes – the net income
–, in this case, consist of sum of all her gross earnings from the three previous periods
(henceforth denoted ”sum gross income”) minus the tax payment. The tax payment is
based on the number of units actually sold over the last three periods. If the number of
units was not reported correctly, a seller will additionally have to pay a penalty that is
equal to the amount of tax liability that was not paid. Hence:
Net income = sum gross income - (actual number of units sold * per unit tax rate) -
(number of units not reported * per unit tax rate)
Payment
The first 3 rounds serve as practice rounds, in which you cannot earn money. The
subsequent 27 rounds are paying rounds.
Buyers do not pay taxes so that gross earnings equal net earnings. A buyer’s payoff
hence equals the sum of gross earnings from all 27 trading periods.
Sellers receive a payoff that consists of the sum of all net incomes, each of which is
earned after every third paying round (i.e., after paying rounds 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24,
27.)
You will be paid the payoff in cash at the end of the experiment. Additionally, each
participant receives a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro. If the sum of all gross or net incomes is
negative or zero, you will be paid the show-up fee; that is, you cannot make losses and
will earn a minimum amount of 2.50 Euro.
Final Remarks
After the completion of all 30 rounds – 3 practice round plus 27 paying rounds – the
experiment is finished. You will be asked to complete a short questionnaire at the end
of the experiment while we prepare the payments. All information collected through
this questionnaire, just like all data gathered during the experiment, are anonymous and
exclusively used for scientific purposes. After you have completed the questionnaire,
please remain seated at your booth until we call you to come up front to pick up your
payment.
Chapter 4
Experimental evidence on the
relationship between tax evasion
opportunities and labor supply
4.1 Introduction
Labor supply elasticities observed in empirical analyses are usually smaller than responses
along other margins (Slemrod 1994) and are often heterogeneously distributed across
different types of workers.1 While there are several reasons why this is the case, this
paper explores one possible explanation: access to tax evasion opportunities. It is well
known that access to evasion opportunities varies across workers, thus making it easier for
some workers to hide income relative to other workers. For example, whereas many wage
earners are subject to third-party reporting, rendering tax evasion almost impossible, the
self-employed and workers in industries that rely on cash payments have considerable
access to evasion. The objective of the present paper is to test whether these differences
in evasion opportunities affect the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in tax rates.
We use the theoretical framework of Pencavel (1979) to show that the responsiveness
of labor supply to taxes is likely to vary with the opportunity to evade because workers
with evasion opportunities are able to adjust their taxable income by exploiting two
inter-related margins: labor supply and evasion. In particular, the theoretical framework
suggests that while both types of workers respond to tax rate changes via standard
income and substitution effects, workers with access to evasion are additionally affected
by evasion-induced effects. As a result, evaders’ labor supply response to tax changes is
expected to differ from that of non-evaders. However, opposing income and substitution
1For example, there is evidence that labor supply elasticities vary by gender, with relatively larger
estimates for females (Keane 2011), tend to decrease in income (Roed and Strom 2002; Aaberge and
Colombino 2013) and vary by marital status (Bargain et al. 2014).
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effects prevent us from obtaining any clear predictions about the relative magnitude of
the effect of access to evasion on the labor supply response.
We rely on an empirical approach to answer the research question because of this
ambiguous theoretical effect. This is achieved by combining well-established laboratory
experimental designs from the tax evasion and labor literatures. In each of ten rounds,
205 subjects first complete a real-effort labor task, as in Gill and Prowse (2012), and then
make a tax payment.2 We vary the tax rate across rounds in three specific ways that
include both tax increases and tax decreases; each variation constitutes a tax evolution.
Subjects are randomly assigned to tax evolutions, as well as treatment and control groups
that are identical in every respect except access to evasion; while subjects in the treatment
group are able to evade taxes by underreporting their earned income, subjects in the
control group cannot. Following Fortin et al. (2007) and Alm et al. (2009), for example,
subjects in the treatment group face an exogenous audit probability and penalty if they
are detected. This experimental design allows us to determine if the responsiveness of
effort supply with respect to tax rates varies between the two groups. Since access to
evasion is the only difference between the two groups, differences in the responsiveness
to tax rate changes can be attributed to the difference in evasion opportunity.
Reliance on experimental methods to answer our research question is motivated
by the near impossibility of answering this question with observational data. Tax eva-
sion opportunities are hardly observable3, and the standard labor supply elasticities are
usually difficult to estimate. Additionally, even if we had good information on evasion
opportunities and labor supply responses, clean identification would require us to solve
self-selection into jobs with greater access to evasion. The advantage of using an experi-
mental approach is that we are able to randomly assign subjects to treatment states and
control the variables of interest, which allows us to cleanly identify the effect of evasion
opportunities on labor responses to taxation. Using economic laboratory experimental
techniques to analyze supply of effort and tax evasion is not new; see Charness and Kuhn
(2011) for a comprehensive survey of the labor effort literature and Graetz et al. (1986),
Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992a), Fortin et al. (2007) and Alm et al. (2009) for tax
evasion examples.4
2Modeling labor effort instead of labor supply is common in the laboratory experimental literature
on labor supply and is usually done because of the difficulty in modeling labor supply as measured by
hours of work; see Dickinson (1999), Falk and Fehr (2003) and Charness and Kuhn (2011) for references
and discussion. This issue is discussed further in sections 4.2.4 and 4.5.3.
3Slemrod and Weber (2012) survey the empirical tax evasion literature and conclude that it is dif-
ficult to obtain credible causal evidence in observational studies. Experiments are one possibility for
approaching tax evasion issues in a causal manner.
4However, in contrast to our work, most experimental contributions in this field look at the amount
of evasion as the outcome of interest. Andreoni et al. (1998) and Torgler (2002) provide surveys on tax
compliance in experiments. Additionally, our work is different from studies that look at the effect of
changes in gross wages, net wages and tax rates; see section 4.5.2 for a more detailed discussion.
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We find evidence that access to evasion affects the extent to which individuals’
labor efforts respond to changes in the net-of-tax-rate, and that this effect depends on
the the institutional setting regarding how tax rates evolve across rounds. The estimated
treatment effect, i.e. the difference between the two groups’ effort response to a change
in the net-of-tax rate, is negative when subjects experience tax increases followed by a
tax decrease. On the other hand, the estimated treatment effect is positive when subjects
experience tax decreases followed by a tax increase. We also find that the treatment effect
is more obvious for tax decreases than for tax increases. Finally, we find that the elasticity
of taxable income is considerably higher in the treatment group relative to the control
group. The internal validity of the experiment, randomization of subjects into groups,
and lack of evidence that subjects did not understand the incentives of the experiment
all point to causal treatment effects.
We are among the first to empirically examine the labor supply implications of the
observed evidence that tax evasion opportunities are heterogeneously distributed across
workers. Whereas most studies based on the seminal theory of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) assume that all taxpayers operate in an environment in which underreporting is
available, more recent studies contradict this view. For example, Slemrod (2007) and
Kleven et al. (2011) find evidence of almost no evasion among individuals subject to
third-party reporting but substantial evasion among the self-employed.5
Our paper is related to the literature at the intersection of labor supply and tax
evasion. As opposed to theoretical (Sandmo 1981; Cowell 1985) and empirical (Lemieux
et al. 1994; Frederiksen et al. 2005) contributions that compare formal and informal
labor markets, we compare formal labor markets that have two distinct levels of access
to evasion. In this respect, our paper is more in line with the theoretical contributions
of Pencavel (1979) and Slemrod (2001), who extend the standard labor supply model
with taxes to account for tax evasion and avoidance, respectively. Both papers provide
theoretical evidence that the ability to reduce one’s tax liability through legal or illegal
means affects labor supply decisions.
However, the paper most closely related to ours is Collins et al. (1992), which uses a
laboratory experimental approach to measure the effect of access to evasion opportunities
on the change in labor effort when individuals move from a system with no taxation to
a system with either a proportional, “mildly progressive” or “steeply progressive” tax
system. In other words, their experiment focuses on the progressivity of the tax structure.
Their results indicate that the opportunity to evade has a positive effect on labor effort
5Other studies show that bunching around kinks in the tax schedule is mostly prevalent among the self-
employed, allowing for the interpretation that other types of workers simply do not have the opportunity
to adjust their taxable income due to lack of evasion opportunities (Saez 2010; Bastani and Selin 2014;
Chetty et al. 2013). Additionally, the tax morale literature shows that the intrinsic willingness to pay
taxes is considerably lower among the self-employed relative to wage earners (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006
and Konrad and Qari 2012).
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when taxes are proportional or steeply progressive and a negative effect when taxes are
mildly progressive. However, it is difficult to tell what the subjects are responding to
when the tax regimes in Collins et al. (1992) are implemented; are they responding to
the fact that they must now pay taxes, the progressivity of the schedule, the multiple
brackets and rates, or the top rate? As a result, the differential effect in effort observed
across compliance groups cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of a change in tax
rates. Unlike Collins et al. (1992), we use a flat tax rate that varies across rounds in all
sessions. We are therefore the first to directly and cleanly measure how the labor effort
response to tax rates varies with access to evasion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the exper-
imental design and set-up. We discuss theoretical predictions in section 4.3 and present
the empirical strategy and results in section 4.4. We discuss the empirical findings and
issues of external validity in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Experimental Design
In the experiment we designed, subjects earn income by completing a labor task and
then pay taxes on their income. In order to answer our research question, one group of
subjects is given the opportunity to underreport their income, while the other is not. We
refer to the group that is given the opportunity to evade as the treatment group; the
group that has no evasion opportunity is called the control group. A detailed description
of the experimental design is provided below.
4.2.1 Organization
The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER),
University of Cologne, Germany. All subjects in the laboratory’s subject pool of approx-
imately 4000 persons were invited via email—using the recruitment software ORSEE
(Greiner 2004)—to participate in the experiment. Potential participants could sign up
on a first-come-first-serve basis. A total of 205 subjects, mostly undergraduate students
from the University of Cologne, participated in our experiment (see section 4.4.2 for
summary statistics). Neither the content of the experiment nor the expected payoff was
stated in the invitation email. The computerized experiment was programmed utilizing
z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007).
We conducted 14 sessions over five school days in June 2012 and July 2013. Each
session included one practice round, 10 paying rounds and 15 subjects; each lasted ap-
proximately 70 minutes on average (including the review of instructions and payment
of participants). Random assignment to computer boothes was implemented by asking
each subject to draw an ID number out of a box upon entering the lab. The subjects’
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decisions and payments were linked to their ID; the experimenter had no way of matching
this information to their names. Subjects also received a hard copy of the instructions
when they entered the lab (See appendix 4.10) and were allowed as much time as they
needed to familiarize themselves with the procedure of the experiment. They were then
given the opportunity to ask any clarifying questions.6
4.2.2 Treatment Effect and Variation in Tax Rates
The 14 experimental sessions consisted of seven treatment sessions in which underreport-
ing was available and seven control sessions with no option to underreport income. In
order to identify the differential response to varying taxes between the control and treat-
ment group, we require variation in tax rates. In six sessions—three treatment and three
control—the tax rate was set at 15% in the first three paying rounds, 35% in rounds
4 to 6, 50% in rounds 7 to 9 and 15% in the last round. We use two additional tax
evolutions in order to check whether the treatment effect depends on the way tax rate
changes across rounds.7 The second evolution of tax rates, which we use in two treatment
and two control sessions, was 50% in rounds 1 to 3, 35% in rounds 4 to 6, 15% in rounds
7 to 9 and 50% in the last round. In the final four sessions—two treatment and two
control—the tax rate evolved as follows: 35% in rounds 1 to 3, 50% in rounds 4 to 6,
15% in rounds 7 to 9 and 35% in the last round. The tax rate was 15% in the practice
round of all sessions. Table 4.1 provides and overview of the variation of the treatment
status and tax rates.
4.2.3 Overview of a single Round
At the beginning of each round, participants in both the treatment and the control groups
were told the tax rate for that round. In the instructions, participants were told that the
“tax rate may, but does not have to, vary from round to round”. Therefore, they did not
know the tax rate for a given round until the beginning of that round. This option was
chosen because we did not want subjects’ labor effort decision in round t to be influenced
by the tax rate in round t+ 1.
Each round had two stages in the treatment group: a labor task and a reporting
decision. In the labor task stage, subjects undertook a real-effort task and earned money
6Doerrenberg and Duncan (2014a) use parts of the same data to study the distributional implications
of tax evasion. In particular, they show that tax evasion drives a wedge between observed and actual
income inequality, which implies that making tax policy decisions on the basis of observed income
inequality can be misleading.
7This also allows us to separate the tax effect from possible learning effects and thus identify the
of tax rate changes in the control group. However, it is possible to identify the treatment effect in the
presence of a correlation between tax rates and learning as long as learning follows the same path in
both groups.
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Table 4.1: Overview of Treatments and Tax Rates
Tax Tax Rates (%): Number of Participants
Evolution 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 Treat Control Overall
1 15 35 50 15 45 45 90
2 50 35 15 50 30 28 58
3 35 50 15 35 30 27 57
Total Number of Participants: 105 100 205
Tax rates in rounds 1-3, 4-6, 7-9 and 10, as well as number of partici-
pants per group for each of the three tax evolutions. 14 sessions were
conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research in June
2012 (Tax Evolution 1) and July 2013 (Tax Evolutions 2 and 3). Each
participant was either in the treatment or control group. Five subjects
did not show up for the control sessions in tax evolutions 2 and 3.
depending on their performance on the task. Their gross-income in each round consisted
of their labor income plus a fixed amount of non-labor income.8 In the reporting decision
stage, subjects in the treatment group had to report an income amount between zero and
their true earned gross income; the reported amount was taxed at the tax rate for that
round. These individuals faced an exogenous audit probability of ten percent and paid
a fine equal to twice evaded taxes if audited. The audit probability and fine rate were
fixed across rounds, and participants were given this information at the beginning of the
experiment.
Participants in the control group undertook the same labor task as the treatment
group, but were not given a reporting decision. That is, they first performed the labor
task and earned money based on their performance. Their gross income, earned money
from the labor task plus the fixed amount of non-labor income, was then automatically
taxed at the tax rate for that round. The tax payment was withdrawn and subjects were
informed of their net income for the round. The two stages are explained in more detail
in the following two sections.
4.2.4 The Labor Task Stage
The labor task, which was completed by both groups in the first stage of each round,
was designed by Gill and Prowse (2012) and involves moving a set of sliders across a
computer screen (see figure 4.4 in the appendix for a screenshot of the task).9 The sliders
8Although every subject has two minutes to earn labor income by completing the labor task, we
provide each subject with non-labor income to ensure that every subject has an income reporting decision
in every round. This design feature mimics income generating processes in the real world since individuals
generally have labor and non-labor income.
9Gill and Prowse (2013) provide details and show how to implement the slider task. It has been used
widely since its introduction: Riener and Wiederhold (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012), Hammermann
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were initially positioned at zero and could be repositioned to any integer between 0 and
100, inclusive. Subjects received feedback on the current position of the slider only, which
was indicated at the rightmost end of each slider. The arrow keys on the key board were
disabled to ensure the subjects only used the left mouse key to complete the task; use
of the arrow keys makes the task trivial. For each round, subjects were given 2 minutes
to align 48 sliders at position 50. As in Gill and Prowse (2012), “the 48 sliders are
arranged on the screen so that no two sliders are aligned exactly one under the other."
This prevented subjects from positioning one slider at 50 and then visually matching the
other sliders at this position. The number of correctly aligned sliders was taken as a
measure of labor effort.
The slider task has a number of advantages, which are described in Gill and Prowse
(2012, 2013). It is easy to explain and implement, does not require prior knowledge,
does not allow guessing, and is identical across rounds, treatments and subjects. Most
importantly, the slider task generates a lot of variation, and it is virtually impossible to
move all sliders correctly within the time frame of two minutes. As a result, performance
on the task can be interpreted as labor effort. It is important to note that we do not
measure hours worked nor do we give subjects the opportunity to substitute “off-the-
job” leisure (e.g., taking a day off to go to the beach) for effort. This is similar to
labor markets in the “real world” that require individuals to work a fixed number of
hours each day. Individuals working under these types of contracts often respond to
market incentives by changing jobs or by changing their effort on the job. For example,
Dickinson (1999) notes that workers can substitute effort for on-the-job leisure such as
relaxing in their chairs without working. Therefore, our experiment provides participants
the opportunity to enjoy on-the-job leisure. We acknowledge that our measure of labor
effort cannot be generalized to more traditional measures of labor supply, such as hours
of work, without caution. However, the choices between labor effort and hours of work
share many characteristics and are isomorphic in many ways, so that our measure of labor
effort can serve as a good proxy for labor supply (Charness and Kuhn 2011).
4.2.5 The Reporting Decision Stage
Subjects in the treatment group were informed of their gross income and were asked to
make an income reporting decision for tax purposes in the second stage of the experiment.
The language used in the instructions and on the computer screen explicitly stated that
reported income would be taxed and the instructions also disclosed that all tax revenues
would be donated to the German Red Cross. Donating tax revenues to the Red Cross may
et al. (2012), Gill and Prowse (2014), Gill et al. (2013) and Cettolin and Riedl (2013), among others.
Djawadi and Fahr (2012) also use the slider task in the context of tax compliance, but they examine a
different research question than we do and employ compliance as the dependent variable.
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be viewed as public good, which has been shown to have a positive effect on willingness
to pay taxes.10 To the extent that subjects view the Red Cross as benevolent, they may
evade less than they would if the money was donated to a less acknowledged organization.
This implies that we derive lower bound estimates of the treatment effect.
As is standard in the experimental tax evasion literature, reported income could be
any amount between 0 and true gross income. After the reporting decision was complete,
student helpers walked up to each computer booth with a 10-sided die, which each subject
threw. The student helper then entered the number thrown on the die in the computer,
which then determined the subject’s audit status and calculated his or her tax liability,
penalty, if any, and net income.11 Allowing subjects to throw a 10-sided die like we do is
one way of ensuring that the evasion opportunity is credible. In other words, subjects are
more likely to believe that their audit status is random if their audit status is determined
manually with a die as compared to automatic randomization with a computer. We
acknowledge that the presence of student helpers in the lab may yield an “experimenter
effect” that could potentially cause disturbances. However, the interaction between the
student helper and the subjects was limited to throwing the die and wait at most 2 seconds
for subjects to hit “enter". The student helper did communicate with the subjects and
had no opportunity to view subjects’ choices.12
Subjects who underreported income and threw a one were audited and had to pay a
fine equal to twice their evaded taxes (i.e., the underreported amount multiplied by twice
the tax rate). This implies an audit probability of 10 percent, which, together with the
fine rate, is a commonly used penalty structure in the tax evasion literature Alm et al.
(2009). All other subjects who either reported honestly or underreported but threw a die
number between two and ten received a net income equal to true gross income less the
tax rate multiplied by the reported gross income. Of course, the student helper could
not see if a subject underreported his or her income because the student helper stepped
away before the screen summarizing the round’s payment appeared.
Unlike those in the treatment group, subjects in the control group did not have
the opportunity to underreport their income and thus could not evade taxes. In other
words, their tax liability was “withheld at source”. A corollary in the “real" world would
10See footnote 25 and our conclusion for a discussion and references. We donated 541.69 EURO to the
German Red Cross after all 14 sessions were completed.
11The exact procedure was as follows: The student helper entered the number showing on the face of
the die; the subject confirmed this number by hitting “ENTER”, which resulted in a pop-up screen with
one of the following sentences: You have been audited or You have not been audited. The subject had
to press “ENTER” again to see the screen summarizing the round’s payment. By this time the student
helper would have moved on to the next subject.
12It should be noted that the outcomes do not support the presence of an experimenter effect; the
level of evasion is consistent with existing estimates of evasion in the literature (e.g., Fortin et al. 2007;
Alm et al. 2009; Alm et al. 2010; Coricelli et al. 2010), and the supply of labor effort is similar to that
found in other studies that use the slider task (e.g., Gill and Prowse 2012; Gill and Prowse 2014).
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be individuals whose only source of income is labor earnings that are subject to third
party reporting and withholding and who receive pre-populated tax forms. For example,
taxpayers in Germany must enter a tax identification number into their tax forms when
filing taxes at the end of the tax year. The tax form is then populated with income
information that has been subjected to third-party withholding, such as labor income.
Therefore if the only source of income is labor income subject to third-party reporting,
there is no opportunity to underreport income.13
Since we are only interested in the extent to which the responsiveness of labor effort
varies with evasion status, both groups faced an identical proportional tax rate that varied
by round (see Table 4.1). Subjects were informed of the parameters of the tax system at
the beginning of each round. Again, the only difference between treatment and control
group was the ability to evade, and the only difference between rounds was the tax rate.
The empirical analysis in section 4.4 exploits this between subject variation in treatment.
4.2.6 Payment
Subjects in both groups earned experimental currency units (ECU) throughout the ex-
periment. Their gross income in each round had two parts: earned labor income and
non-labor income. The non-labor income was set at five ECU per round and remained
constant across subjects and sessions. The labor income was based on performance in the
slider task, and subjects were paid six ECU for every correctly aligned slider. The net
income in each round was a function of gross income, the tax rate, and, in the treatment
group, the reporting decision and audit outcome.
After all rounds of a session were completed, each subject threw a 10-sided die to
determine which of the 10 rounds she would receive payment for. Paying subjects their
net income for a single randomly chosen round instead of the sum of net incomes across
all rounds is advantageous because it allows us to avoid wealth effects, satiation and
irrational decisions that generally occur once a certain expected payoff is achieved (see
e.g. Blumkin et al. 2012 for a recent example that handles payment in a similar manner).
Additionally, this payment method, along with the fact that subjects were not informed
about the prevailing tax rate until the start of a round, avoids adding an intertemporal
13We acknowledge that taxpayers in Germany and most other countries who file taxes still have the
opportunity to evade taxes by overstating their deductions. However, this is not an option in our
experiment. Even if taxpayers have the opportunity to enter their income on tax forms as is customary
in the United States, it would make little sense to underreport income that has been subject to third-party
reporting since the tax authority has independent information on the correct labor earnings. In other
words, the probability of detection is 100 percent for these individuals, which means that underreporting
income for tax purposes will lead to lower net income than if gross income were reported accurately.
Workers facing these conditions almost always report their true gross income. For example, Slemrod
(2007) shows that income subject to third-party reporting in the United States has a compliance rate of
over 90 percent. We designed the experiment to be similar to the institutional setting of Germany since
this was where the experiment was implemented.
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component to our experiment. Therefore, the experiment matches our static theoretical
framework, and the differential effects that we derive ought to be interpreted as differences
in Marshallian elasticities, as opposed to intertemporal labor substitution elasticities. The
total ECU for the selected round was converted to EUROs using an exchange rate of 1
ECU to 0.1 EURO. A show-up fee of 2.5 EURO was added to the subject’s net income
to determine the final payment. Final payment ranged from 2.5 EURO to 25.2 EURO
with an average of 10.11 EURO in the control group and 11.98 EURO in the treatment
group.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
This section of the paper sets up a theoretical framework that matches the experimental
design discussed in the previous section. We rely on this framework to highlight the main
channels through which access to evasion affects the responsiveness of labor supply. The
model is informed by Pencavel (1979), who merges the standard neo-classical labor supply
model with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion. While social norms
or preferences certainly matter for tax evasion decisions, we exclude such variables from
our theoretical discussion because randomization in our experiment implies that they are
balanced across groups and therefore do not have a differential effect on the treatment
and control groups. We also make reference to results from the standard labor supply
model with taxation but no evasion.
4.3.1 Model
Individuals make a labor supply decision L, which yields labor income wL and non-labor
income M ; w is the wage rate. They then report R ≤ (wL + M) to the tax authority
to determine their tax liability. Reported income R is audited with probability p and,
because we assume all audits lead to the full discovery of true income, a fine equal to
twice the evaded taxes must be paid if audited. Assuming individuals consume all of
their income implies:
Consumption =

Ca = (wL+M)− τR− 2τ(wL+M −R)
= (wL+M)(1− 2τ) + τR with probability p
Cn = wL+M − τR with probability (1-p),
(4.1)
where subscripts a and n indicate audited and not audited, respectively, and τ is the
proportional tax rate.
As in Pencavel (1979), we assume individuals choose L and R to maximize an
expected utility function that satisfies the standard assumptions of the neo-classical labor
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supply model; continuous, twice differentiable, and concave. We also assume the utility
function is strongly separable in consumption and labor (Pencavel 1979). With these
assumptions in mind, the individual maximization problem is specified as follows
maxEU = pU(Ca, L) + (1− p)U(Cn, L)
st.
Ca = (wL+M)(1− 2τ) + τR
Cn = wL+M − τR,
(4.2)
This model reduces to the standard labor supply model with taxation if there is no
opportunity to evade. Differentiating equation (4.2) with respect to R and L, respectively,
yields first-order conditions, which can be used to determine the effect of evasion on the
responsiveness of labor supply. Since the derivations are similar to those presented in
Pencavel (1979), we discuss the implications here and leave a formal derivation of the
main results for appendix 4.9.
4.3.2 Prediction
The derivations presented in appendix 4.9 identify two channels through which evasion
affects the responsiveness of labor supply to tax rate changes. The first channel pertains to
the standard income and substitution effects, which apply to both groups. An increase in
the tax rate reduces the return on effort, which reduces effort via a substitution effect and
increases effort via an income effect. Because these effects work in opposite directions,
their net effect on the responsiveness of effort supply is ambiguous. These standard
income and substitution effects are similar to those derived in the standard labor supply
model, and they apply to both types of workers.
While the discussion above represents the total effect on workers who do not have tax
evasion opportunities, there is a second channel for workers who are able to hide income
from the tax authorities. For this group of workers, higher taxes are likely to lead to
higher evasion (Alm 2012), which implies a higher net wage. This evasion-induced effect
on net wages has income and substitution effects on the responsiveness of labor effort.
Increased evasion implies higher net wage and thus higher income, which implies lower
work effort via the income effect if leisure is a normal good. At the same time, the higher
net wage implies that leisure is more costly, thus leading to a substitution towards greater
effort. The signs of these evasion-induced income and substitution effects are not only
opposite each other, but also opposite the signs of the standard income and substitution
effects. Assuming leisure is a normal good, the evasion-induced income effect reinforces
the standard substitution effect while the evasion-induced substitution effect reinforces
the standard income effect. Therefore, the net effect on evaders depends on the size of
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evasion-induced effects relative to the standard effects.
Because the effect of taxes on both groups is ambiguous, it is not clear whether
workers with evasion opportunities are more or less responsive than workers without
such opportunities. It is also possible that the two opposing effects cancel each other
so that there is no difference in responsiveness among workers with and without evasion
opportunities. This ambiguity makes sense, since workers with evasion opportunities
have two interrelated means of changing their taxable income in response to a change in
the tax rate: work less and/or report less income. We are therefore forced to rely on an
empirical analysis to answer our research question.
4.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
Recall that we are interested in identifying the differential effect of tax rates on partici-
pants with an evading opportunity relative to those without access to evasion. We begin
this section by describing the empirical strategy that allows us to identify this treatment
effect (Section: 4.4.1). The relevant summary statistics and empirical results (4.4.2) for
the full sample of subjects are presented next, followed by results for each tax evolution.
4.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Participants in our experiment are randomly assigned to either the treatment or control
group. Because the treatment status of a each participant is always the same, we employ
a between-subjects design to identify our coefficient of interest. Furthermore, because
we are only interested in the labor effort changes with respect to varying tax rates, we
average (collapse) the decisions of each individual by rounds without tax rate changes.14
Therefore, our data set has four observations per person: average behavior over rounds
1, 2, 3; over rounds 4, 5, 6; over rounds 7, 8, 9 and finally behavior in round 10. It follows
that we compare average behavior across changes in the tax rate as is usually done in
the ETI literature (Saez et al. 2012). Analyzing the data in this way also allows us to
abstract from learning effects occurring within rounds for which there are no tax changes.
It is further consistent with the notion that people adjust to the prevailing tax rate across
periods (i.e., years) without tax changes, whereas policymakers are mostly interested in
the effects of an actual change in the tax rate.
As our research question is ultimately about changes in labor effort in response
to tax rates, we first generate a variable for each person that measures the changes
in labor effort between periods t and t − 1. Due to random assignment, any (non-
parametric) difference in this generated variable between the treatment and control groups
14Recall that the tax rates in all sessions change after rounds three, six and nine.
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will be a first test for the presence of treatment effects. We also test for treatment effects
parametrically by regressing labor effort on the net-of-tax rate (NTR), which is defined
as (1 - tax rate).15 The estimated model is specified as follows:
Li,r,s = β0 + β1(1− τr) + β2Ts + δ(1− τr)Ts + i,r,s, (4.3)
where Li,r,s indicates labor effort of individual i (with i = 1, ..., 205) in treatment state
s (with s = 0, 1) and period r (with r = 1, 2, 3, 4). (1 − τr) stands for the net-of-tax
rate NTR, and Ts is a dummy for the treatment state: either control (dummy is zero)
or treatment (dummy is one) group. i,r,s is a standard error term. Our coefficient of
interest is δ, which represents the difference in the effect of taxes on supply of effort across
the two groups. More precisely, δ indicates the effect of the NTR in the treatment group
relative to the control group. Due to the random assignment of participants to the two
groups, our experimental set-up allows us to causally identify the treatment effect given
by the parameter δ.
We set up our data as a panel with four observations per individual and run random
effects (GLS) regressions with standard errors clustered on individuals. Random effects
regressions yield unbiased results because random selection into treatments and exogenous
tax rates cause the error term to be uncorrelated with our explanatory variable of interest
in each time period (Wooldridge 2010).16 Obviously, because the treatment status of a
single individual never changes, it is not possible to estimate the treatment effect in the
presence of individual fixed effects.
4.4.2 Results
The following subsections provide summary statistics and then results for the full sample
of 205 participants and each tax evolution separately.
Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for several of the participants’ demo-
graphic and attitudinal characteristics, separately for the treatment and control groups
using the pooled sample. After the experiment, we surveyed tax morale using a question
15Estimating the effect of NTR rather than the tax rate is standard in both the labor supply literature
(Keane 2011) and the public finance literature (Saez et al. 2012).
16Note that the labor decision is not censored from above, making use of estimators that allow for
censoring, such as Tobit models, unnecessary. Table 4.2 depicts that the average number of correctly
adjusted sliders was 18.22 (out of 48). The maximum number of correct positions was 37, suggesting that
it was impossible to reach the upper bound of 48. Additionally, there is no evidence that the distribution
of the number of correctly positioned sliders is skewed in any particular direction.
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very similar to one used by the World Values Survey (Minkov 2012).17 We also derived
a measure of risk aversion by asking subjects to choose between a certain pay-off of $50
and a gamble that pays $100 with probability of 0.5 and $0 with probability of 0.5.
Casual observation of the data shows that randomization into the treatment states
worked well. This is confirmed by non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for differences
in distributions between groups (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and Whitney 1947);18 we do not
observe any statistically significant differences in demographic characteristics (gender,
age, share of participants whose native language is German) and attitudinal variables
(tax morale, risk aversion) across the two groups. While we do not explicitly measure
other attitudinal variables such as social norms or preferences, randomization implies
that these omitted variables are also balanced across groups and therefore do not have
any effect on our results. We also find evidence that the tax evolutions are balanced
with respect to individual characteristics, suggesting that randomization also worked
well across tax evolutions (results available upon request).
Among all participants, approximately 46% were male , 78% indicated German to
be their native language, and the average age was 24.6 years. The average tax morale is
7.11 on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the highest level of morale.
Full Sample
Non-parametric Results Panel B of Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for the
two choice variables in our experiment: labor effort and evasion decision. We find that
participants in the treatment group failed to report roughly 73% of their gross income on
average. This level of evasion is at the high end of estimates in the tax evasion literature,
which finds noncompliance rates from 30 percent to 78 percent (Fortin et al. 2007; Alm
et al. 2009; Alm et al. 2010; Coricelli et al. 2010). Additionally (not reported in the
Table), we find that the evasion share is positively correlated with tax rates. The simple
correlation coefficient is 0.091 and the regression coefficient from regressing evasion share
on the tax rate controlling for period effects is 0.002; both are statistically different from
zero.
Although the mean level of effort differs slightly between the treatment group (18.51)
and the control group (17.92), the difference is not statistically different from zero (p-
value Wilcoxon rank-sum test: 0.238). A similar story holds for the mean change in
17“Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you have the chance’.” This is the most frequently
used question to measure tax morale in observational studies (e.g., Slemrod 2003, Alm and Torgler 2006,
Halla 2012 and Doerrenberg and Peichl 2013)
18A difference in distributions usually implies a difference in means. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is
basically the non-parametric equivalent to a t-test for differences in means. It is the most common test
in experimental economics to test for differences between treatment states.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Control Treatment
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p > |z| N
Panel A: Characteristics
Male 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.942 205
Age 24.07 3.58 25.00 6.15 0.656 205
German native 0.78 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.883 205
Tax Morale 7.26 2.71 6.97 2.68 0.409 205
Risk Aversion 1.28 0.64 1.33 0.70 0.664 205
Panel B: Choice Variables
Effort 17.92 3.85 18.51 4.13 0.238 205
Effort Change 0.98 1.01 1.01 1.03 0.992 205
Share Evaded / / 0.73 0.33 / 105
Means and Standard Deviations of demographic and attitudinal variables by Treat-
ment Status. Male and German native are dummy variables. Effort indicates the
number of correctly positioned slides. Share evaded is the share of gross income that
has not been reported for tax purposes. Effort change is the difference in correctly
positioned sliders between period P and the previous period, P−1. p > |z| reports the
p-value of a (non-parametric) Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in distributions
(H0: no differences) between the two treatment groups (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and
Whitney 1947). N indicates the number of observations in both treatments.
effort, but this simple difference likely masks variation in the difference between rounds.
We provide a more rigorous test for the treatment effect by regressing effort on the NTR.
Regression Results The first column of Table 4.3 presents results from estimating
equation (4.3) using the full sample. We find that the net-of-tax rate has a smaller effect
on effort in the treatment group than the control group. The effect of a 10-percentage
point increase in the net-of-tax rate is smaller by 0.08 sliders. Although marginally
economically meaningful, the effect is not statistically different from zero.
As a result of randomization, equation (4.3) identifies the causal impact of interest
without any need for further adjustments. However, identifying δ using equation (4.3)
implies that participants in the two treatment states make the same progress in learning
how to play the effort task because tax rates and learning are marginally correlated. In
order to ensure that different learning abilities across the two groups do not confound our
results, we extend the baseline model to include a learning trend that takes the values 1,
2, 3 or 4 for each period. We also run specifications including the logged learning trend
to account for potentially diminishing learning trend. These results, which are presented
in columns two and three, respectively, of Table 4.3, show that the treatment effect is not
driven by learning effects. Finally, column four of Table 4.3 shows that the estimates are
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not driven by individual characteristics such as age, gender, a dummy for German being
the native language, risk aversion, tax morale, or a dummy for the time of day at which
a participant’s session was run (morning or afternoon).19 Although the control variables
are jointly significant (Wald test of joint significance: p < 0.000), the fact that the results
of interest are not altered by controlling for these variables provides further evidence that
randomization worked well and that the results are internally valid.
Table 4.3: Regression of Effort on Taxes. Full Sample
I II III IV
NTR ∗ Treat −0.837 −0.892 −0.926 −0.890
(0.935) (0.890) (0.888) (0.892)
NTR 0.288 −0.276 0.042 0.015
(0.703) (0.688) (0.705) (0.712)
Treatment Status 1.162 1.199 1.222 1.444*
(0.883) (0.848) (0.832) (0.810)
Trend (linear) 0.987***
(0.068)
Trend (log) 2.146*** 2.146***
(0.142) (0.142)
constant 17.721*** 15.634*** 16.182*** 21.891***
(0.629) (0.612) (0.606) (1.727)
Controls No No No Yes
Panel Obs 820 820 820 820
Indiv. Obs 205 205 205 205
Periods 4 4 4 4
R2 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.21
Random Effects Regressions for the full Sample. Dependent Variable is Effort. Stan-
dard Errors in parentheses are clustered by Individual. Treated is a dummy variable
taking “1” if a participant is in the group with evasion opportunity (treated) and “0”
if not. NTR (net-of-tax rate) is defined as (1 - Tax Rate). Specification IV includes
controls for age, gender, a dummy indicating native German, risk aversion, tax morale
and time of day. Significance levels: ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01.
Besides looking at the variables in levels, we also run models in which we use the
logged levels of labor effort Li,r,s and (1 − τr). That is, we additionally identify the
differences in labor effort elasticities with respect to the NTR across the two treatment
19To the extent that individuals who show up in the evening are systematically different from those
who show up in the morning, one might expect that this difference is driving our treatment effect. A
similar concern might also be expressed for native Germans, gender, age, tax morale and risk aversion.
Note however, that even if the response to taxation is affected by these characteristics, this is only a
problem for us if the treatment and control groups differ with respect to the characteristics. In other
words, randomization into groups is all that is needed for identification (Charness et al. 2012).
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states. The results presented in Table 4.6 of Appendix 4.8 show qualitatively similar
results for the estimated elasticity; the elasticity is smaller in treatment group, but the
difference not statistically different from zero.
Although pooling the data like we do here makes sense, it is possible that it masks
heterogenous responses to the various evolutions of the tax rate. In particular, it is
possible that the response of taxpayers depends on the order in which tax rates change
across rounds. We investigate this possibility by looking at each tax evolution separately
in the following sections.
Tax Evolution Analysis
Effort trend Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 depict the evolution of effort over the course of
all four rounds in each of the three tax evolutions. First, the figures show that there is an
upward trend in effort for both groups, which suggests a learning effect (as also found in
Gill and Prowse 2012). However, the figures also show that the slopes in each graph differ
between the two groups, suggesting that the adjustment to changing tax rates depends
on evasion opportunities. Additionally, the visual evidence suggests that the difference
between the treatment states likely varies with tax evolution.
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Figure 4.1: Effort by period and treatment status. Tax Rates: 15, 35, 50, 15
Non-parametric Comparison of Effort Adjustments A more careful look at the
treatment effect is presented in Table 4.4 where we compare the differential changes in
labor effort in response to tax changes between periods t and t− 1 for each tax evolution
and tax change. The results presented in panel A for tax evolution 1 show that the effort
response to tax rate changes is significantly higher in the treatment group relative to the
control group when the tax rate falls from 50% to 15%. This difference is statistically
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Figure 4.2: Effort by period and treatment status. Tax Rates: 50, 35, 15, 50
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Figure 4.3: Effort by period and treatment status. Tax Rates: 35, 50, 15, 35
different from zero at the 2% level and is also visible in Figure 4.1. The results for tax
evolution 2, which are presented in panel B of Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2, also show a
difference in effort response between the two groups. Again, this effect is statistically
different from zero at the 3% level when the tax rate falls from 35% to 15%. More
importantly, though, the sign of the treatment effect is opposite of what we find in panel
A. Finally, the results for tax evolution 3 in panel C show that the treatment group is
more responsive when the tax rate increases from 35% to 50% and less responsive when
the tax rate falls from 50% to 15%. The former effect is statistically different from zero
at the 2-percent level while the latter is marginally significant at the 11-percent level.
This result is demonstrated in Figure 4.3.
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Table 4 also reveals three additional findings. First, we observe an asymmetric labor
supply response to tax rate changes. For example, an increase in the tax rate from 15%
to 35% has no effect in Panels A or C, while a decrease from 35% to 15% has a fairly
large effect in Panel B. Similarly, an increase from 15% to 50% has no effect in Panel
B while a decrease from 50% to 15% has a statistically significant effect in Panel A and
is marginally significant in panel C. Additionally, an increase from 35% to 50% has a
statistically significant effect in Panel C, while a decrease from 50% to 35% has no effect
in Panel B. Second, this asymmetric labor supply response further suggests that subjects
appear to be more responsive to tax decreases than tax increases. Three out of four tax
decreases lead to a treatment effect that is either statistically or marginally statistically
different from zero: 50% to 15% in Panels A and C, and 35% to 15% in Panel B. On the
other hand, only one out of five tax increases triggered a statistically significant treatment
effect: 35% to 50% in Panel C.
Finally, we observe that the direction of the treatment effect depends on the order
in which tax rates changes across rounds. In other words, tax evolution and history of tax
rates matter. Subjects in Panels A and C experienced tax increases before tax decreases
while subjects in Panel B experienced tax decreases before tax increases. We observe that
tax changes in Panel B lead to a positive treatment effect (treatment more responsive
than control) while tax changes in Panels A and C lead to negative treatment effects.
The treatment group in Panels A and C appears to be more responsive to tax increases
while the control group is more responsive to tax decreases; the opposite is observed in
Panel B.20 The sign of the treatment effect in panel C is therefore consistent with the
results in panel A in that the effort adjustment is higher (lower) in the control group
when taxes go down (up). We observe the opposite result in panel B, where the control
group has a smaller adjustment to a tax decrease than the treatment group (see section
4.5 for a discussion of this finding). This variation in the sign of the treatment effect
across tax evolutions explains why the treatment effect is not distinguishable from zero
when we pool the data (see regression results in Table 4.3).
Regression The results discussed so far are supported by a parametric analysis in
which we estimate equation (4.3) separately for each tax evolution. The results in Table
4.5 confirm the existence of a negative treatment effect for tax evolutions one (panel A)
and three (panel C). The coefficient of -3.056 in panel A is statistically different from zero
and implies that the effect of a 10 percentage point increase in the net-of-tax rate on the
supply of labor effort is 0.3 lower in the treatment group relative to the control group.
The estimate in panel C is about one third that of panel A but is not distinguishable from
zero. On the other hand, the estimated treatment effect is 2.714 in tax evolution two
20These differences are not always statistically significant; as we indicated above, the effect is more
likely to be significant for tax decreases than for tax increases.
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Table 4.4: Effort Adjustments
Control Treatment
Period ∆ Tax Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p > |z| N
Panel A: Tax Evolution 1
1 to 2 ↑ (15-35%) 1.56 2.61 1.85 2.37 0.651 90
2 to 3 ↑ (35-50%) 0.87 2.12 0.90 2.12 0.958 90
3 to 4 ↓ (50-15%) 1.33 2.99 -0.30 2.42 0.013 90
Panel B: Tax Evolution 2
1 to 2 ↓ (50-35%) 1.01 2.01 1.51 2.10 0.405 58
2 to 3 ↓ (35-15%) -0.19 2.68 1.31 2.00 0.025 58
3 to 4 ↑ (15-50%) 1.19 2.72 1.10 2.89 0.987 58
Panel C: Tax Evolution 3
1 to 2 ↑ (35-50%) 0.61 1.85 1.82 1.47 0.011 57
2 to 3 ↓ (50-15%) 1.40 2.18 0.91 1.30 0.110 57
3 to 4 ↑ (15-35%) 0.49 2.54 0.23 2.99 0.631 57
Means and Standard Deviations for effort change between periods t and t − 1 by Treatment
Status. ∆ Tax indicates the direction of the tax rate change. Tax rates in periods 1-4 are
15, 35, 50, 15% in panel A; 50, 35, 15, 50% in panel B and 35, 50, 15, 35% in panel C.
p > |z| reports the p-value of a (non-parametric) Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in
distributions (H0: no differences) between the two treatment groups (Wilcoxon 1945; Mann
and Whitney 1947). N indicates the number of observations in both treatments.
(panel B). These results are robust to the inclusion of period trend as well as individual
demographics. Similar results are obtained when we estimate the elasticity of labor effort
with respect to the NTR (see Table 4.7) in appendix 4.8.
4.5 Discussion of Results
Our empirical analysis highlights three important findings: access to evasion affects the
labor supply response of workers, this effect is stronger and most obvious when tax rates
fall, and the sign of the effect depends on the evolution of tax rates. This section first
provides a discussion of these results (4.5.1). Because the pooled results are being driven
by opposing effects of the three tax evolutions, we focus on tax evolution specific results.
We then discuss how our experimental design differs from studies that focus on the effect
of wages and taxes (4.5.2) as well as the external validity of our findings (4.5.3).
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Table 4.5: Regression of Effort on Taxes by Tax Evolution
I II III IV
Panel A: Tax Evolution 1
NTR ∗ Treat −3.056** −3.056** −3.056** −3.056**
(1.398) (1.400) (1.400) (1.412)
NTR −1.130 −0.273 1.078 1.078
(1.082) (1.092) (1.119) (1.128)
Treat 2.672* 2.672* 2.672* 2.209
(1.535) (1.537) (1.537) (1.406)
R2 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.35
Panel B: Tax Evolution 2
NTR ∗ Treat 2.714* 2.714* 2.714* 2.714*
(1.596) (1.599) (1.599) (1.617)
NTR −0.501 −1.670 −2.895** −2.895**
(1.236) (1.242) (1.276) (1.290)
Treat −0.663 −0.663 −0.663 −0.786
(1.084) (1.086) (1.086) (1.065)
R2 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.22
Panel C: Tax Evolution 3
NTR ∗ Treat −1.105 −1.105 −1.105 −1.105
(1.386) (1.389) (1.389) (1.405)
NTR 4.003*** 1.431 1.563 1.563
(1.197) (1.225) (1.210) (1.224)
Treat 1.194 1.194 1.194 2.095
(1.307) (1.309) (1.309) (1.354)
R2 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.26
Trend No Linear Log Log
Controls No No No Yes
Random Effects Regressions. Dependent Variable is Effort. Tax rates in periods
1-4 are 15, 35, 50, 15%, in panel A; 50, 35, 15, 35% in panel B and 35, 50, 15,
35% in panel C. Number of observations is 360, 232, and 228 in panels A, B and C.
Number of subjects is 90, 58 and 57 in panels A, B and C. Observations are from four
periods per participant. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered by Individual.
Treated is a dummy variable taking “1” if a participant is in the group with evasion
opportunity (treated) and “0” if not. NTR (net-of-tax rate) is defined as (1 - Tax
Rate). Specification IV includes controls for age, gender, a dummy indicating native
German, risk aversion, tax morale and time of day. Significance levels: ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗
< 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01.
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4.5.1 Labor Supply Responses
The theoretical model discussed in section 4.3.2 suggests two channels through which
access to evasion might affect labor effort response. First, an increase in the tax rate
yields the standard income and substitution effects, which together ought to have a
theoretically ambiguous effect on labor effort. Although we are unable to cleanly identify
the sum of these standard effects, we argue that they should be approximately the same
for both groups given randomization into groups. In other words, these standard income
and substitution effects cannot explain the differential effects we observe.
The second channel is related to the fact that individuals with evasion opportuni-
ties have two interrelated margins along which to adjust their income: labor effort and
reported income. As described in section 4.3.2 (as well as 4.9.3 in the appendix), evaders’
labor response is affected by evasion-induced income and substitution effects in addition
to standard income and substitution effects. An increase in the tax rate is likely to in-
duce an increase in evasion, which would then lead to higher net wages for subjects in
the treatment group relative to those in the control group, all else equal. The higher net
wage then leads to evasion-induced income and substitution effects. While this income
effect reduces labor effort, the substitution effect increases effort.
This theoretical framework explains the results in panels A and C of Table 4.4. We
find that subjects in the treatment group underreport their income by approximately 73
percent and that the share of income that is underreported increases with the tax rate
(see section 4.4.2). Since the effect of the NTR (tax rate) on effort is smaller (larger) in
the treatment group relative to the control group, it seems plausible to argue that the
evasion-induced substitution effect outweighs the evasion-induced income effect, which
then explains the observed differential effect in panels A and C of Table 4.5.
To see the evasion-induced effects more clearly, consider the impact of evasion on
net wages. Recall that the gross wage of 6 ECU per correctly positioned slider is constant
and identical both between and within groups. This is not the case for the net wage.
Since subjects in the treatment group can underreport income, their average net wage is
higher than that of subjects in the control group. For example in tax evolution 1, the
control group receives a net wage of 5.10 ECU per correctly positioned slider in period
one where the tax rate is 15%, while the treatment group faces an average net wage of
5.64 ECU.21 This difference is due solely to the share of underreported income in the
treatment group: approximately 60%. Now consider the effect of the tax rate increase
from 15 to 35% between rounds one and two. It is straightforward to show that the net
wage of the control group falls to 3.90 ECU and that the impact of the tax rate change on
21Net wage is calculated as w = (1− τ)×W in the control group and w = (1− (1− pi)τ)×W in the
treatment group, where pi is the share of income that is underreported on average, τ is the tax rate, w
is the net wage rate and W is the gross wage.
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the net wage in the treatment group depends on the evasion response. The increase in the
tax rate reduces the average net wage in the treatment group to 5.16 ECU, assuming the
average share of underreported income stayed at 60%. Concurrently, the higher tax rate
increases underreporting to 74%, which causes the net wage to increase to 5.45 ECU.22
We argue that this evasion-induced effect on net wages leads to income and substitution
effects that explain the differential effort supply response we observe in panels A and
C of Tables 4.4 and 4.5. In both cases, the treatment group is less responsive to tax
increases and more responsive to tax decreases, even if the differences are not always
distinguishable from zero.
The results in tax evolution two are also consistent with the theoretical framework,
but only if the evasion-induced income effect outweighs the evasion-induced substitution
effect or if increasing tax rates trigger less tax evasion. However, it is unlikely that
income effects in our laboratory setting are large enough to outweigh the substitution
effect. Additionally, we find a positive correlation between tax evasion and tax rates in
all evolutions.
An alternative explanation is that the treatment effect predicted by the model
depends on the evolution and history of tax rates. This conclusion is supported by two
crucial features of the experimental design. First, the tax evolutions and treatment and
control groups are balanced with respect to individual characteristics as demonstrated by
the fact that including these covariates does not affect the estimated treatment effects.
Second, the experimental design is internally valid, which implies that the results are not
being driven by design features that differentially affect treatment and control groups
in the various tax evolutions. We also argue that the results are not being driven by
differences in the year in which the tax evolutions were implemented. Tax evolution one
was implemented in June 2012, and tax evolutions two and three were implemented in
the same week of July 2013. The fact that tax evolution three is consistent with tax
evolution one suggests that year of implementation is not driving the results. We are
therefore confident that the only difference between the three panels in Tables 4.4 and
4.5 is the evolution of tax rates.
As a result, we interpret the variation in the sign and significance of the treatment
effect across tax evolutions along with the fact that the treatment effect is more obvious
when tax rates fall as evidence that the institutional setting for how tax rates evolve
across rounds matters for how individuals respond to tax rates. In particular, we argue
that the difference in the sign of the treatment effect between panel B and panels A and
C is due to the difference in the evolution of tax rates. This is evident from the discussion
in section 4.4.2.
22Similar calculations for the other rounds show that tax rate increases have a substantially smaller
effect on net wages in the treatment group relative to the control group due to evasion.
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The result that the institutional setting matters for the direction of the treatment
effect is consistent with Collins et al. (1992), who find that the opportunity to evade has
a positive effect on labor effort when taxes are proportional or steeply progressive and a
negative effect when taxes are mildly progressive.
4.5.2 Evasion vs. Net Wage and Effective Tax Rate
We acknowledge that providing one group of workers the opportunity to hide taxable
income might be viewed as equivalent to a reduction in the effective tax rate of this
group and therefore an increase in the net wage rate (Rosen 1976a, 1976b). This argument
suggests that our experiment is eventually similar to other experimental studies examining
the effect of wage rates or tax rates on supply of effort in standard real-effort tasks.
However, several theoretical and empirical studies show that people respond differently
to taxes than they do to wages (Koenig et al. 1995; Slemrod 2001; Fochman and Weimann
2011; Fochman et al. 2012), which suggests that the impact of evasion opportunities on
effort supply in our experiment is not equivalent to the effect of the net wage rate.
We further argue that our experiment differs from experimental set-ups that ex-
amine the effect of varying effective tax rates on real-effort because our subjects have
to take an explicit action, underreporting, in order to benefit from a lower tax burden.
Since this action is costly due to risk and loss aversion as well as subjective moral costs of
evading, it is likely to illicit different behavioral responses than would an explicit exoge-
nous change in effective tax rates, which would not be associated with any costs.23 The
observation that people substantially overestimate risks (Tversky and Kahneman 1974)
further supports our argument that (risky) evasion opportunities are not equivalent to
reductions in effective tax rates or net wages.
4.5.3 External Validity
As with all economics laboratory experiments, there remains doubt about the external
validity of our results.24 One major concern is that the setting in the lab is abstract
and artificial. However, subjects in our experiment must complete a “real effort” task for
which they earn money dependent on their performance. While not perfectly equivalent
to a naturally occurring environment, the effort task represents real economic choices and
is similar to many “real world” labor tasks in the sense that it is annoying and somewhat
“painful”. Again, we acknowledge the need to exercise caution when generalizing labor
effort decisions to more traditional labor supply decisions, such as hours worked. However,
23The literature shows that tax compliance decisions are indeed associated with non-pecuniary costs
such as increased heart-rates (Dulleck et al. 2012) or skin conductance (Coricelli et al. 2010).
24See Levitt and List (2007) for a critical discussion of the generalizability of lab experiments. Falk
and Heckman (2009) offer a defense of most concerns, some of which are also discussed here.
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since the choices between effort and hours worked are isomorphic in many ways (Charness
and Kuhn 2011) and share many characteristics, we argue that choices in the real-effort
experiment can serve as a good proxy for actual labor supply. In order to make the tax
evasion decision as realistic as possible we used actual tax terminology and announced to
the participants that all tax revenue would be donated to the German Red Cross, a non-
ideological charity organization that is usually perceived as reliable and transparent.25
It is also often argued that the stakes in lab experiments are too small to interpret
the outcomes as realistic. This is unlikely to be true in our case because our average
pay-off of EUR 11.08 roughly corresponds to five full lunch meals in the student cafeteria
at Cologne University.26 Furthermore, many experiments conducted in locations where
the stakes were equivalent to more than a month’s earnings find very similar results
to conventional “small-stake” experiments (Slonim and Roth 1998). Additionally, it is
questionable whether high stakes render a more realistic setting, since most “real-life”
decisions do not involve massive amounts of money (Falk and Heckman 2009). Another
concern is the reliance on university students as participants. Many experiments with
non-student populations find results comparable to experiments with students (Charness
and Kuhn 2011; Falk et al. 2013). Furthermore, Alm et al. (2011) compare students
to non-students in tax compliance experiments and find that the reporting responses of
students to policy innovations are largely the same as those of non-students in identical
experiments and “real" people in non-experiment environments.
4.6 Conclusion
Motivated by the observation that some types of workers have the opportunity to hide
their income while others do not have such opportunities, this paper is the first to cleanly
identify the differential effect of access to evasion opportunities on labor supply elasticities
with respect to tax rates. We first use a theoretical framework to describe the channels
through which evasion is likely to affect labor supply elasticities. A lab experiment with
205 participants is then utilized to test the theoretical prediction that access to evasion
influences the responsiveness of labor supply to tax rates.
In the experiment, all subjects first undertake a simple labor effort task and then
have to pay taxes on the income they earn from the labor task. The tax rate varies
across rounds and is announced before each new round. A treatment group is given the
25Tax morale research (Torgler 2007) finds that taxpayers are more likely to comply with tax laws if
they believe that the tax revenue is spent transparently. Eckel and Grossman (1996) show that dictators
share more in dictator games if the recipient is the American Red Cross. Overall, we donated EUR
541.69 to the Red Cross.
26The show-up fee is equivalent to one meal. The cafeteria at University of Cologne is the most popular
spot for students to buy their daily lunch.
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opportunity to report their income either correctly or falsely, while the control group
does not have the opportunity to evade; their tax liability is simply withdrawn. We find
evidence that subjects with evasion opportunities respond differently to tax rate changes
than those without such opportunities. However, the sign of the difference between the
two groups depends on the tax institutional setting of how tax rates evolve over time. In
particular, the treatment effect is more prevalent when tax rates fall than when tax rates
increase. We also find that the evolution of tax rates over time matters; the treatment
effect is negative in tax evolutions where tax rates first increase then decrease and positive
in tax evolutions where tax rates first decrease then increase.
Our results provide one possible explanation for why observed labor supply elas-
ticities might be different across different types of workers. Workers with a reporting
decision, i.e., the opportunity to evade taxes, have two channels through which to adjust
their taxable income - labor supply and evading - whereas workers who are subject to
third-party reporting are only able to resort to labor adjustments. The present paper is
the first to empirically show that heterogeneous access to evasion opportunities, as found
in recent empirical studies (Slemrod 2007; Kleven et al. 2011; Chetty et al. 2013), has
an impact on economic decisions such as labor supply.
The findings of the paper further show that tax rate reforms may have heterogeneous
effects on different types of workers. The elasticity of taxable income is significantly larger
among the group with an evasion opportunity, which is due to the fact that this group
is able to exploit an extra margin to adjust taxable income. In this sense, our findings
are consistent with the observation that bunching around kink points in the tax schedule
is more prevalent among the self-employed, who have greater access to evasion (Saez
2010; Bastani and Selin 2014; Chetty et al. 2013). Finding that the ETI is relatively
higher in the treatment group is also consistent with recent work by Burns and Ziliak
(2012), who find that the ETI increases with education and is greater than one for
individuals with a graduate degree, as well as by Heim (2009, 2010) who shows that the
ETI increases in income and is larger for the self-employed. We argue that our findings
represent one possible explanation for these results since well-educated individuals with
higher incomes and a higher propensity to be self-employed are more likely to have better
evasion opportunities.
Along with previous findings in the literature, our results support the notion that
tax reform evaluations ought to consider how behavioral responses to tax policy vary
across populations. The results would seem to suggest that policy makers ought to adopt
discriminatory tax rates; e.g., rates that vary by access to evasion. However, we argue that
policy makers should strive to minimize evasion/avoidance loopholes instead of adopting
discriminatory tax rates. Minimizing evasion and avoidance opportunities would reduce
the responsiveness of the tax base and allow for more uniform tax rates, which may be
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higher or lower. Closing loopholes would also lead to equity gains by ensuring that the
effective tax rate is equal across all types of workers all else equal (Alm and Finlay 2013).
Additionally, closing loopholes and evasion opportunities is likely to have positive tax
revenue implications as well. We find in our setting that the average tax payment per
person is considerably higher in the control than in the treatment group.
Our findings also suggest that policy makers ought to consider the direction of tax
rate changes when evaluating tax policy proposals. As we show, there is evidence that
the evolution and history of tax rate changes matters for the behavioral impact of tax
policy. Therefore, policy makers evaluating tax rate increases following years of tax rate
decreases might find different results than those evaluating tax rate increases following
years of tax rate increases. This is especially important given that recent fiscal deficits
have lead to a number of countries considering or implementing tax rate increases after
almost three decades of lowering tax rates (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2010).
An obvious caveat to our experimental findings is the fact that our experimental set-
up mirrors a world where only two channels are available to adjust taxable income. It is
not immediately clear what the implications are for a model with more than two response
margins. We leave such considerations for future research. We further acknowledge that
external validity has to be considered when extrapolating our results to the “real” world.
However, just as with field experiments and quasi-experimental observational studies, we
argue that our results should be interpreted as Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE)
that provide causal evidence on a particular sub-population.
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4.7 Appendix A: The Slider Task
Figure 4.4: Screen showing the slider task
Note: The slider task was designed by Gill and Prowse (2012). In the displayed screen,
the subject positioned four sliders correctly and four falsely. She currently works on
positioning the ninth slider. 28 seconds are left in this round.
4.8 Appendix B: Elasticity Estimates
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Table 4.6: Elasticity Estimates. Full Sample
I II III IV
NTR (log) × Treat −0.035 −0.037 −0.038 −0.037
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
NTR (log) 0.017 −0.000 0.011 0.011
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
Treatment Status 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.038
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Trend (linear) 0.057***
(0.004)
Trend (log) 0.124*** 0.124***
(0.009) (0.009)
constant 2.851*** 2.701*** 2.750*** 3.082***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.098)
Controls No No No Yes
Panel Obs 820 820 820 820
Indiv. Obs 205 205 205 205
Periods 4 4 4 4
R2 0.004 0.05 0.05 0.18
Random Effects Regressions. Full Sample. Dependent Variable is Logged Effort. Stan-
dard Errors in parentheses are clustered by Individual. Treated is a dummy variable
taking “1” if a participant is in the group with evasion opportunity (treated) and “0”
if not. NTR (net-of-tax rate) is defined as (1 - Tax Rate). Specification IV includes
controls for age, gender, a dummy indicating native German, risk aversion, tax morale
and time of day. Significance levels: ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01.
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Table 4.7: Elasticity Estimates by Tax Evolution
I II III IV
Panel A: Tax Evolution 1
NTR (log) × Treat −0.123** −0.123** −0.123** −0.123**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
NTR (log) −0.025 0.011 0.058 0.058
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Treat −0.021 −0.021 −0.021 −0.045
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.048)
R2 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.36
Panel B: Tax Evolution 2
NTR (log) × Treat 0.117* 0.117* 0.117* 0.117*
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
NTR (log) −0.035 −0.076 −0.127** −0.127**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056)
Treat 0.113** 0.113** 0.113** 0.109*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
R2 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.20
Panel C: Tax Evolution 3
NTR (log) × Treat −0.067 −0.067 −0.067 −0.067
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
NTR (log) 0.169*** 0.058 0.071 0.071
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Treat 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.100
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.099)
R2 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.24
Trend No Linear Log Log
Controls No No No Yes
Random Effects Regressions. Dependent Variable is logged Effort. Tax rates in periods
1-4 are 15, 35, 50, 15%, in panel A, 50, 35, 15, 35% in panel B, and 35, 50, 15,
35% in panel C. Number of observations is 360, 232, and 228 in panels A, B and C.
Number of subjects is 90, 58, and 57 in panels A, B and C. Observations from four
periods per participant. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered by Individual.
Treated is a dummy variable taking “1” if a participant is in the group with evasion
opportunity (treated) and “0” if not. NTR (net-of-tax rate) is defined as (1 - Tax
Rate). Specification IV includes controls for age, gender, a dummy indicating native
German, risk aversion, tax morale and time of day. Significance levels: ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗
< 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01.
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4.9 Appendix C: Theoretical model
This section of the appendix outlines a simple theoretical framework that captures the
main features of the labor supply and evasion decision that individuals face in the treat-
ment group as defined in section 4.2. The model merges the standard neo-classical labor
supply model with the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion (Pencavel
1979). We acknowledge that the theoretical framework used here models labor supply as
hours of work rather than effort, which is the basis of our experimental design. However,
as discussed in section 4.2.6, the choices between labor effort and hours of work share
many characteristics and are isomorphic in many ways so that modeling labor effort in
a labor supply framework should nonetheless yield valid hypotheses for our experimen-
tal set-up. Modeling labor supply instead of effort also eases the comparison with the
standard labor supply model.
Because the model describing the control group is the standard labor supply model,
we simply state the results of this model where appropriate without any derivations.
4.9.1 Model
Individuals make a labor supply decision L, which yields labor income wL and non-labor
income M ; w is the wage rate. They then report R ≤ (wL + M) to the tax authority
to determine their tax liability. Reported income R is audited with probability p and,
because we assume all audits lead to the full discovery of true income, a fine equal to
twice the evaded taxes must be paid if audited. Assuming individuals consume all of
their income implies:
Consumption =

Ca = (wL+M)− τR− 2τ(wL+M −R)
= (wL+M)(1− 2τ) + τR with probability p
Cn = wL+M − τR with probability (1-p),
(4.4)
where subscripts a and n indicate audited and not audited, respectively, and τ is the
proportional tax rate.
As in Pencavel (1979), we assume individuals choose L and R to maximize an
expected utility function that satisfies the standard assumptions of the neo-classical labor
supply model; continuous, twice differentiable, and concave. We also assume the utility
function is strongly separable in consumption and labor (Pencavel 1979). With these
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assumptions in mind, the individual maximization problem is specified as follows
maxEU = pU(Ca, L) + (1− p)U(Cn, L)
st.
Ca = (wL+M)(1− 2τ) + τR
Cn = wL+M − τR,
(4.5)
Differentiating equation (4.5) with respect to R and L, respectively, yields the fol-
lowing first order conditions:
pU
′
Caτ − (1− p)U
′
Cnτ = 0
pU
′
Caw(1− 2τ) + pU
′
L + (1− p)U
′
Cnw + (1− p)U
′
L = 0,
(4.6)
which we rewrite as
pU
′
Ca = (1− p)U
′
Cn (4.7)
w = − U
′
L
p(1− 2τ)U ′Ca + (1− p)U ′Cn
(4.8)
Assuming interior solutions exist, it can be shown from equation (4.7) that utility
is maximized by the level of reported income that equalizes the weighted marginal utility
of consumption in both states of the world. Similarly, equation (4.8) implies individuals
choose the level of labor supply that equalizes the wage rate to the ratio of the marginal
utility of labor and the expected marginal utility of consumption. This is comparable to
the equilibrium condition facing our non-evader treatment in the standard neoclassical
labor supply model with taxes and no tax evasion; w = − U
′
L
(1−τ)U ′C
.
4.9.2 Maximum exists
This section of the appendix shows that the conditions for a maximum are satisfied. To
see this we differentiate the equations in (4.6) with respect to L and R to get:
V =
A B
C D

where A = [pw2γ2U ′′Ca+qw2U
′′
Cn+U
′′
L], B = [pwγτU
′′
Ca−qwτU
′′
Cn ], C = [pγwU
′′
Ca−qwU
′′
Cn ],
and D = [pτU ′′Ca + qτU
′′
Cn ], and q = (1− p) and γ = (1− 2τ). Maximum requires that V
is negative definite; i.e.; A < 0 and Λ = A ∗D−B ∗C > 0. A is less than zero as long as
U
′′
Ca < 0, U
′′
Cn < 0, and U
′′
L < 0. Therefore, we need to show that Λ = A ∗D−B ∗C > 0.
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It can be shown that
A ∗D = (pwγU ′′Ca)2τ + pq(wγ)2τU
′′
CaU
′′
Cn + pqw
2τU
′′
CaU
′′
Cn + (qw)
2τ(U ′′Cn)
2 + pτU ′′CaU
′′
L + qτU
′′
CnU
′′
L
= p2w2τU ′′CnU
′′
Ca [γ
2U
′′
Ca
U
′′
Cn
+ q
p
γ2 + q
p
+ q
p
2U
′′
Cn
U
′′
Ca
] + pτU ′′L[U
′′
Ca +
q
p
U
′′
Cn ]
and that
B ∗ C = (pwγU ′′Ca)2τ − pqγw2τU
′′
CaU
′′
Cn − pqw2γτU
′′
CaU
′′
Cn + (qw)
2τ(U ′′Cn)
2
= p2w2τU ′′CnU
′′
Ca [γ
2U
′′
Ca
U
′′
Cn
− 2q
p
γ + q
p
2U
′′
Cn
U
′′
Ca
]
Therefore,
A ∗D −B ∗ C = p2w2τU ′′CnU
′′
Ca(1 + γ)
2 + pτU ′′L[U
′′
Ca +
q
p
U
′′
Cn ] > 0 Q.E.D.
4.9.3 Comparative Statics
This section of the appendix derives comparative static results for our theoretical model.
We are particularly interested in the effect of non-labor income and the tax rate on labor
supply. Start by totally differentiating the equations in (4.6) under the assumption that
dτ = dw = 0, dm 6= 0, dL 6= 0, and dR 6= 0. This yields:
pwγU
′′
Ca(γwdL+ γdM + τdR) + qwU
′′
Cn(wdL+ dM − tdR) + U
′′
LdL = 0
pU
′′
Ca(γwdL+ γdM + τdR)− qU
′′
Cn(wdL+ dM − tdR) = 0
(4.9)
where q = (1− p) and γ = (1− 2τ). Rewrite equation (4.13) as27
AdL+BdR +GdM = 0
AdL+BdR +HdM = 0
(4.10)
and solve for the income effect to get:
dL
dM
= −pqwτU
′′
CaU
′′
Cn(1 + γ)2
Λ ≤ 0 (4.11)
This result implies that labor supply is an inferior good; i.e., an increase in non-labor
income reduces labor supply.28
27 A, B, C, and D are as defined earlier while G = pwγU ′′Ca + qwU
′′
Cn
, and H = pγU ′′Ca − qU
′′
Cn
.
28The effect of non-labor income on labor supply would be ambiguous as in the standard labor supply
model had we not imposed the strong separability assumption.
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Similarly, the effect of true income on reported income is:
dR
dM
=
(p(1− 2τ)U
′′
Ca
U
′′
Cn
− q)
Λ ≶ 0
=
(1− p)U ′′CaU
′′
L(
Racc
Racn
(1− 2τ)− 1)
Λ ,
(4.12)
where Raci is the measure of absolute risk aversion in state i.
Next we derive the effect of tax rate on labor supply by totally differentiating the
equations in (4.6) under the assumption that dM = dw = 0, dτ 6= 0, dL 6= 0, and dR 6= 0.
This yields:
−2pwU ′Cadτ + pwγU
′′
Ca [γwdL− 2Idτ + τdR +Rdτ ] + qwU
′′
Cn [wdL− τdR−Rdτ ] + U
′′
LdL = 0
pU
′′
Ca(γwdL− 2Idτ + τdR +Rdτ)− qU
′′
Cn(wdL− τdR−Rdτ) = 0
which we rewrite as29
AdL+BdR− Edτ = 0
CdL+DdR− Fdτ = 0
(4.13)
Rewriting equation (4.13) in matrix form and solving for dL
dt
yields:
dL
dτ
=
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
p2wτU
′
CaU
′′
CaZ
Λ
2︷ ︸︸ ︷
−pwτU
′′
CaU
′′
CnQ
Λ
3︷ ︸︸ ︷
− dL
dM
(wL+M)
(1− τ) ≶ 0, (4.14)
where30
Z = [2 + 2(1− 2τ)(wL+M −R) + (1− p)
p
R
U
′′
Cn
U
′′
Ca
]
Q = [2(1− 2τ)U
′′
Ca
U
′′
Cn
(wL+M) + (p(1− 2τ)U
′′
Ca
U
′′
Cn
− (1− p))R + 2(1− p)]
Λ = p2w2τU ′′CaU
′′
Cn
(1− p)
p
4(1− τ)2 + pτU ′′L(U
′′
Ca +
(1− p)
p
U
′′
Cn),
.
As in the standard model, equation (4.14) may or may not be negative. The first
two terms capture substitution effects and is always negative as long as τ < 0.5. In other
words, an increase in the tax rate leads to lower labor supply. On the other hand, higher
29A, B, C, and D are as defined earlier while E = [2pwU ′Ca + 2pwIγU
′′
Ca
− pwγRU ′′Ca + qwRU
′′
Cn
] and
F = [2pIU ′′Ca − pRU
′′
Ca
− qRU ′′Cn ].
30Note that Q > 0 since 2(1 − 2τ)U
′′
Ca
U
′′
Cn
> (p(1 − 2τ)U
′′
Ca
U
′′
Cn
− (1 − p)), and wL + M > R. This follows
from the fact that 0 < p < 1. We also assume (1− 2τ) > 0, which requires τ < 0.5 as in our experiment.
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taxes imply lower income, which leads to higher labor supply to compensate for the lost
income. This income effect is captured by the third term.
4.10 Appendix D: Instructions
4.10.1 English translation: Evasion opportunity treatment
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end
of the experiment, please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you do
not abide by this rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment.
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions
after reading the instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand and one
of the instructors will come to you and answer your question in person. Your payment
and your decisions throughout the experiment will be treated confidentially. None of
the other participants is informed, neither during nor after the experiment, about your
decisions in the experiment or your payment.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your
decisions. During the experiment, your payments will be calculated in a virtual currency:
Experimental Currency Units (ETU). 1 ECU corresponds to 0.10 Euro. After the
experiment, your pay-off will be converted to Euro and given to you in cash. Additionally,
you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
The Experiment
Overview The experiment consists of 11 rounds. In each round, you will first complete
a labor task and, depending on your performance, earn money from this labor task. You
will have to pay taxes on your earned income. Therefore, after the labor task you will
be faced with a tax reporting decision. Both the labor task and the tax return filing are
described in more detail further below.
Payment The first of 11 rounds serves as a practice round, in which you cannot earn
money. The subsequent 10 rounds are paying rounds. All rounds are independent of
each other. What is more, your pay-off does not at all depend on the decisions of other
participants. The pay-off, which you will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment,
does not consist of the sum of the net incomes from all 10 paying rounds. Instead, after the
experiment, one round will be randomly chosen to determine your payment. Practically
this means that after all 10 paying rounds have been completed you will throw a 10-sided
die. The number shown by the die determines the round for which you will be paid.
4.10. APPENDIX D: INSTRUCTIONS 129
Flow of each round You will be told the tax rate for a given round at the beginning
of that round. The tax rate may, but does not have to, vary from round to round. In the
next step you will complete the labor task on the computer screen. After completion of
this labor task, you will be shown your gross income. This is based on your performance
during the labor task plus a fixed amount. Details on the labor task are described further
below.
After completion of the labor task, you will be faced with a tax reporting de-
cision. You choose an amount, which shall be taxed at the prevailing tax rate. The
amount you chose may be as high as your earned gross income or lower. There is a ran-
dom chance of 10% that your decision will be checked to see whether you reported your
true gross income. If you are not checked, your payment for this round - the net income
- will consist of your gross income less the tax payment. If you are checked and you have
not fully reported your gross income, you will have to pay a penalty. More details are
explained further below. All tax revenues paid by you and all other participants will be
donated to the German Red Cross.
In Summary, each of the 11 rounds is timed as follows:
1. Information on prevailing tax rate
2. Completing the labor task
3. Information on gross income
4. Tax reporting
5. Check whether tax reporting is checked.
6. Calculation of this round’s net income
The Labor Task At the beginning of each round you will first be informed about the
tax rate in that round. Afterwards, you undertake a labor task on the computer screen
using the computer mouse. In each round the task will last 120 seconds. During the task
a screen with 48 so-called sliders appears on the screen. Each slider is initially positioned
at "0" (Zero) and can be moved by you. You can move the slider to every whole number
between "0" and "100" by clicking on the slider and moving the computer mouse. The
current position of each slider is displayed to the right of this slider. You can readjust
the position of each slider as many times as you wish. For each slider that you position
exactly at "50" during the 120 seconds, you earn 6 ECU. During the 120 seconds of the
labor task, on the upper right of the screen you are shown how many sliders are currently
positioned at "50".
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The Tax Return In the next step, you are shown on the screen how many ECU you
earned in the labor task. Regardless of the ECU you earned based on correctly positioned
sliders, you will receive an additional 5 ECU per round. The sum of the income from the
labor task and this unconditionally given amount determines your gross income. This
is shown on the screen. You are, once more, also shown which tax rate is in force.
You are now asked to report income for tax purposes. You choose an amount
which shall be taxed at this round’s prevailing tax rate. This chosen amount can be
between zero and your gross income.
Calculation of Net Income After the completion of the tax reporting decision, one
of the experimental investigators will come up to your booth with a 10-sided die. Please
throw this 10-sided die. Based on the result of the die throw, there are two alternative
scenarios, of which one is realized.
a) The die shows a number between 2 and 10 (that is, a number out of 2,3,..., 9,
10)
In case the die shows a number between 2 and 10, your reporting decision will
not be checked to determine whether you reported your full gross income for tax
purposes. Your payment for this round - the net income -, in this case, consists
of your gross income (earnings from labor task plus 5 ECU) less the tax payment.
Thereby, the tax payment is the reported income multiplied with the prevailing tax
rate. Hence:
Net income = gross income - (reported amount*tax rate)
b) The die shows the number 1:
In case the die shows the number 1 your reporting decision will be checked to de-
termine whether you reported your full gross income for tax purposes. Depending
on your previous decision, there are two different possibilities for your net income:
- If your reported income equals your true gross income, then your net income
consists of your gross income less your tax liability. Hence:
Net income = gross income - (gross income*tax rate)
- If your reported income is lower than your gross income, then you will have
to pay the tax liability based on your true gross income and additionally you will
have to pay a penalty. This penalty is equal to the difference between your true
gross income and your reported income multiplied by the prevailing tax rate. Hence:
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Net income = gross income - (gross income*tax rate) - [(gross income - reported
income) * tax rate]
Final Remarks After the completion of all 11 rounds - one practice round plus 10
paying rounds - the experiment is finished. One of the experimental investigators will
come up to your booth and, once more, we ask you to throw a 10-sided die. The die throw
determines the round (out of the 10 paying rounds) for which you are paid. For example,
if the die shows the number "2", then your payment consists of the net income that you
earned in the second paying round. In addition, you receive the show-up fee of 2,50 Euro.
You will also be asked to complete a short questionnaire at the end of the experiment
while we prepare the payments. All information collected through this questionnaire,
just like all data gathered during the experiment, are anonymous and exclusively used
for scientific purposes. After you have completed the questionnaire, please remain seated
at your booth until we call you to come up front to pick up your payment.
4.10.2 English translation: No-Evasion opportunity treatment
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end
of the experiment, please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you
do not abide by this rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment. We kindly
ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions after reading the
instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the instructors
will come to you and answer your question in person. Your payment and your decisions
throughout the experiment will be treated confidentially. None of the other participants is
informed, neither during nor after the experiment, about your decisions in the experiment
or your payment. You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends
on your decisions. During the experiment, your payments will be calculated in a virtual
currency: Experimental Currency Units (ETU). 1 ECU corresponds to 0.10 Euro.
After the experiment, your pay-off will be converted to Euro and given to you in cash.
Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
The Experiment
Overview The experiment consists of 11 rounds. In each round, you will complete a
labor task and, depending on your performance, earn money from this labor task. You
will have to pay taxes on your earned income.
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Payment The first of 11 rounds serves as a practice round, in which you cannot earn
money. The subsequent 10 rounds are paying rounds. All rounds are independent of
each other. What is more, your pay-off does not at all depend on the decisions of other
participants. The pay-off, which you will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment,
does not consist of the sum of the net incomes from all 10 paying rounds. Instead, after the
experiment, one round will be randomly chosen to determine your payment. Practically
this means that after all 10 paying rounds have been completed you will throw a 10-sided
die. The number shown by the die determines the round for which you will be paid.
Flow of each round You will be told the tax rate for a given round at the beginning
of that round. The tax rate may, but does not have to, vary from round to round. In
the next step you will complete the labor task on the computer screen. After completion
of this labor task, you will be shown your gross income, the prevailing tax rate and your
corresponding net income. Your gross income is based on your performance during the
labor task plus a fixed amount of 5 ECU. Details on the labor task and calculation of
the net income are described further below. All tax revenues paid by you and all other
participants will be donated to the German Red Cross.
In Summary, each of the 11 rounds is timed as follows:
a) Information on prevailing tax rate
b) Completing the labor task
c) Information on gross income
d) Calculation of this round’s net income
The Labor Task At the beginning of each round you will first be informed about the
tax rate in that round. Afterwards, you undertake a labor task on the computer screen
using the computer mouse. In each round the task will last 120 seconds. During the task
a screen with 48 so-called sliders appears on the screen. Each slider is initially positioned
at "0" (Zero) and can be moved by you. You can move the slider to every whole number
between "0" and "100" by clicking on the slider and moving the computer mouse. The
current position of each slider is displayed to the right of this slider. You can readjust
the position of each slider as many times as you wish. For each slider that you position
exactly at "50" during the 120 seconds, you earn 6 ECU. During the 120 seconds of the
labor task, on the upper right of the screen you are shown how many sliders are currently
positioned at "50".
4.10. APPENDIX D: INSTRUCTIONS 133
Calculation of Net Income After the completion of the tax reporting decision, you
will be shown your gross income for this round. The gross income is based on the number
of correctly positioned sliders plus a fixed amount of 5 ECU. Your gross income will be
taxed at this round’s prevailing tax rate. Your payment for this round - the net income
-, consists of your gross income less the tax payment. Thereby, the tax payment is the
gross income multiplied with the prevailing tax rate. Hence:
Net income = gross income - (gross income*tax rate)
Final Remarks After the completion of all 11 rounds - one practice round plus 10
paying rounds - the experiment is finished. One of the experimental investigators will
come up to your booth and we ask you to throw a 10-sided die. The die throw determines
the round (out of the 10 paying rounds) for which you are paid. For example, if the die
shows the number "2", then your payment consists of the net income that you earned in
the second paying round. In addition, you receive the show-up fee of 2,50 Euro. You will
also be asked to complete a short questionnaire at the end of the experiment while we
prepare the payments. All information collected through this questionnaire, just like all
data gathered during the experiment, are anonymous and exclusively used for scientific
purposes. After you have completed the questionnaire, please remain seated at your
booth until we call you to come up front to pick up your payment.
Chapter 5
Nice guys finish last: Do honest
taxpayers face higher tax rates?
5.1 Introduction
Tax ethics, tax honesty or tax morale1 – the intrinsic motivation to honestly pay taxes – is
widely seen as beneficial for an economy because it reduces the cost of financing the public
sector. As a result, the literature on tax morale mostly focuses on the determinants of tax
morale and on ways of improving it. This paper takes a different perspective and seeks
to examine the tax policy implications of different levels of tax morale. Using a unique
cross-country data set based on the World Values Survey and the World Tax Indicators,
we find empirical support for the conclusion that tax rates increase with tax morale. To
our knowledge, we are the first to investigate whether differences in tax morale affect the
distribution of the tax burden across different groups of taxpayers.
Whereas the early evasion literature usually assumes that evasion decisions are
driven solely by monetary considerations (Allingham and Sandmo 1972), more recent
research has established that evasion behavior is also determined by psychological and
cultural factors such as tax morale (Erard and Feinstein 1994; Andreoni et al. 1998; Alm
and Torgler 2011). This is confirmed by several studies that have shown that tax morale
is indeed negatively correlated with levels of tax evasion and the size of the shadow
economy (Torgler and Schneider 2009; Halla 2012).2 These findings suggest that the
1The literature usually uses the term ‘tax morale’. This might be misleading and ‘tax honesty’ or
‘tax ethics’ might be more appropriate. However, since ‘tax morale’ is the commonly used terminology,
we stick to it throughout this paper. In the literature, tax morale is typically defined as ‘the intrinsic
motivation to pay taxes which arises from the moral obligation to pay taxes as a contribution to society’
(e.g., Schwartz and Orleans 1967; Cummings et al. 2009).
2The standard model fails to explain why taxpayers honestly pay their taxes even in situations where
detection is unlikely and penalties are low. It is now widely accepted that missing access to evasion
opportunities (Kleven et al. 2011) and morale costs of evading (Frey and Feld 2002; Alm 2012) can
explain high observed levels of compliance despite low audit probabilities and penalties.
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prevailing level of tax morale is an important determinant of the government’s ability to
raise taxes and the cost of doing so (Feld and Frey 2007). As a result, many scholars
argue that policy makers should design tax systems and broader political institutions so
as to preserve and improve tax morale.
Unlike the existing literature which mostly examines the determinants of tax morale,3
this study focuses on a different aspect of tax morale. We ask whether policymakers ex-
ploit the fact that their citizens have different levels of tax morale when setting tax rates.
In other words, we take the level of tax morale as given and ask how tax morale affects
the tax burden governments impose on different groups of taxpayers.4
We examine this research question using data from the World Value Survey (WVS),
the European Values Survey (EVS), and detailed income tax data from the World Tax
Indicators Database (WTI) (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2010). The WVS data allow us
to observe levels of tax morale for different income groups in different countries, as well
as various control variables. We then use the WTI database to compute average and
marginal tax rates for the different income groups. The resulting unique data set allows
us to study the effect of income group-level tax morale on tax rates.
Causal identification of our research question would require a (quasi-) experimental
approach. Unfortunately, such an identification strategy is not available in our setting
since it is difficult, if not impossible, to exploit (quasi-) random variation in either tax
morale itself or another (quasi-) random variable that would be suitable to instrument for
tax morale. Nor is it feasible to run a controlled field experiment that randomly assigns
tax morale to individuals or income groups within countries.5 Nonetheless, we think it
is important to fully exploit the available data in order to improve our understanding of
the relationship between tax morale and tax policy. Therefore, we intend to approximate
the causal effect as precisely as possible by employing a (non-randomly assigned) IV
and conditioning on a rich set of control variables (including country group fixed effects,
income, education, trust, religiosity, patriotism and occupation).
Using this empirical strategy, we find that groups with higher levels of tax morale,
ceteris paribus, face higher average and marginal tax rates. The results are robust to
various specification checks. Further research would be helpful to confirm our suggestive
3The only study that we are aware of which uses tax morale as an explanatory variable (to explain
subjective well-being) is Lubian and Zarri (2011).
4Qari et al. (2011) show that countries with higher levels of patriotism typically have higher levels of
taxation as well. See Torgler (2007) for an extensive overview of the literature on the determinants of tax
morale. Alm and McClellan (2012) show that the concept of tax morale is not restricted to individuals
but can also be applied to firms.
5Slemrod and Weber (2012) survey the empirical tax evasion literature and conclude that causal
identification is a major shortcoming of this strand of literature. Some studies have also used laboratory
experiments to examine research questions related to tax compliance in general (Alm 2010 for a recent
survey) and also tax morale (e.g., Alm et al. 1999; Feld and Tyran 2002; Wahl et al. 2010). This is,
however, not an option in our context.
136 CHAPTER 5. DO HONEST TAXPAYERS FACE HIGHER TAX RATES?
results and to establish a causal interpretation.
We propose three alternative mechanisms that may explain our results: i) The
first mechanism relies on arguments from the optimal taxation literature. Assuming that
groups with high levels of tax morale have a lower tendency to evade in response to
higher taxes relative to groups with low morale, governments will impose higher taxes
on the high morale group simply because taxing them creates less distortions. ii) The
second is a political economy argument suggesting that groups with high levels of tax
morale are less politically opposed to high tax rates. Politicians seeking reelection might
then impose higher taxes on these high morale groups because they are less likely to
vote against (parties in favor of) tax increases. iii) The third mechanism focuses on the
administrative costs of taxation. If high morale groups are more likely to comply with
taxes, politicians might seek to minimize the administrative costs of taxation by imposing
higher taxes on high morale groups because it requires less enforcement costs (i.e., audits)
to collect tax revenue from these groups.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data
sources and presents summary statistics. The empirical strategy and our main results as
well as robustness checks are presented in Section 5.3. We discuss several mechanisms
behind our empirical findings in section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Data and Operationalization
In order to approach our research question empirically, we combine micro data on tax
morale and other covariates from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values
Survey (EVS) (Inglehart 2000) with information on tax rates from the World Tax Indica-
tors (WTI) (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2010). Below we describe our approach to combine
the data, discuss each data source and define our measures of tax morale and tax rates.
Tax Morale The WVS/EVS is the most common data source in tax morale research.
It is a worldwide survey which collects comparative data on many values and attitudes
using standardized questionnaires for representative national samples of at least 1000
respondents per country. The surveys are conducted by professional scientific institutions
and performed through face-to-face interviews at the respondents’ home and in their
respective national language. We employ all five waves, which were carried out between
1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, and 2005-2008, respectively.
Our key explanatory variable, tax morale, is measured by individuals’ responses to
the following question:
Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you
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have the chance’.
The question is measured on a ten-scale index with one (1) meaning ‘never justifi-
able’ and ten (10) meaning ‘always justifiable’. This is by far the most frequently used
measure for tax morale (e.g., Slemrod 2003, Alm and Torgler 2006, Richardson 2006,
Torgler 2006 and Halla 2012), but it is of course not free of bias. For example, Andreoni
et al. (1998) argue that people might overstate their degree of morality in self-reports
such as the WVS and those who have evaded might want to excuse their behavior by
declaring a high tax morale. Elffers et al. (1987) find that there are significant differ-
ences between actual tax evasion and self-reported tax evasion in surveys. Nevertheless,
asking about tax morale is less blunt than asking about tax evading behavior, and so the
degree of honesty should be higher (Frey and Torgler 2007). Another shortcoming of the
question is the fact that taxpayers might find tax evasion justifiable if tax revenue is used
for, say, financing a dictator’s war machine (Frey and Torgler 2007).6
However, previous studies show that low WVS levels of tax morale are associated
with high tax evasion and vice versa (Torgler and Schneider 2009; Halla 2012). This
provides evidence in our favor of the view that true tax evasion behavior can indeed
be proxied with responses to questions about tax morale. As we describe below, we
aggregate the WVS/EVS data on the level of income groups. This might help to cancel
out incorrect reporting by respondents. Given these arguments in favor of the variable
and the frequent use in the literature, we believe that it is appropriate to measure tax
morale with this question.
Tax Rates Unlike tax morale, which is covered at the individual level across countries
and time in the WVS/EVS, tax rates at this level are more difficult to obtain. Of
course, statutory variables, such as the top marginal personal income tax rate, have very
wide country-year coverage and are available from many sources. However, our analysis
requires tax rates that vary across time, countries, and income groups. We rely on data
from the recently published World Tax Indicator database to overcome these challenges.
This large panel data set covers personal income tax structures at the country level in 189
countries for the period 1981 to 2005 (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2010). As it contains the
complete national income tax structures, including statutory rates, tax brackets, country-
specific tax formulae, standard deductions and tax credits, among others, the data allow
us to compute average and marginal tax rates.7
6The question used to measure tax morale is conceptually related to another WVS question which
has recently been used to study benefit morale (Heinemann 2008; Halla et al. 2010).
7The WTI collects tax schedule information for single tax payers only. This is not likely to have any
noticeable effect on the results since very few countries tax family income (exceptions include Germany,
France and the U.S.) or have tax schedules that depend on marital status (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2010).
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More importantly, we are able to calculate these tax rates for any level of gross
income. However, the WVS/EVS does not contain information on a respondent’s personal
gross income; instead of reporting their actual income level, respondents only indicate
which of ten income groups (brackets) their income falls into.8 That is, we do not know
each respondent’s actual income, but only her income group.
This implies that we are not able to calculate a “personal” tax rate for each re-
spondent of the survey. We therefore use the raw WTI data to estimate average (AR)
and marginal (MR) tax rates for each income group reported in the WVS/EVS for each
country-year. The income level which we use to calculate the tax rate is equal to the
lower bound of each country-wave-income group. Hence, the WTI are used to estimate
a marginal and an average tax rate for each country-wave-income group cell which is
based on the lower bound of this cell’s income range.9 Both tax rates adjust for standard
deductions and credits and are calculated using country specific tax formulae.10 Because
there is no adjustment for tax evasion or avoidance, these tax rates are close to, but are
not, effective tax rates. Nonetheless, they are superior to using statutory rates.
Data Structure and Summary Statistics In order to relate the calculated income
group tax rates to the WVS/EVS data, all information from the WVS/EVS are aggre-
gated (means) on the level of country-wave-income groups. We restrict the sample to
employed individuals before aggregating the data in an effort to limit our analysis to
individuals who potentially paid income taxes. We also exclude the lowest income group
in each country-year observation from our estimations as individuals in theses groups
usually do not pay income taxes; hence, we do not observe any variation in taxes within
and across these groups. Finally, the aggregated WVS/EVS data are merged with the
tax rates from the WTI. The unit of observation in our main analyses therefore is the
country-wave-income group cell.
It seems reasonable to aggregate individual information – including tax morale – on
the income group level because i) it is very unlikely that policy makers have individual
level information on tax morale and ii) even if they do, they could not tax each person
individually. In addition, grouping can alleviate measurement error in the covariates.
We use the tax morale question to define two measures of tax morale for our em-
8 The provided income steps are adjusted to the respective national income distributions, but they
do not reflect income deciles.
9The downloadable WVS/EVS data do not contain information about the income levels which cor-
respond to each country-wave income group. We therefore had to retrieve this information from the
questionnaires used in each country and wave. Estimation is restricted to 52 countries that recorded
gross income in the questionnaires. For a sensitivity check (see Section 5.3.5), we also estimate lead tax
rates to analyze the impact of tax morale in year t on tax rates in t+ 1.
10We are not able to adjust for deductions and credits that vary by individual characteristics (e.g.,
child credits). See Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010) for a more detail description of the WTI and the tax
rates.
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pirical analyses which, in the light of our data structure, are defined as follows: i) ‘tax
morale (ten)’ represents income-group averages of the original 10-scale variable as re-
ported in the survey; ii) ‘tax morale (bi)’ is based on a dummy variable that is equal to
1 for individuals who report the highest level of tax morale (1 on the original scale) and
‘0’ for individuals who report a value greater than 1. It follows that ‘tax morale (bi)’ is
the share of individuals in each income-group that report the highest possible level of tax
morale – an operationalization commonly used (see, e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006). Both
variables are coded such that a higher value implies a higher level of tax morale.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 in the Appendix provide summary statistics for all relevant
variables. The standard deviations reported in Table 5.6 reveal that there is variation
across income-groups within a given country-wave for tax morale and tax rates. We report
summary statistics by income group in Table 5.7 and find that while the relationship
between tax rates and income is approximately linear, the relationship between tax morale
and income has an inverted-U shape.
5.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
5.3.1 Empirical Model
We are interested in examining the relationship between tax rates and tax morale, which
we wish to do by estimating the following model:
tijt = α + βmijt +Xδ + Cφ+ υi + θt + λj + ijt, (5.1)
where subscripts indicate an income group i in country j surveyed in the t-th wave of
the WVS. Our dependent variable tijt is either the average or marginal tax rate. The
explanatory variable of interest is mijt, which is one of our tax morale measures (tax
morale (ten) or tax morale (bi))11 and ijt is an iid error term. We further include survey
wave fixed effects θt to capture time specific effects and income group dummies υi. The
latter is crucial in light of the progressive structure of almost all tax systems around the
world and the literature in the field of tax morale which finds that income has an effect
on tax morale (e.g., Torgler 2007). λj indicates a set of country fixed effects.
The vectors X and C control for income group and country-level variables, respec-
tively. X includes several confounding variables on the income-group level which are
known determinants of both tax morale and tax rates: marital status, number of chil-
dren, education, religiosity, patriotism, trust, and employment type (full time vs part
time). At first glance, it might not appear obvious why patriotism and trust in other
11 Recall that ‘tax morale (bi)’ is the share of individuals in each income group that reports the highest
level of tax morale whereas ‘tax morale (ten)’ is the average of the 10-point scale value.
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people are potential determinants of both tax rates and tax morale.
However, Qari et al. (2011) show that patriotism affects tax rates because patriotic
citizens are less likely to move to a foreign country in response to higher taxation. In
another study, Konrad and Qari (2012) show that tax morale and patriotism are related.
Trust in other people is likely to confound our result of interest since trust affects tax
compliance and tax morale (Scholz and Lubell 1998; Slemrod 2003). Trust also affects the
size of the government via its impact on preferences for redistribution and the demand
for social insurance and public goods (Luttmer 2001; Bjornskov and Svendsen 2012).
Since evasion opportunities vary by occupation (e.g., Kleven et al. 2011) and possibly
affect tax morale, we also control for the share of self-employed individuals in an income
group.12 We additionally include age, age squared and gender in X. All variables in X
are obtained from the WVS/EVS and averaged over income groups. We further include
per capita GDP (in PPP), GDP growth rate, and foreign direct investments (FDI) in
vector C in order to account for confounding country-level variables. All country-level
variables are taken from the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank
2010).
Ignoring unobserved country-specific factors that affect both tax rates and tax
morale will potentially lead to biased estimates. For example, countries such as Nor-
way and the United States are not comparable because the former has a culture of high
taxation, whereas the latter is known for low taxes. Since these two countries also have
different levels of tax morale due to reasons other than the level of tax rates, relying on
variation between them would bias our estimates.
While controlling for country-level variables mitigates this bias, estimating the
model with a full set of country fixed effects is problematic given our data constraints:
First, the fixed effects are highly collinear with tax morale, which inflates the standard
errors and thus reduces the precision of the estimates. Second, controlling for country
fixed effects implies including a large set of dummy variables, which reduces our degrees of
freedom: this, too, leads to inflated standard errors because our number of observations
is relatively small. Finally, the sample is highly unbalanced with many gaps in the data
because many countries did not participate in every wave of the WVS/EVS: for example,
some countries participated in the first and last waves while others participated in only
one wave (see Table 5.6 in the Appendix for an overview). This makes the problem of
collinearity even more serious. We find a positive relationship between tax rates and tax
morale when we estimate equation (5.1) with country fixed effects (and excluding the
country-level variables). However, due to the above reasons the results are only partly
statistically different from zero.
12Robustness checks in which we restrict the analysis to self-employed individuals who have better
evasion opportunities reveal a positive relationship between tax morale and tax rates and are hence
similar to our baseline results. These results are available upon request.
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In order to control for cultural effects and estimate precise standard errors, we form
9 groups of countries which are homogenous with respect to their tax system and include
dummies for each of the 9 groups in our regressions (e.g., Helliwell 2003 employs a similar
approach using WVS data). That is, we replace the country fixed effects λj in equation
5.1 with country group fixed effects. This approach mitigates the discussed problems of
country fixed effects while still controlling for heterogeneity in the culture of taxation
and tax morale.13 The groups are defined as: 1) English-speaking countries (Anglo-
Saxon plus Australia and New Zealand), 2) Mid-central Europe plus Israel, 3) Southern
Europe, 4) Scandinavia, 5) Eastern Central Europe, 6) former Soviet countries, 7) Latin
America, 8) Asia, and 9) (other) Developing Countries (see Table 5.6 for an overview
of countries in each country groups). To the extent that country-level time-invariant
factors are common across countries within a region, this approach should address any
bias resulting from omitted cultural fixed effects, even if imperfectly so.
Regarding the source of variation, the use of income-group and country-group dum-
mies eventually implies that our empirical analysis exploits variation in tax morale be-
tween the same income groups within a country-group, thereby conditioning on a wide
set of control variables as well as wave fixed effects.
5.3.2 Ordinary Least Squares
Estimation Results We start examining the data by estimating the country group
fixed effects model with Ordinary Least Squares methods in order to learn about the
relationship between tax morale and tax rates.14 The OLS results are displayed in table
5.1: Specifications I and II include the effect of tax morale – measured on the ten and
two point scale, respectively – on average tax rates, while III and IV show the effect
on marginal tax rates. All four coefficients are positive but the effect is only statistically
distinguishable from zero when tax morale (bi) is the explanatory variable of interest; we
observe a clear significant and positive relationship between tax morale and tax rates in
specifications II and IV .
Bias in OLS estimates While the OLS results provide a useful first glance at the
data, we suspect they are biased for two main reasons. First, previous research has
argued that there is a feedback effect from tax rates (or the general system of taxation)
to the level of tax morale, which implies reverse causality bias. That is, taxes are not
only influenced by the level of tax morale, but they also affect tax morale. Second, we are
13We present robustness checks in section 5.3.5 in which we conduct the analysis on the individual
person level (rather than the income group level) in the presence of actual country fixed effects.
14All subsequent estimations display panel-adjusted standard errors that account for clustering effects
of a certain country’s income groups and are robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity.
142 CHAPTER 5. DO HONEST TAXPAYERS FACE HIGHER TAX RATES?
Table 5.1: Effect of tax morale on tax rates: OLS regressions
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable AR AR MR MR
Tax Morale (ten) 0.939 0.779
(0.718) (0.750)
Tax Morale (bi) 11.172*** 10.626***
(3.946) (4.012)
Constant −10.970 −5.672 −4.477 −0.182
(31.382) (30.471) (31.265) (30.843)
N 576 576 575 575
R2 0.529 0.534 0.548 0.553
Country Group FE yes yes yes yes
[1] Dependent variables are average (AR) and marginal (MR) tax rates [2] Tax
Morale (ten) is based on the original ten-point scale. Tax Morale (bi) is based
on a dummy variable indicating the highest level of tax morale. [3] Estimation
is by OLS with clustered standard errors [4] All specifications condition on full
set of control variables (see Table 5.8 in the appendix for the full specification)
[5] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
not able to control for the actual extent of tax evasion or the size of the shadow economy
– except for the part captured by the country group fixed effects. Since both variables
are known determinants of tax rates and tax morale, we must also contend with omitted
variable bias. In order to evaluate the presented OLS results, it is important to discuss
the direction of the bias. In the following, we argue that omitting measures of the shadow
economy and tax evasion is expected to induce a downward bias in the OLS estimates.
Empirical evidence suggests that tax rates and shadow economy/evasion are posi-
tively related (e.g., Gorodnichenko et al. 2009 and Schneider et al. 2010 for observational
studies and Alm 2012 for experimental work). The reason is that in countries with high
levels of evasion and shadow economy, the government can only rely on a smaller tax
base and has to use higher rates in order to finance (a given level of) public expenditures
– under the assumption that governments consider the level of evasion as given. At the
same time, empirical evidence shows that the shadow economy is negatively correlated
with tax morale because people are less willing to pay their taxes if many of the fellow
citizens engage in tax evasion (e.g., Frey and Torgler 2007). Hence, the omitted shadow
economy variable is likely to be positively correlated with tax rates and negatively cor-
related with tax morale; resulting in a downward bias of the estimated (positive) OLS
effect of tax morale on tax rates.
Additionally, the bias generated by reverse causality is likely to be directed down-
ward as well because higher tax rates presumably have a negative effect on tax morale.
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Although the tax morale literature is mostly silent in this respect, the scarce empirical
evidence suggests that the effect is negative (e.g., Torgler et al. 2010). Indeed, it seems
reasonable to expect a negative relationship for at least two reasons. First, higher tax
rates make evasion more profitable, all else equal, and therefore increase the temptation
to evade. Second, if the perception is such that the government keeps too much of an
individual’s gross income, it is likely that a negative attitude towards the government is
triggered.
Summing up, the positive effect of the shadow economy on tax rates and its negative
effect on tax morale as well as the negative effect of tax rates on tax morale are likely
to create downward bias in the OLS estimates. This possibly explains why we cannot
distinguish the effect of tax morale (ten) on tax rates from zero in Table 5.1. The biased
OLS estimations hence require a different empirical strategy which we put forward in the
next section.
5.3.3 Instrumental Variables
In order to approximate the true effect of tax morale on tax rates more precisely, we
require variation that is exogenous conditional on the country-group fixed effects and
all other control variables in equation 5.1. In other words, we require an instrumental
variable (IV) zijt that is independent of the error term in equation 5.1. Most importantly,
the IV should overcome the two main threats to identification discussed in the previous
section: it needs to be uncorrelated with i) tax rates in order to overcome the problems
stemming from reverse causality, and ii) the size of the shadow economy to mitigate
potential omitted variable bias.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain (quasi) experimental evidence to answer
our research question as this requires either a controlled field experiment or an IV based
on random assignment. Although both alternatives are unavailable in our setting with
many countries over time, we argue that the research question at hand is sufficiently
relevant so that, even in the absence of randomization based evidence, an attempt ought
to be made to pursue an empirical analysis (see the discussion in the Introduction).
Instrument
Finding suitable instruments is generally a difficult task. We require a variable that
is related to income group tax morale, but does not have any direct link to the same
income group’s tax rate. Given the structure of our dataset, we also require a variable
with sufficient variation across income groups. Our chosen IV is based on a question asked
in the WVS/EVS. In this regard, our strategy is similar to the approach by Lubian and
Zarri (2011) who also use tax morale as an explanatory variable (to explain happiness)
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and instrument it with another question from the same survey.15
The IV we employ in the subsequent analyses exploits the answer to the question
‘Tell me whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified or something in
between, to avoid a fare on public transportation’. Respondents are asked to respond to
the question on a 10 point scale where 1 implies never justified. We first reverse the
scale of the variable so that higher values indicate higher ‘dodging-fares-morale’ and then
use the income group average as our IV. We presume that many individuals who have
high tax morale also develop a high level of ‘dodging-fares-morale’ because of general
moral attitudes driving both types of morality. Therefore, this instrumental variable
allows us to exploit variation in general morale attitudes that is not related to other
variables affecting both tax rates and tax morale (see below for a thorough discussion of
the exclusion condition). A valid IV in our set-up needs to be sufficiently correlated with
tax morale and orthogonal to the error term in the equation of interest. We discuss both
conditions below.
Instrument Relevance Instrument relevance is testable and requires examining the
effect of the instrument on the explanatory variable of interest conditional on all control
variables. In our set-up this first-stage equation reads:
mijgt = γ0 + γ1zijgt +Xδ1 + Cφ1 + υ1i + θ1t + λ1g + ς1ijgt, (5.2)
where subscript g now indicates one of nine country groups and all other subscripts are
defined as in equation (5.1). zijgt is our instrument and all other variables are as described
above.
Our first-stage results are depicted in Table 5.2 (as well as Table 5.9 in the appendix
where the effects of all covariates are displayed). The results indicate that our chosen
instrument is strongly correlated with the variable of interest, tax morale. Models I
and III show the effect of the instrument “Cheat” on tax morale (ten) and II and IV
show the effect on the tax morale (bi). The coefficient of interest is positive and highly
significant in all four models suggesting that the effect is as expected a-priori and that
the instrument is relevant. The observation of a positive correlation between our IV and
tax morale is not surprising since individuals who report high tax morale are also likely
to develop a high level of ‘dodging-fares-morale’. The instrument’s relevance is further
supported by F-statistics of excluded instruments which are considerably larger than the
critical value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). The F-statistics in our set-up vary between
33 and 55 thus putting us in the ‘safe zone’.16
15Lubian and Zarri (2011), however, use a different dataset (for Italy) and their instrument is not
available in our data.
16Note that the number of observations in these first-stage regressions varies because they are estimated
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Table 5.2: First Stage Regressions of tax morale on ’dodging-fares-morale’
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable TM10 TM2 TM10 TM2
Cheat Transport 0.412*** 0.059*** 0.418*** 0.060***
(0.056) (0.010) (0.056) (0.010)
Constant 4.678* −0.227 4.695* −0.226
(2.612) (0.387) (2.615) (0.388)
N 504 504 503 503
R2 0.670 0.703 0.673 0.703
Country Group FE yes yes yes yes
F Statistic 54.95 33.86 55.52 33.80
[1] Dependent variables is Tax Morale (ten) in I and III and Tax Morale
(bi) in II and IV . Tax Morale (ten) is based on the original ten-point scale.
Tax Morale (bi) is based on a dummy variable indicating the highest level
of tax morale. [2] First Stage Results corresponding to models I to IV
in equation 5.3 [3] Instrument: Cheating on Public Transportation [4] All
specifications condition on full set of control variables (see Table 5.9 in
the appendix for the full specification) [5] F-statistic indicates F-statistic
of excluded instruments [6] The corresponding second-stage results are
displayed in Table 5.3. [7] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
Exclusion Restriction The second condition of valid instruments, exclusion restric-
tion, is not testable and can only be defended on the basis of economic theory and
intuitive reasoning. Our main concerns for identification are reverse causality bias and
omitted variable bias. Although the latter is primarily due to the omission of the shadow
economy, it is also possible that our IV introduces additional sources of omitted vari-
able bias. We argue that our IV and model specification are able to overcome some of
these concerns, even though we are not able to establish a clean causal identification. In
other words, although our IV lacks random assignment, we argue below that it generates
income-group-level variation in tax morale that is exogenous conditional on the vector of
covariates in equation (5.1). In particular, the IV generates variation that is not driven
by either the tax system or the shadow economy.
First, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that individuals do not directly link
public transportation to tax legislation. The willingness to pay for public transportation
is instead likely to be shaped by the quality of the public transportation system (e.g.
coverage, prices, timeliness). Additionally, Algan and Cahuc (2009), show that ‘civic
attitudes’ (i.e., ‘benefit morale’ from WVS in their case) do not change systematically in
response to changing institutions. Therefore, it is unlikely that ‘dodging fares’ is directly
on the same sample as the corresponding second-stage regressions.
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driven by tax rates. Nonetheless, there might be an indirect link between tax rates and
our IV via trust and levels of patriotism (see previous discussion). For example, patriotic
citizens might be more willing to pay for public transportation in “their” country and
therefore have a higher “doging-fare-morale”. We control for this indirect link between
tax rates and our IV by including patriotism and trust in our regressions.
Second, we argue that our IV helps to prevent potential omitted variable bias due
to the omission of measures of the shadow economy. Using a similar argument as before,
it is unlikely that variation in the shadow economy is related to the system of public
transportation and the willingness to pay for it. Variation in the level of shadow economic
activity is unlikely to have any effect on the willingness to pay for public transportation
which, as argued before, is rather shaped by the quality of public transportation itself. It
is therefore unlikely that the level of shadow economic activity directly affects our IV. Still,
it is possible that the shadow economy indirectly affects our IV through levels of trust
and patriotism. For example, individuals might lose their trust in other people once they
realize that many people work in the shadow economy. Similarly, people could lose pride
for a country that is characterized by high levels of shadow economic activity. However,
this is not a problem for our analysis since we control for both trust and patriotism.
Third, because the IV is not based on random assignment, it is likely to be cor-
related with other variables that affect tax rates. For example, high income individuals
might have higher ‘dodging-fares-morale’ because bus and train fare is a relatively smaller
component of their income. Since high income individuals also have higher tax rates, our
2SLS estimates would be biased if we do not control for income groups.17 A similar ar-
gument can be constructed for education. Educated individuals acknowledge the value
of public transportation better and therefore dodge less fares. Since the well-educated
are also richer on average and therefore face higher tax rates, the estimates would be
biased if we did not condition on the level of education in an income group. The omis-
sion of cultural differences in tax rates, tax morale, and the IV (the previously discussed
example with Norway and the United States illustrates this) may also lead to biased
estimates. We address this problem by including country-group fixed effects, where each
group represents a set of homogeneous countries.
An additional identification issue arises for countries where public transportation
is operated by the government and where taxes and public transportation are financed
from the same budget. If, in those countries, many people dodge fares, the transportation
sector might have to be cross-subsidized by tax revenue, which implies higher taxes,
ceteris paribus. However, public transportation is privately or semi-privately run in most
countries. Moreover, semi-privately run transportation companies usually operate on a
17 In our data set the relationship between ‘dodging-fares-morale’ and income rather has an inverted-U
shape.
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different budget than the tax legislating government.
5.3.4 Estimation Results
This section describes the second stage results, which are obtained by estimating the
following second stage regressions:
tijgt = α + βmijgt +Xδ2 + Cφ2 + υ2i + θ2t + λ2g + ς2ijgt (5.3)
where mijgt represents the fitted values of tax morale from the first-stage regressions
(Equation 5.2) and all other variables and subscripts are defined as defined before. Our
coefficient of interest is β.
The second stage IV results are displayed in Table 5.3 (the full specification is
presented in Table 5.10 in the appendix). First, note that the coefficients from the 2SLS
estimations are larger than those of the OLS regressions reported in Table 5.1. This is
consistent with our expectations on the OLS bias; OLS estimates are downward biased
due to the omission of a measure of the shadow economy and reverse causality. The
larger coefficients also suggest that our IV accounts for some of the endogeneity concerns
in OLS estimations.
Models I and III in Table 5.3 depict the effect of tax morale as measured on the
ten point scale on average and marginal rates, respectively. Accordingly, models II and
IV measure the impact of tax morale (bi) on both types of tax rates. The coefficient on
tax morale is positive and highly significant in all four specifications. Additionally, the
coefficient on tax morale (bi) is considerably larger than that on the ten-point-scale tax
morale variable. This is intuitive because the former tells us the change in average tax
rates if a group’s average tax morale increases to the highest level, whereas the former
indicates the effect of an increase in average tax morale in an income group by 1 on the
ten point scale.
We observe that a one standard deviation increase in tax morale (ten) increases the
average rate by 0.659 (= 12.441×0.806/15.208) and the marginal rate by 0.583 standard
deviations. A one standard deviation increase in ‘tax morale (bi)’ increases the average
and marginal tax rate by 0.970 and 0.865 standard deviations, respectively.18
Regarding the effect of confounding variables (see Table 5.10 in the appendix),
we mostly observe theoretically expected effects: We include dummies for each income
18Recall that tax morale (bi) is the share of individuals in an income group with the highest level of
tax morale. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of our coefficients is that, relative to groups where
subjects have levels of tax morale between 1 and 9 on the 10 point scale, average tax rate is 86.239
percentage points higher for income groups where everyone has the highest level (10 on the scale) of
tax morale. However, since none of the groups in our sample has this extreme value of high average
tax morale, it makes more sense to use the standard deviations interpretation of the results. The same
reasoning applies to ‘tax morale (ten)’.
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Table 5.3: Effect of tax morale on tax rates: Second Stage IV Regressions
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable AR AR MR MR
Tax Morale (ten) 12.441*** 11.193***
(2.698) (2.743)
Tax Morale (bi) 86.239*** 78.254***
(18.814) (19.260)
Constant −86.744 −9.013 −76.794 −6.593
(56.847) (47.236) (54.439) (46.063)
N 504 504 503 503
R2 0.359 0.294 0.422 0.380
Country Group FE yes yes yes yes
F Statistic 54.95 33.86 55.52 33.80
[1] Dependent variables are average (AR) and marginal (MR) tax rates [2]
Tax Morale (ten) is based on the original ten-point scale. Tax Morale (bi) is
based on a dummy variable indicating the highest level of tax morale. [3] IV
regressions with clustered standard errors. The corresponding first stage results
are displayed in table 5.2 [4] Instrument: Cheating on Public Transportation
[5] All specifications condition on full set of control variables (see Table 5.10
in the appendix for the full specification) [6] F-statistic indicates F-statistic of
excluded instruments [7] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
group in the analysis in order to capture non-linear effects of income. Reflecting the
progressivity of tax systems in almost all countries in the analysis, we clearly observe
that higher income groups pay higher tax rates. Dummy variables for each survey wave
indicate that there is a trend in time towards lower levels of taxation – a trend that is
widely recognized (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2010). We further observe that tax rates are
higher in rich countries and, all else equal, a higher level of foreign direct investments
(FDI, as a proxy for openness) yields lower rates. We also see from the data that groups
with high average numbers of children face lower rates (for reasons of clear arrangement,
the displayed result tables do not show the coefficients of included sociodemographic
control variables).
Overall, we find evidence for a positive effect of tax morale on tax rates. It seems
to be the case that income groups with high levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus, face
systematically higher average and marginal tax rates.
5.3.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present several robustness checks in order to evaluate the sensitivity
of our results. In particular, we first present evidence that our results are robust to the
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inclusion of a full set of country fixed effects (as opposed to the country group fixed effects
on which we condition in our previous estimations). In a second step, we show that our
results are robust to: i) the inclusion of a control variable on institutional quality, ii)
regressions that are weighted with the number of observations in each income group, iii)
using lead tax rates as dependent variables, and iv) estimating the effect for the more
homogeneous set of OECD countries.
Country Fixed Effects in Individual Level Regressions
The results presented so far rely on within country group variation where each country
group represents a set of countries that are homogeneous with respect to their tax system
and culture of taxation. As we discussed earlier, controlling for a full set of country fixed
effects is difficult and leads to upward biased standard errors. However, since controlling
for country fixed effects might yet be important in order to ensure that the results are
not driven by cultural differences within the country groups, we explore individual level
data as a robustness check; this allows us to include the full set of country fixed effects.
This approach provides greater within country variation than our previous esti-
mations based on averages of individual values within income groups. The challenge
in implementing this approach is that we do not have individual level data on income.
Instead, the WVS provides data on each respondent’s income group. We take several
approaches in order to overcome this challenge and estimate our models on the individ-
ual level using country fixed effects. Running the regressions on the individual level will
yield coefficients that are an order of magnitude smaller than the income group estimates
reported in Table 5.3. This can be explained by the increased variation in the explana-
tory variables, which results in smaller coefficients on the individual level compared to
the aggregate level.19 Additionally, whereas before our coefficients represented the ef-
fect of a one-unit increase in a group’s average tax morale, in the individual regressions
they represent a one-unit change in an individual’s tax morale. This also yields smaller
coefficients.
We use three separate estimation strategies to implement the analysis on the in-
dividual level: (1) ’inverse multilevel analysis’ with dependent variable on the income
group-level and independent variables on the individual level, (2) interval regression, and
(3) imputation of individual income levels and corresponding tax rates. The three ap-
19See, e.g., Wooldridge (2006). For intuition, consider a simple univariate OLS regression of y on x
where the slope coefficient is given by the covariance of x and y over the variance of x. Estimation at
the individual level allows us to use the maximum available variation in each variable (see Table 5.11 in
the Appendix for Summary Statistics of the used sample). Because the variation on the individual level
is greater than on the group level, the slope coefficient decreases c.p. (the actual change also depends on
the change in the covariance). In addition, the smaller coefficients could be an indicator of attenuation
bias due to measurement error in the explanatory variables, which may be alleviated by grouping the
covariates. Therefore, we prefer to keep the income group level regressions as our baseline specifications.
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Table 5.4: Effect of tax morale on tax rates: Individual Level Fixed Effect Estimations
Expl. Variable Tax Morale (ten) Tax Morale (bi)
Dependent Variable AR MR AR MR
Panel A: Inverse Multilevel Analysis
Country Group Fixed Effects:
Tax Morale 0.866*** 0.761*** 4.851*** 4.265***
(0.144) (0.149) (0.790) (0.820)
Country Fixed Effects:
Tax Morale 0.168*** 0.157*** 0.937*** 0.871***
(0.051) (0.054) (0.279) (0.299)
Observations 30, 024 30, 024 30, 024 30, 024
Panel B: Interval Regression
Country Group Fixed Effects:
Tax Morale 0.861*** 0.701*** 4.830*** 3.935***
(0.141) (0.134) (0.787) (0.753)
Country Fixed Effects:
Tax Morale 0.167*** 0.151*** 0.929*** 0.844***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.276) (0.265)
Observations 29, 816 29, 816 29, 816 29, 816
Panel C: Multiple Imputation Approach
Country Group Fixed Effects:
Tax Morale 0.865*** 0.723*** 4.850*** 4.056***
(0.143) (0.142) (0.787) (0.784)
Country Fixed Effects:
Tax Morale 0.171*** 0.163*** 0.953*** 0.906***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.274) (0.283)
Observations 29, 834 29, 834 29, 834 29, 834
[1] 2SLS IV regressions [2] Instrument: cheating on public transportation [2] Tax Morale
(ten) is based on the original ten-point scale. Tax Morale (bi) is based on a dummy variable
indicating the highest level of tax morale. [4] Individual person level [5] All specifications
include the same control variables as the previous, but exclude country-level variables
[6] Groups as defined before (see Appendix) [7] Multiple Imputation Standard Errors are
calculated following Reiter (2003) [8] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
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proaches differ in how they treat the (unobserved) variation in the dependent variable.
In the first approach, we neglect this variation by assigning each individual the reported
(midpoint) income and corresponding tax rate (i.e. AR or MR) of his/her income group.
In the second approach, we assign each individual her income group’s lower and upper
bound tax rates and run an interval regression, i.e. a generalized Tobit regression for
interval censored data (Wooldridge 2006). In the third approach, we employ a multiple
imputation procedure, which is comparable to the approach proposed by Jenkins et al.
(2011), and described in more detail in Appendix 5.7, in order to generate even more vari-
ation on the left-hand side of our estimations. For each individual, we randomly draw
an income (and corresponding AR and MR) lying between the lower and upper bounds
of her income group and then estimate the model. This is repeated 500 times and the
average coefficients are reported. We employ the combination method proposed by Reiter
(2003), and applied by Jenkins et al. (2011), to calculate standard-errors and levels of
significance, taking into account the finite number of imputations. Note that randomly
assigning tax rates within each bracket generates noise and renders the relationship be-
tween tax morale and tax rates less strong. This might lead to smaller coefficients –
hence, it is a conservative approach for the expected positive relationship.
Our analysis includes the following control variables; i) the same individual-level
controls as in the baseline, ii) survey wave fixed effects, iii) income group fixed effects,
and iv) country fixed effects. We exclude country-level variables from our estimations in
order to use the full sample of countries, including those that are only part of one WVS
wave. Results from these regressions are presented in Table 5.4.
The results are very similar for the three approaches – despite the different treatment
of the variation in the dependent variable. As expected, the individual level estimations
are an order of magnitude smaller than the income group estimates. Nonetheless, the
coefficients – for both tax morale (ten) and tax morale (bi) – are positive and statistically
different from zero. This is not only true for the country group fixed effects but also when
including actual country fixed effects. Of course, the estimated coefficients become smaller
since country fixed effects take out more variation. However, as all country specific effects
are captured and controlled for, the positive coefficients can be attributed solely to within-
country variation in tax morale. This provides further evidence that our results are not
only driven by heterogeneity between countries within a country group. For example,
using the inverse multilevel analysis including the full set of country fixed effects, we
find that a one standard deviation rise in an individual’s tax morale (ten) increases her
group’s marginal tax rate by 0.023 (= 0.157× 2.336/15.642) standard deviations.
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Further Robustness Checks
For our set of sensitivity checks, we go back to income-group level estimations with
country group fixed effects. We first include a country level measure of bureaucratic
quality (ICRG 2011) – a variable found to be a possible determinant of tax morale (Barone
and Mocetti 2011) – in order to control for the possibility that countries with less efficient
governments have higher tax rates (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Unfortunately, this
variable is not available for all country-year observations which is why we only include it
in a robustness check. We also run regressions in which we weight the income groups by
the number of their members. Additionally, we restrict the analysis to OECD countries
in order to gain insights for a more homogeneous set of countries. Finally, we employ
lead tax rates where tax rates in year t+ 1 are related to tax morale in year t. Table 5.12
in the Appendix summarizes these sensitivity checks.
We are able to confirm our baseline results in all sensitivity checks. Tax rates,
ceteris paribus, depend positively on the level of tax morale and the results are mostly
significantly different from zero. In most specifications, the size of the tax morale point
estimates is roughly similar to the sizes in the baseline. Interestingly, when the sample is
restricted to OECD countries, we find significant point estimates that are slightly larger
than in the baseline scenario. Additionally, we confirm Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980)
argument of a negative relationship between tax rates and the quality of bureaucracy.
5.4 Discussion and Potential Explanations
Our empirical analysis provides suggestive but robust evidence for a positive effect of tax
morale on tax rates – a relationship that has not been examined in the literature before.
While we think that we have fully exploited the data to approximate the causal effect as
precisely as possible, we are not able to rely on random-based evidence that would be
able to establish causality. We therefore find it important to discuss potential mecha-
nisms that might explain our finding that tax rates are highest on the most honest. This
section describes three such mechanisms. i) an inverse elasticity argument where gov-
ernments seek to minimize economic distortions, ii) a political economy argument where
governments take voting behavior into account, and iii) an administrative costs argument
where taxing high morale groups is more cost efficient. While the latter arguments do
not make any assumptions about government behavior, the first shows that it is even
possible to derive such a tax setting from a model with a benevolent welfare maximizing
government based on optimal tax considerations.
Inverse Elasticity Rule Individuals with different levels of tax morale most likely re-
spond differently to increases in tax rates: individuals with low tax morale, and therefore
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low subjective costs of evading, are likely to respond by evading more relative to subjects
with high levels of tax morale, who feel an intrinsic motivation to pay their taxes. This ar-
gument implies that individuals with high levels of tax morale may have lower elasticities
of evading. Following an inverse elasticity rule reasoning, governments setting tax rates
that minimize distortions created by the tax system will account for heterogeneous levels
of evading elasticities by imposing higher tax rates on groups with high average levels of
tax morale, ceteris paribus. This potential driver behind our findings is based on a simple
Ramsey-type argument: groups with less elastic responses to tax rate changes should be
taxed at higher rates than groups with elastic responses. It is straight-forward to for-
malize this story using utility maximizing individuals who have heterogeneous levels of
subjective evasion costs and a benevolent welfare maximizing government (see Appendix
5.8).
This argument of course implies that governments are able to observe the average
levels of tax morale in different income groups. While politicians usually do not consult
surveys like the WVS/EVS before passing tax reforms, they might learn about tax morale
levels from history over time. Algan and Cahuc (2009), for example, show that “civic
attitudes”, which are likely to contain tax morale, tend to be very persistent over time.
Politicians are therefore likely to have an impression of different income or occupation
groups’ tax morale.
Although the idea that governments seek to minimize distortions is appealing to
economists, it is not an empirical fact that politicians indeed set tax rates following the
laws of optimal taxation. One can interpret our paper as one of the first empirical papers
supporting this view. The lack of evidence in the literature, along with a long line of
political economy findings suggesting that governments do not only seek to maximize
welfare, could nevertheless also indicate that politicians set higher tax rates for high
morale groups not only to minimize distortions but also for other reasons.
Maximizing Votes An alternative explanation for our findings is that groups with
high levels of tax morale might also be less politically opposed to high tax rates. This
is supported by the literature on tax morale research finding that the perception of the
tax system and the government are positively correlated with tax morale (see Torgler
2007 or Doerrenberg and Peichl 2013 for overviews). Politicians facing strict revenue
requirements and reelection might then impose higher taxes on these high morale groups
because they are less likely to vote against (parties in favor of) tax increases. For example,
a Gallup poll in 2011 showed that 71% of Democrats in the US are in favor of higher taxes
(on the rich) whereas 69% of Republican voters were against it. If this heterogeneity in
attitudes towards higher taxes is correlated with tax morale – which, based on the tax
morale literature, we consider to be reasonable – then our results might be driven by such
a political economy argument.
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Administrative Costs Governments might also seek to minimize the administrative
costs of taxation and its enforcement. If high morale groups are more likely to comply
with taxes, politicians might be inclined to impose higher taxes on these groups simply
because it is more cost efficient: it requires less enforcement costs (i.e., audits) to collect
tax revenue from groups with high tax morale. This argument is obviously related to the
previous “inverse elasticity” argument, but it is based on a different assumption regarding
the intentions of politicians. They do not intend to minimize distortions but instead try
to gather as much tax revenue as possible with a given administrative budget.
Other Mechanisms We acknowledge the possibility that no single argument explains
our results, but that our findings are driven by a combination of different mechanisms.
We also do not claim that our list of possible mechanisms is exhaustive. However, there
are at least two seemingly plausible mechanisms that we argue do not drive our results.
For example, one potential mechanism is the following: some countries have both high
tax rates and efficient tax enforcement, which leaves little scope for tax evasion. On the
other hand, other countries have lower tax rates and less efficient tax enforcement and
thus a lot of room for evasion. If tax morale is positively related with the strength of
enforcement, then governments in the “low tax low enforcement” countries will have to
impose lower taxes on factors that are susceptible to evasion or avoidance by necessity.
We argue that this mechanism neglects the fact that the tax morale question in the
survey ask respondents about a hypothetical situation: do you think evasion is justifiable
if the opportunity to evade exists? The ability to evade does not imply that an individual
will find it justifiable to evade. The story is also inconsistent with previous research
on tax morale that finds no robust association between tax morale and tax enforcement
parameters such as the fine rate or audit probability (Torgler 2005; Torgler and Schneider
2007). More importantly, our empirical analysis established the positive relationship
between tax morale and tax rates conditional on country-group and country fixed effects,
i.e. exploiting within country (group) variation. In other words, cross country differences
are not driving our findings.
Another possible mechanism is the following: Suppose two individuals have the
same true gross income. One individual with high tax morale reports the full amount for
tax purposes, whereas the other person has low morale and therefore reports less. In a
system with progressive taxation, the high morale subject will then be taxed at a higher
rate. Our results would only be driven by this mechanical effect if individuals with low
morale indeed underreported their true gross income in the WVS/EVS data, just as they
do on their tax returns. We argue that this is likely not the case: First, the fact that
respondents are asked to indicate the income group in which they fall instead of their
exact income alleviates the concern of systematic underreporting by tax evaders in the
survey. Second, since the WVS/EVS is an international academic survey, we consider it
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unlikely that individuals underreport their income class in fear of any connection between
the tax authorities and the conductors of the survey. We do not wish to neglect that
income might be misreported in some cases, but we do not find it plausible that the
misreporting is more prevalent among low morale respondents relative to high morale
respondents.20
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a unique dataset of (average and marginal) tax rates and tax
morale parameters in order to provide evidence of the relationship between tax morale and
the tax burden imposed on different income groups. Combining data from the EVS/WVS
and the WTI, we find empirical support showing that ‘nice guys finish last’, i.e., groups
with higher tax morale have to bear a higher tax burden. In order to explain our results,
we propose three different mechanisms which could be drivers of our results: governments
may tax high morale groups higher because of intentions i) to minimize distortions caused
by the tax system, ii) to get reelected, and/or iii) to minimize the administrative costs
of taxation.
One should note that the empirical strategy used in this paper has limitations.
Unfortunately, a (quasi-) experimental set-up is not available to investigate the impact of
tax morale on the distribution of tax burdens. As a result, we rely on a non-random IV
strategy and conditioning on a rich set of control variables including country group fixed
effects to approximate the true causal effect. Although we believe this is an important
first step in answering the question posed here, it would be interesting to test our results
with data that allow for cleaner identification in future research.
Our findings shed new light on the growing literature on tax morale. So far, scholars
have mostly argued that a high general level of tax morale is advantageous for a society
because it increases the efficiency of a tax system. Many empirical studies have worked out
possible determinants of tax morale and derived the policy implication that strengthening
these determinants helps to increase tax morale and therefore the efficiency of raising
taxes. While we do not contradict this view, we show that governments already seem to
exploit high relative levels of tax morale among particular groups and, ceteris paribus,
tax them higher than low morale groups in the same country.
The welfare implications of our findings are, however, less clear. Although high
tax morale groups are taxed more heavily, they may still benefit from this policy if they
receive some kind of ‘warm glow’ due to the intrinsic satisfaction of doing the right thing
20Recall that we do not relate a person’s actual tax rate to his tax morale. Instead, we relate the
average morale for each income group to the income group’s tax rate using the income group’s gross
income class.
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when complying with the tax law. This is also in line with recent observations from the
US, where rich individuals like Warren Buffet claim they would like to pay higher taxes,
provided that other rich people also face higher taxes. When deriving policy implications
from our findings, it is important to account for endogenous tax morale (see, e.g., Traxler
2010, for endogenous tax morale in the standard model of tax evasion). A tax policy as
sketched in our study could be self defeating in the long run if it created incentives to
develop a lower level of tax morale.
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5.6 Appendix A: Tables and Results
5.6.1 Summary Statistics: Income Group Level
Table 5.5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Average Tax Rate (AR) 23.311 15.208 576
Marginal Tax Rate (MR) 30.147 15.475 575
AR lead 23.27 15.626 549
MR lead 29.924 15.736 548
Tax Morale Ten 8.49 0.806 583
Tax Morale Bi 0.575 0.171 583
Cheat public transp 8.547 0.671 511
Full time 0.722 0.151 583
Part time 0.126 0.094 583
Self employed 0.152 0.136 583
Single 0.296 0.136 583
Married 0.631 0.168 583
Divorced 0.052 0.075 583
Widowed 0.021 0.033 583
Age 39.071 3.787 583
Age squared / 100 15.409 2.983 583
Male 0.607 0.123 583
Numb children 1.764 0.560 583
Education 19.375 3.274 583
Church once month 0.347 0.244 583
Patriotism 3.32 0.374 583
Trust most people 0.358 0.187 583
GDP per cap ppp 19.725 11.344 583
GDP growth 2.714 3.292 583
FDI net inflows 12.796 69.635 583
Institutional Quality 3.148 0.879 542
Table 5.6: Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables by country and year
Country Group Year TM ten TM bi AR MR cheat
Albania East Eur 2002 9.079 0.587 17.672 21.972 8.583
0.185 0.049 5.449 6.337 0.250
Australia Anglo 1995 8.616 0.563 44.611 46.441 8.819
continues on next page
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0.209 0.059 0.912 1.480 0.187
2005 8.701 0.546 23.058 33.248 8.361
0.164 0.089 7.708 12.012 0.498
Austria Mid Eur 1999 8.687 0.553 21.224 33.229 8.509
0.184 0.039 7.578 11.275 0.415
Belgium Mid Eur 1990 6.290 0.261 24.841 39.387 8.217
0.528 0.056 8.187 9.122 0.375
1999 6.941 0.310 23.078 36.633 8.538
0.524 0.063 9.618 13.581 0.267
Brazil Latin 1990 7.789 0.531 24.751 24.885 8.341
0.540 0.055 0.304 0.325 0.467
Bulgaria East Eur 1999 8.804 0.626 14.997 24.356 .
0.429 0.097 5.269 7.095 .
Canada Anglo 1982 8.920 0.704 17.103 26.267 8.687
0.724 0.164 6.643 9.177 0.627
1990 8.437 0.546 24.224 31.524 8.764
0.500 0.090 6.121 9.489 0.325
2000 8.886 0.657 21.856 30.253 8.662
0.272 0.088 7.053 9.844 0.177
2006 9.116 0.655 20.900 27.254 8.786
0.246 0.053 6.807 9.239 0.323
Chile Latin 1990 9.121 0.748 14.285 24.712 8.040
0.183 0.048 11.747 17.849 0.432
1996 8.818 0.634 17.509 28.563 8.582
0.416 0.081 11.651 15.678 0.400
2000 8.726 0.697 22.826 34.549 7.546
0.550 0.068 12.185 13.709 0.739
Croatia East Eur 1999 8.187 0.578 19.322 26.484 7.785
0.526 0.079 9.609 12.704 0.487
Czech Republic East Eur 1999 8.785 0.527 13.666 19.210 7.863
0.190 0.080 2.644 4.723 0.409
Denmark Scand 1981 8.436 0.618 35.985 48.582 9.162
0.417 0.079 8.459 14.175 0.226
1999 8.795 0.601 42.805 56.731 9.161
0.342 0.035 7.640 7.391 0.243
Estonia Soviet 1999 7.605 0.357 22.220 24.845 .
0.490 0.084 2.962 3.464 .
Finland Scand 1990 7.542 0.315 11.171 23.508 8.704
1.321 0.189 8.603 13.530 0.470
2005 8.715 0.543 14.719 25.566 8.515
0.339 0.095 9.016 13.124 0.324
France Mid Eur 1999 7.599 0.421 12.016 20.705 8.195
0.443 0.055 6.031 9.120 0.238
Germany Mid Eur 1990 8.267 0.464 23.754 32.703 8.879
0.196 0.040 4.318 8.297 0.181
Hungary East Eur 1991 7.682 0.482 19.412 30.257 7.712
0.301 0.075 12.321 15.603 0.456
Iceland Scand 1984 8.570 0.590 26.081 30.974 8.908
0.449 0.130 5.355 9.122 0.250
India Asia 1990 9.439 0.801 8.686 17.930 9.592
0.152 0.050 10.441 17.471 0.259
2001 9.126 0.819 8.868 12.917 9.282
0.588 0.113 10.753 14.706 0.616
Ireland Anglo 1990 8.045 0.444 23.787 38.492 8.740
0.302 0.076 13.700 18.184 0.361
continues on next page
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Italy South Eur 1990 7.647 0.393 49.877 49.943 8.704
0.986 0.228 0.160 0.170 1.301
1999 8.572 0.538 45.457 45.491 8.732
0.244 0.055 0.019 0.026 0.111
2005 8.415 0.522 27.996 33.774 9.065
0.586 0.090 3.772 6.395 0.464
Japan Asia 1990 9.541 0.814 64.896 64.973 9.529
0.119 0.041 0.063 0.081 0.108
1995 9.504 0.811 21.246 32.636 9.461
0.124 0.019 5.958 10.724 0.124
2000 9.527 0.812 49.944 49.988 9.367
0.134 0.047 0.027 0.037 0.159
2005 9.390 0.778 49.944 49.988 9.358
0.260 0.074 0.027 0.037 0.249
Latvia Soviet 1999 7.946 0.467 21.977 23.856 .
0.863 0.154 3.096 3.431 .
Lithuania Soviet 1999 7.278 0.379 32.319 32.782 7.754
0.578 0.079 0.583 0.654 0.548
Luxembourg Mid Eur 1999 7.792 0.447 11.922 25.227 8.475
0.584 0.097 6.641 12.221 0.609
Malta Mid Eur 1999 9.238 0.742 7.209 16.946 .
0.222 0.054 6.657 13.908 .
Mexico Latin 2000 8.666 0.669 4.133 8.498 7.339
0.366 0.076 5.373 9.989 0.259
2005 8.746 0.681 7.513 15.243 7.013
0.345 0.083 6.379 11.805 0.894
Morocco Develop 2001 9.578 0.930 18.459 24.182 8.801
0.383 0.048 18.422 20.526 0.406
Netherlands Mid Eur 1981 7.701 0.371 12.933 24.974 8.340
0.685 0.155 5.542 10.088 0.306
1990 7.771 0.381 32.546 40.010 8.348
0.321 0.082 4.417 8.678 0.500
Nigeria Develop 1990 8.683 0.614 37.634 43.428 8.476
0.264 0.048 6.734 7.278 0.255
Norway Scand 1996 8.196 0.458 25.411 34.634 9.134
0.290 0.068 5.999 9.786 0.447
Peru Latin 1996 8.759 0.625 5.046 8.316 8.083
0.498 0.074 5.332 7.458 0.559
2001 8.900 0.673 3.781 6.563 8.477
0.316 0.080 5.020 7.433 0.553
Portugal South Eur 1990 7.403 0.375 39.944 39.980 8.325
0.344 0.046 0.051 0.059 0.302
Slovakia East Eur 1999 8.898 0.602 15.539 22.375 .
0.191 0.064 3.222 6.365 .
Slovenia East Eur 1999 8.515 0.568 22.756 30.034 .
0.360 0.063 4.840 6.787 .
South Africa Develop 1996 8.889 0.706 22.405 33.542 9.095
0.309 0.075 12.893 16.196 0.330
2001 8.755 0.598 14.575 21.494 8.774
0.150 0.056 14.041 18.432 0.304
Spain South Eur 1981 7.858 0.445 40.000 40.000 8.478
0.266 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.260
1990 7.898 0.475 14.195 22.927 8.408
0.699 0.118 8.710 11.496 0.283
1995 8.652 0.654 55.872 55.957 8.703
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0.655 0.073 0.117 0.128 0.743
Sweden Scand 1996 8.297 0.459 8.695 19.398 8.025
0.289 0.083 8.185 15.971 0.290
1999 8.423 0.469 6.889 17.085 .
0.308 0.097 6.954 15.250 .
2006 8.466 0.478 4.884 15.316 8.058
0.351 0.098 5.512 15.119 0.272
Turkey Develop 2001 9.630 0.882 39.998 39.999 .
0.458 0.151 0.002 0.002 .
Uganda Develop 2001 7.802 0.611 29.961 29.982 8.439
1.241 0.257 0.039 0.045 0.438
United Kingdom Anglo 1990 8.231 0.471 15.011 21.664 8.670
0.236 0.073 7.723 8.292 0.466
United States Anglo 1990 9.010 0.654 13.390 19.146 8.688
0.499 0.148 5.006 8.304 0.556
2000 8.661 0.591 15.049 22.008 8.375
0.304 0.087 5.648 8.656 0.205
Venezuela Latin 2000 9.291 0.738 33.973 33.994 8.460
0.244 0.056 0.014 0.018 0.448
For each country-year: first row indicates the mean; second row indicates standard deviation.
Abbreviations: TM ten: Tax morale (ten), TM (bi): Tax morale (bi), AR: Average tax rate, MR:
marginal tax rate, cheat: Cheating on public transportation, Anglo: Anglo-Saxon plus AUS and
NZ, Mid Eur: Mid Central Europe plus Israel, South Eur: Southern Europe, Scand: Scandinavia,
East Eur: Eastern Central Europe, Soviet: Former Soviet countries, Latin: Latin America, Asia:
Asia, Develop: Developing countries
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Table 5.7: Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables by Income Group
Group TM ten TM bi AR MR Cheat
2 8.450 0.586 14.999 14.947 8.330
0.866 0.181 16.948 17.025 0.800
3 8.562 0.589 17.345 22.280 8.435
0.813 0.166 16.248 15.941 0.649
4 8.617 0.590 19.045 24.640 8.544
0.705 0.157 15.881 15.641 0.634
5 8.592 0.601 21.087 28.262 8.596
0.664 0.151 15.178 14.500 0.608
6 8.585 0.597 23.445 32.349 8.647
0.698 0.152 14.043 11.853 0.536
7 8.472 0.561 25.919 35.231 8.613
0.840 0.176 12.983 11.177 0.640
8 8.451 0.560 28.122 37.167 8.658
0.763 0.160 12.514 11.261 0.523
9 8.409 0.554 29.612 38.327 8.636
0.914 0.201 11.731 10.373 0.636
10 8.242 0.534 32.307 40.398 8.468
0.943 0.188 11.074 9.358 0.912
Means and Standard Deviations by Income Groups. For each
income group, the first row indicates the mean and the second
row is the standard deviation. Abbreviations: TM ten: tax
morale (ten), TM bi: tax morale (bi), AR: Average tax rate, MR:
marginal tax rate, Cheat: Cheating on public transportation
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5.6.2 OLS results displaying covariates
Table 5.8: OLS Estimations of Tax Morale on Tax Rates
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable AR AR MR MR
Tax Morale (ten) 0.939 0.779
(0.718) (0.750)
Tax Morale (bi) 11.172*** 10.626***
(3.946) (4.012)
Income Group 3 2.780 2.884 6.790** 6.878***
(2.311) (2.310) (2.626) (2.618)
Income Group 4 4.173* 4.364* 8.680*** 8.850***
(2.293) (2.284) (2.620) (2.601)
Income Group 5 5.845** 5.952** 11.431*** 11.532***
(2.444) (2.451) (2.717) (2.723)
Income Group 6 8.284*** 8.425*** 15.384*** 15.521***
(2.385) (2.381) (2.435) (2.432)
Income Group 7 10.747*** 11.242*** 17.743*** 18.236***
(2.332) (2.323) (2.481) (2.476)
Income Group 8 12.811*** 13.158*** 19.600*** 19.945***
(2.263) (2.246) (2.502) (2.489)
Income Group 9 14.541*** 14.921*** 21.115*** 21.505***
(2.345) (2.302) (2.557) (2.524)
Income Group 10 16.893*** 17.244*** 22.536*** 22.910***
(2.568) (2.513) (2.752) (2.706)
Part Time 4.673 4.751 −5.331 −5.265
(7.094) (7.107) (7.512) (7.506)
Self-employed 4.191 4.884 −0.098 0.626
(4.254) (4.249) (4.006) (4.013)
Married 0.736 −0.193 6.816 5.899
(5.296) (5.173) (5.936) (5.840)
Divorced −22.077*** −22.138*** −24.088*** −24.082***
(8.213) (8.450) (8.782) (9.064)
Widowed −0.367 −1.601 8.010 6.907
(17.193) (16.980) (16.580) (16.495)
Age 1.625 1.442 1.861 1.687
(1.525) (1.513) (1.570) (1.576)
Age (squared) −2.265 −2.026 −2.277 −2.053
(1.947) (1.935) (2.018) (2.030)
Male −1.461 −0.586 −5.395 −4.565
(4.802) (4.830) (4.794) (4.779)
Number Children 0.278 0.847 −0.363 0.202
(1.353) (1.329) (1.394) (1.355)
Education −0.300* −0.266* −0.359** −0.325**
(0.157) (0.157) (0.167) (0.164)
Church −9.628*** −9.547*** −8.327*** −8.234***
(2.900) (2.927) (3.018) (3.048)
Patriotism −5.330*** −6.201*** −6.621*** −7.524***
(1.793) (1.895) (1.873) (1.966)
Trust −0.089 −0.834 3.592 2.763
(4.334) (4.196) (4.321) (4.152)
wave 2 −2.241 −0.749 −3.245 −1.732
(2.329) (2.344) (2.332) (2.302)
wave 3 −6.435* −5.152 −6.146* −4.858
(3.771) (3.723) (3.579) (3.515)
wave 4 −5.942** −5.004* −7.950*** −7.008***
(2.587) (2.580) (2.645) (2.627)
wave 5 −11.046*** −10.156*** −11.239*** −10.337***
(2.998) (2.974) (3.209) (3.197)
GDP per capita 0.771*** 0.781*** 0.589*** 0.598***
(0.125) (0.127) (0.132) (0.134)
GDP growth 0.123 0.131 0.296* 0.301*
continues on next page
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(0.157) (0.155) (0.170) (0.167)
FDI −0.055*** −0.055*** −0.039*** −0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
constant −10.970 −5.672 −4.477 −0.182
(31.382) (30.471) (31.265) (30.843)
N 576.000 576.000 575.000 575.000
R2 0.529 0.534 0.548 0.553
Country Group FE yes yes yes yes
[1] Dependent variables are average (AR) and marginal (MR) tax rates [2] Esti-
mation is by OLS with clustered standard errors [3] Income group 2, wave 1, full
time, single and female are reference categories [4] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
5.6.3 Baseline IV Results displaying covariates
First Stage Results
Table 5.9: IV Estimations of Tax Morale on Tax Rates: First Stage
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable TM10 TM2 TM10 TM2
Cheat Transport 0.412*** 0.059*** 0.418*** 0.060***
(0.056) (0.010) (0.056) (0.010)
Income Group 3 0.079 −0.005 0.056 −0.006
(0.109) (0.022) (0.110) (0.023)
Income Group 4 0.036 −0.016 0.012 −0.018
(0.107) (0.022) (0.107) (0.022)
Income Group 5 −0.085 −0.021 −0.110 −0.022
(0.107) (0.023) (0.107) (0.023)
Income Group 6 −0.138 −0.030 −0.164 −0.032
(0.115) (0.024) (0.115) (0.025)
Income Group 7 −0.266* −0.068** −0.291** −0.069**
(0.137) (0.027) (0.138) (0.028)
Income Group 8 −0.239* −0.055** −0.262** −0.056**
(0.126) (0.025) (0.126) (0.025)
Income Group 9 −0.366*** −0.071** −0.390*** −0.072**
(0.134) (0.028) (0.134) (0.028)
Income Group 10 −0.379*** −0.062** −0.402*** −0.063**
(0.142) (0.027) (0.143) (0.027)
Part Time 0.210 0.039 0.152 0.036
(0.375) (0.081) (0.374) (0.082)
Self-employed −0.804** −0.111 −0.831** −0.113
(0.343) (0.077) (0.339) (0.078)
Married −0.104 0.023 −0.115 0.022
(0.364) (0.066) (0.367) (0.066)
Divorced −0.752 −0.107 −0.646 −0.101
(0.969) (0.165) (1.004) (0.169)
Widowed −1.030 −0.007 −1.133 −0.013
(1.077) (0.250) (1.084) (0.251)
Age −0.055 0.009 −0.059 0.009
(0.126) (0.018) (0.126) (0.018)
Age (squared) 0.061 −0.014 0.066 −0.014
(0.154) (0.022) (0.154) (0.022)
Male 0.083 −0.084 0.086 −0.084
(0.440) (0.077) (0.441) (0.077)
Number Children −0.038 −0.039** −0.043 −0.039**
(0.080) (0.019) (0.080) (0.019)
Education 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.000
(0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
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Church −0.489** −0.097*** −0.461** −0.096**
(0.191) (0.037) (0.190) (0.037)
Patriotism 0.394** 0.100*** 0.403** 0.101***
(0.174) (0.031) (0.174) (0.031)
Trust 1.211*** 0.175*** 1.274*** 0.178***
(0.302) (0.055) (0.302) (0.056)
wave 2 −0.657*** −0.172*** −0.667*** −0.172***
(0.138) (0.032) (0.139) (0.032)
wave 3 −0.562*** −0.162*** −0.572*** −0.163***
(0.162) (0.037) (0.163) (0.037)
wave 4 −0.399** −0.120*** −0.398** −0.120***
(0.158) (0.034) (0.158) (0.034)
wave 5 −0.275 −0.096** −0.292 −0.097**
(0.199) (0.044) (0.197) (0.044)
GDP per capita 0.011* 0.001 0.011* 0.001
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
GDP growth 0.055*** 0.006*** 0.055*** 0.006***
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
FDI −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 4.678* −0.227 4.695* −0.226
(2.612) (0.387) (2.615) (0.388)
N 504.000 504.000 503.000 503.000
R2 0.670 0.703 0.673 0.703
Country Group FE yes yes yes yes
F Statistic 54.95 33.86 55.52 33.80
[1] Dependent variables is tax morale (ten) in I and III and tax morale (bi) in II
and IV [2] First Stage Results corresponding to models I to IV in equation 5.10
[3] Instrument: Cheating on Public Transportation [4] Income group 2, wave
1, full time, single and female are reference categories [5] F-statistic indicates
F-statistic of excluded instruments [6] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
Second Stage Results
Table 5.10: IV Estimations of Tax Morale on Tax Rates: Second Stage
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable AR AR MR MR
Tax Morale (ten) 12.441*** 11.193***
(2.698) (2.743)
Tax Morale (bi) 86.239*** 78.254***
(18.814) (19.260)
Income Group 3 1.857 3.290 5.957** 7.092**
(2.873) (3.071) (3.019) (3.135)
Income Group 4 3.245 5.088* 7.951*** 9.458***
(2.831) (3.004) (2.980) (3.109)
Income Group 5 6.552** 7.292** 12.121*** 12.634***
(2.914) (3.224) (3.070) (3.324)
Income Group 6 9.417*** 10.305*** 16.577*** 17.223***
(2.900) (3.154) (2.848) (3.089)
Income Group 7 13.944*** 16.486*** 20.712*** 22.874***
(3.005) (3.228) (2.968) (3.157)
Income Group 8 15.545*** 17.325*** 22.059*** 23.543***
(2.763) (2.948) (2.872) (3.040)
Income Group 9 18.670*** 20.239*** 24.981*** 26.275***
(2.744) (2.887) (2.865) (3.007)
Income Group 10 22.611*** 23.238*** 27.609*** 28.060***
(3.008) (3.007) (3.089) (3.072)
Part Time 5.049 4.275 −3.972 −5.085
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(8.433) (10.129) (8.402) (9.968)
Self-employed 7.847 7.443 4.157 3.683
(6.726) (7.901) (6.195) (7.361)
Married −4.807 −8.068 3.821 0.797
(7.457) (7.460) (7.572) (7.485)
Divorced −19.312 −19.409 −20.145 −19.450
(17.501) (18.583) (16.831) (17.950)
Widowed 0.363 −11.807 12.524 0.885
(22.669) (25.866) (21.569) (23.916)
Age 1.866 0.418 2.323 0.988
(2.598) (2.348) (2.507) (2.317)
Age (squared) −2.521 −0.516 −2.832 −0.985
(3.218) (2.966) (3.137) (2.962)
Male −1.638 6.627 −4.729 2.788
(7.631) (8.246) (6.892) (7.421)
Number Children 1.998 4.898** 0.945 3.543*
(1.640) (2.095) (1.571) (1.955)
Education −0.307 −0.212 −0.366* −0.288
(0.202) (0.229) (0.193) (0.210)
Church −4.632 −2.305 −3.329 −0.983
(4.591) (5.179) (4.472) (5.090)
Patriotism −12.793*** −16.520*** −13.960*** −17.317***
(3.138) (3.958) (3.111) (3.904)
Trust −15.318** −15.309** −10.122 −9.803
(6.558) (7.588) (6.409) (7.224)
wave 2 7.312** 13.930*** 5.521* 11.521**
(3.418) (4.755) (3.221) (4.492)
wave 3 1.336 8.340 1.277 7.622
(4.276) (5.186) (3.998) (4.831)
wave 4 1.267 6.697 −0.960 4.008
(3.426) (4.451) (3.334) (4.261)
wave 5 −4.098 0.794 −4.450 −0.096
(4.108) (5.189) (4.153) (5.125)
GDP per capita 0.565*** 0.626*** 0.377** 0.432**
(0.161) (0.184) (0.158) (0.178)
GDP growth −0.166 −0.005 −0.044 0.096
(0.280) (0.257) (0.284) (0.256)
FDI −0.044*** −0.050*** −0.028*** −0.033***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
constant −86.744 −9.013 −76.794 −6.593
(56.847) (47.236) (54.439) (46.063)
N 504.000 504.000 503.000 503.000
R2 0.359 0.294 0.422 0.380
Country Group FE yes yes yes yes
F Statistic 54.95 33.86 55.52 33.80
[1] Dependent variables are average (AR) and marginal (MR) tax rates [2] IV
regressions with clustered standard errors. Second Stage Results [3] Instrument:
Cheating on Public Transportation [4] Income group 2, wave 1, full time, single
and female are reference categories [5] F-statistic indicates F-statistic of excluded
instruments [6] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
5.6.4 Summary Statistics: Individual level
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Table 5.11: Summary Statistics: Individual Level
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Average Tax Rate (AR) 23.125 14.883
Marginal Tax Rate (MR) 30.274 15.642
Tax Morale (ten) 8.538 2.336
tax Morale (bi) 0.581 0.493
Cheat public transp 8.632 2.207
N 30044
5.6.5 Robustness Checks
Table 5.12: Robustness Checks
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable AR AR MR MR
Baseline
Tax Morale (ten) 12.441∗∗∗ 11.193∗∗∗
(2.698) (2.743)
Tax Morale (bi) 86.239∗∗∗ 78.254∗∗∗
(18.814) (19.260)
Inst Quality 0.956 -2.610 2.389 -0.982
(2.345) (2.296) (2.288) (2.254)
N 504 504 503 503
R2 0.359 0.294 0.422 0.380
Institutional Quality
Tax Morale (ten) 16.675∗∗∗ 15.784∗∗∗
(4.145) (4.039)
Tax Morale (bi) 109.836∗∗∗ 105.415∗∗∗
(27.237) (27.034)
N 464 464 463 463
R2 0.299 0.202 0.368 0.280
Weighted by number of observations in income group
Tax Morale (ten) 14.731∗∗∗ 12.340∗∗∗
(2.913) (2.964)
Tax Morale (bi) 106.555∗∗∗ 89.465∗∗∗
(20.536) (20.191)
N 502 502 501 501
continues on next page
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R2 0.280 0.184 0.403 0.365
OECD Countries
Tax Morale (ten) 12.774∗∗∗ 13.855∗∗∗
(3.283) (3.417)
Tax Morale (bi) 77.558∗∗∗ 85.327∗∗∗
(18.689) (19.996)
N 385 385 384 384
R2 0.469 0.463 0.420 0.414
Lead Tax Rates
Tax Morale (ten) 8.828∗∗∗ 9.071∗∗∗
(2.644) (2.745)
Tax Morale (bi) 61.902∗∗∗ 64.084∗∗∗
(18.192) (19.242)
N 477 477 476 476
R2 0.404 0.392 0.429 0.420
[1] Dependent variables are average (AR) and marginal (MR) tax rates [2] IV regressions
with clustered standard errors. [3] Instrument: Cheating on Public Transportation [4] All
estimations include same control variables as in baseline specifications including country
group fixed effects. [5] Lead tax rates estimations are IV regressions of tax rates in year
t + 1 on tax morale in t. [6] Weighted IV regressions weight income groups with the
number of individuals in each respective group [7] ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
5.7 Appendix B: Multiple Imputation Procedure
In order to tackle the problem of not having individual level data on income, among
others, we employ a multiple imputation procedure, which is comparable to the approach
proposed by Jenkins et al. (2011). The basic steps are as follows:
a) For each country-year, divide each of the 10 income groups of the WVS data into
100 equally wide segments.21
b) For each of the resulting 100 incomes within each income group, calculate the
corresponding (average and marginal) tax rates using the WTI data.
21In principle, it is possible to randomly assign each individual a random income between the lower
and upper bounds for the respective income brackets. However, we would not gain more variation in tax
rates, whereas the computational procedure would be slightly more difficult.
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c) Randomly assign one of the 100 incomes (within an income group) to each individual
in that income group. This step also automatically assigns corresponding tax rates
to individuals. Since some groups have more than 100 individuals, it is possible for
two or more individuals within a given group to have the same income.
d) Run individual level IV-regressions.
e) Repeat steps (3) and (4) 500 times.
The average (mean) coefficients of these 500 replications is used to derive our coef-
ficient of interest. We employ the combination method proposed by Reiter (2003), and
applied by Jenkins et al. (2011), to calculate standard-errors and levels of significance,
taking into account the finite number of imputations.
5.8 Appendix C: An Optimal Tax Model with Tax
Morale
This section describes a Ramsey-type model to describe the relationship between tax
morale and tax rate.22 Income groups have heterogeneous levels of tax morale and max-
imize their utility with respect to their labor supply and evasion decisions. Governments
may tax different income groups differently. The optimal policy maximizes an objective
function which may be interpreted as a welfare function or a function reflecting politi-
cal influence. The optimal tax rates set by the government then depend, among other
things, on the level of tax morale of the different groups. Groups with a high level of tax
morale are taxed more heavily because, other things equal, their reported income reacts
less elastically to tax rate changes than the reported income of groups with lower tax
morale. While this explanation is intuitive, one should bear in mind that it is based on
the assumption that different income groups can be taxed independently of one another.
5.8.1 Households
Consider an economy with n groups of households, i = 1, ..., n. For simplicity, we nor-
malize group size to unity, i.e., there is one household representing each group. We model
tax morale as follows. We assume that households can evade taxes, but doing so gives
rise to a subjective cost. The cost function is given by the function β(ei,mi), where ei
is undeclared income of group i and mi is a parameter which captures differences in tax
22An alternative approach to modeling the relationship of interest is to incorporate tax morale in the
standard Mirrleesian model of optimal income taxation. The challenge with this approach is that the
resulting relationship between tax burdens and tax morale is ambiguous. This is yet another reason to
exploit the available data to examine the relationship between tax morale and tax rates.
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morale—the intrinsic motivation to honestly pay taxes—across groups. The cost func-
tion β(ei,mi) can be interpreted broadly as also including possible real costs of evading
or being detected and fined. The crucial point for our analysis is that it also includes
differences in tax morale.23 The utility function of household i is given by
ui = ci − α(li)− β(ei,mi), (5.4)
where ci is consumption, li is labor supply and α(li) is a strictly convex function which
represents the disutility of work. The assumption of quasi-linearity in consumption sim-
plifies notation by allowing us to abstract from income effects of taxation on labor supply
and evasion. We assume that the tax evasion cost function has the following properties:
Assumption 1: βe, βee > 0, βem > 0, βeem > 0.
Assumption 1 implies that the marginal cost of evading taxes is strictly convex in
the amount of evaded income ei. In addition, the marginal cost of undeclared income
is higher for households with higher tax morale (βem > 0) and this marginal cost also
increases more quickly (βeem > 0).
Following Feldstein (1999), it is convenient to express utility in terms of earned
income yi = liwi, where wi is the wage rate of household i and declared income di = yi−ei.
This yields for our utility function:
ui = ci − α( yi
wi
)− β(yi − di,mi). (5.5)
The household’s budget constraint is
ci = yi − tidi, (5.6)
where ti is the income tax rate. The household chooses earned income yi and declared
income di to maximize utility, subject to the budget constraint. This yields the following
first order conditions:
1− α1(y
∗
i
wi
) 1
wi
− βe(y∗i − d∗i ,mi) = 0, (5.7)
−ti + βe(y∗i − d∗i ,mi) = 0. (5.8)
Note that (5.7) and (5.8) implicitly define the household’s optimal choices, which
23Note that our approach can also be interpreted in terms of a ‘warm glow’ effect, i.e., the intrinsic
satisfaction of doing the right thing when complying with the tax law. Similar theoretical results can
also be derived from political economy models of rentier states or government capture, though yielding
different welfare implications.
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can be expressed by the functions y∗i (ti,mi), d∗i (ti,mi). For later use note that
∂di
∂ti
= −
[
1
βee
+ w
2
i
α11
]
< 0, ∂di
∂mi
= βem
βee
> 0. (5.9)
An increase in the tax rate on household i reduces declared income for two reasons.
Firstly, labor supply and, hence, earned income declines. Secondly, the higher tax rate
induce the household to declare a smaller part of the income earned, which means that
tax evasion increases. Moreover, declared income is increasing in the level of tax morale,
as one would expect.
5.8.2 The Government
The government finances a given revenue target R using a wage tax, which may differ
across household groups. The government budget constraint is given by
R =
∑
tidi. (5.10)
In the decision making process of the government, each group i is given a weight bi,
which is assumed to be independent of tax morale24 and may be interpreted either as a
welfare weight or as a parameter reflecting relative political influence. Given the optimal
choices of the households, the government maximizes the objective function
W =
∑
biui (5.11)
subject to (5.10).25 The optimal tax rate levied on group i is given by the formula
t∗i = −
(η − bi)
η
di
[
∂di
∂ti
]−1
, (5.12)
where η is the marginal cost of public funds. This formula implies that, for a given cost of
public funds, the optimal tax rate levied on household i is increasing in the household’s tax
morale parameter mi if βem > 0 (which implies ∂di/∂mi > 0) and βeem > 0, as assumed
above in assumption 1. The economic explanation is as follows. If βem > 0, a higher tax
24If the ‘social planner’ systematically attributed a higher weight to the wellbeing of groups with high
tax morale, or if these groups had more influence in the political process than other groups, this would
of course imply that high tax morale would not necessarily lead to higher tax burdens.
25This objective function implies that the government takes into account that some groups benefit
more from tax evasion than others because their tax morale is lower. In addition, the expected payment
of fines in case of detection represents redistribution from the taxpayer to the government (Chetty 2009).
One could argue that governments would rather maximize a function based on a group specific utility of
the type W =
∑
biu
∗
i where u∗i = ci−α( yiwi ). However, it is problematic to assume that the government
pursues objectives which are not based on individual utilities. In any case, it is easy to check that the
optimal tax policy would be the same.
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morale increases the tax base, holding everything else constant, so that it is optimal to
levy a higher tax rate on this group. βeem(ei,mi) > 0 implies that the decline in the tax
base caused by a higher tax rate is smaller for groups with higher tax morale. This is
because their marginal cost of evading taxes increases quickly as evasion increases. Both
effects imply that the elasticity of declared income with respect to the tax base declines
if tax morale increases. The presence of one of these effects is sufficient for the result
that a higher tax morale leads to a higher optimal tax rate. Clearly, this is well in line
with standard results of optimal income tax theory following Ramsey (1927) or Mirrlees
(1971): Groups with a higher responsiveness to taxation should be taxed lower than
groups with low levels of responsiveness, i.e., a low elasticity of taxable income. Hence,
our empirical analysis also provides an empirical verification of the inverse elasticity rule
of optimal taxation, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been tested for income
taxation before.
Note also that, by assuming separability between the disutility of work and the
subjective cost of evading taxes, we have assumed that tax morale does not affect the
elasticity of labor supply. Yet, group specific differences may also be driven by differences
in labor supply elasticities. We assume that tax morale and the elasticity of labor supply
are unrelated in our empirical analysis. While it is straightforward to generalize our model
in various aspects, we opt for a simple model which includes the features and channels
we can explore empirically. For instance, we do not build in detection probabilities
and penalties. We assume that these are implicitly captured in the model parameters on
evasion and tax morale. In principle, it would also be possible to construct a richer model,
which allows for tax avoidance (e.g., income shifting) in addition to evasion and that would
allow for sorting of individuals into tax brackets. As evasion implies a tax rate of zero
while avoidance or income shifting yields a positive (but smaller) tax rate, our main results
would not change in that case. A richer model could also consider the interplay of both
the evasion and labor supply margins (e.g., Pencavel 1979 and Doerrenberg and Duncan
2014b). The impact of tax morale on labor supply and evasion responses is ambiguous
in such a model. However, labor supply elasticities are typically rather small (Saez et al.
2012; Bargain et al. 2014). It is also worth noting that Simonovits (2011) builds on an
earlier version of our paper and extends our model by introducing redistributive concerns,
but does not derive different conclusions in his numerical simulations. Additionally,
Traxler (2010) allows tax morale to be endogenous and incorporates it into the seminal
tax evasion framework of Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
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III
Memberships International Institute of Public Finance, Society of Labor Economists, Verein fu¨r
Socialpolitik, European Economic Association
Non-Academic Professional Experience
2005-2009 Deutsche Bank Research, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt a.M. (Internship, 08—10.2009);
Ministry of Economics at the German Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate, Mainz
(Internship, 10.2007); State Parliament at the German Federal State North Rhine-
Westphalia, Duesseldorf (Internship, 07.2005—09.2005); School for Mentally Disabled
Children: Helen-Keller-Schule, Ratingen (Civilian Service, 09.2004—05.2005)
Miscellaneous
Languages
• German (native), English (fluent)
Computer
• Stata, MS Office, zTree, LATEX
Mannheim, August 11, 2014
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